State ex rel. Foot v. Bazille
| Decision Date | 29 December 1905 |
| Docket Number | 14,636 - (214) |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. JESSE FOOT v. EDMUND W. BAZILLE |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by the state from an order and judgment of the district court for Ramsey county, Orr, J., denying the application of the county treasurer for a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding Edmund W. Bazille, as judge of probate for that county, to appoint appraisers to value certain legacies and devises for the purpose of determining the amount of the inheritance tax imposed thereon by chapter 288, Laws 1905. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings
Case Followed.
Drew v. Tifft, 79 Minn. 175, 81 N.W. 830, 47 L.R.A. 525, 79 Am. St. Rep. 446, section 1, art. 9, of the state constitution as modified by the inheritance tax amendment followed and applied.
Act Valid.
Chapter 288, p. 427, Laws 1905, imposing a tax upon certain devises bequests, inheritances, and gifts, held a constitutional and valid legislative enactment.
Classification.
The classified and progressive features of the statute are in accordance with the general principles of the law on the subject of inheritance taxation, and authorized by the amended constitution.
Collateral and Lineal Descendants.
Whether a distinction should be made between collateral and lineal descendants is a matter of legislative discretion, and not a judicial question.
Ambiguities in Act.
Certain indefinite and ambiguous provisions of the statute above referred to considered in the light of the general rule that inaccurately drawn statutes will be construed to effectuate the intention of the legislature, and the statute held not inoperative or void for the ambiguities referred to.
Rule of Strict Construction.
The rule of strict construction, ordinarily applied to the operation and effect of a statute imposing a tax upon the citizen and to proceedings thereunder, does not apply to its interpretation.
Edward T. Young, Attorney General, for appellant.
How Butler & Mitchell, for respondent.
A. D. Smith, by consent of counsel, filed brief in behalf of interested parties.
Application was made to the court below, under the provisions of chapter 288, p. 427, Laws 1905, for a writ of mandamus commanding and requiring respondent, as judge of probate of Ramsey county, to appoint appraisers to ascertain the value of certain legacies and devises made by the last will and testament of Paul D. Ferguson, deceased, whose estate was being probated in his court, for the purpose of determining the amount of the inheritance tax imposed by that statute. The application was denied on the ground, in the opinion of the court below, that the statute referred to is unconstitutional and void. Relator appealed.
The sole question presented, aside from certain contentions respecting the interpretation of the statute, is its constitutionality. This statute represents the fourth attempt of our legislature to enact an inheritance tax law. It is, in essential respects, different from prior statutes on the subject, though the main purpose, an inheritance tax, is the same.
The first statute enacted was declared unconstitutional in Drew v. Tifft, 79 Minn. 175, 81 N.W. 839, 47 L.R.A. 525, 79 Am. St. Rep. 446, for the reason, among others, that real property was excluded from its operation, that it exempted certain corporations, prescribed a higher exemption to lineal than collateral heirs, and did not lay the tax upon the excess of the inheritance or devise above the exemption.
The second (Laws 1901, p. 402, c. 255) was held unconstitutional in State v. Bazille, 87 Minn. 500, 92 N.W. 415, 94 Am. St. Rep. 718, on the ground that it operated unequally as respects the exemption, in that the tax upon collateral heirs was laid on the whole inheritance when it exceeded $5,000, while as to lineals the tax was upon the excess over $5,000. The result was an unwarranted discrimination in the matter of exemption; none being allowed collateral heirs receiving over $5,000.
The third (Laws 1902, p. 43, c. 3) was declared void in State v. Harvey, 90 Minn. 180, 95 N.W. 764, for the reason that it imposed a tax of ten per cent., double that allowed by the constitution.
The Drew case involved a construction of the provisions of our state constitution authorizing this sort of a tax, and also the validity of the statute enacted under it; but the other two cases involved only the statutes there before the court, which were materially different from that now before us, and throw no particular light upon the questions in the case at bar, and are not in point. Upon the construction of the constitution the Drew case is in point, and, as will be presently seen, is decisive of the present case.
We first turn our attention to the contention of respondent respecting the interpretation of the statute. The rules governing courts on this subject are too familiar to require extended discussion or citation of authorities. It may be stated as a cardinal rule, supported by an unbroken line of authorities, that in cases of imperfectly drawn statutes the court, rather than pronounce them unconstitutional and void, will draw inferences from the evident intent of the legislature, as gathered from the whole statute, correcting by intendment technical inaccuracies in expression, and supplying obviously unintentional omissions, that they may be rendered operative and effectuate the legislative will. The rule was applied recently by this court in State v. Bates, 96 Minn. 110, 104 N.W. 709, a case involving the construction of a statute of far greater indefiniteness and uncertainty than the one in the case at bar, and where, to save the statute from total destruction, words which apparently rendered it nugatory and without effect were wholly eliminated therefrom.
The sole purpose of the rules of construction is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, and inartificially constructed statutes, containing ungrammatical expressions or inconsistent provisions, will, if not so vague and indefinite as to render them void for uncertainty, be reduced or extended by intendment to effectuate the legislative intent. State v. Board of Commrs, of Polk County, 87 Minn. 325, 92 N.W. 216; State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 281, 37 N.W. 782; Moody v. Stephenson, 1 Minn. 289 (401); Woodruff v. Town of Glendale, 26 Minn. 78, 1 N.W. 581; McGee v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Hennepin County, 84 Minn. 472, 481, 88 N.W. 6.
Though the statute under consideration is one imposing a tax upon a class of citizens, its interpretation is governed by the general rule just referred to. The rule of strict construction ordinarily applied to the operation and effect of such statutes, and to proceedings thereunder, does not apply. The statute must be given a fair and reasonable construction. State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 Minn. 13, 104 N.W. 567; Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264, 21 S.Ct. 611, 45 L.Ed. 853; In re Stewart, 131 N.Y. 274, 30 N.E. 184, 14 L.R.A. 836. With this rule in mind we will examine the various provisions of this statute in connection with the contentions of counsel for the respective parties. The statute is as follows:
Section 1. A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon all inheritances, devises, bequests, legacies and gifts of every kind and description, of any and all persons and corporations, the value of which exceeds $10,000, and upon such excess only.
Sec. 2. Such tax shall be computed upon the full and true value of such inheritance, devise, bequest, legacy or gift, above such excess, at the following rates, viz.:
1. When such valuation is over $10,000 and less than $50,000, the rate shall be one and one-half per cent. thereof.
2. When such valuation is $50,000 or over, and less than $100,000, the rate shall be three per cent. thereof.
3. When such valuation is $100,000 or over, the rate shall be five per cent. thereof.
The first paragraph of section 2 is rendered ambiguous by the use of the word "excess," immediately preceding the words "at the following rates"; but the use of that particular word in that connection was manifestly not intended, for, if full effect be given it, the whole statute is thereby rendered inoperative. The intention of the legislature, clearly disclosed by the first section, was to lay a tax upon all inheritances and devises in excess of an exemption of $10,000; but the provision now in question purports to lay the tax upon all sums above the excess. The excess being the only thing taxed, it is obvious that the word was inadvertently inserted in this connection. The word "exemption" expresses the undoubted intention of the legislature, and may be supplied by intendment. Properly construed, the section lays the tax upon all inheritances and devises in excess of an exemption of $10,000.
It is also urged that subdivision 1 of this section contains an arbitrary and unfair discrimination in favor of inheritances and devises amounting to less than $10,000, and such as to render the statute violative of the constitution. It will be observed that the statute divides the tax into three classes. The first class includes inheritances or devises between the sums of $10,000 and $50,000; the second, to sums between $50,000 and $100,000; and the third, those above $100,000. Respecting the first class the statute provides that the tax thereby imposed shall be computed upon the full value of the inheritance above the exemption It is contended that by the language here employed the statute creates an exemption of $20,000 to persons coming within the first class, receiving less...
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