State ex rel. Ford v. King County, 33328

• Decision Date: 25 November 1955
• Docket Number: No. 33328,33328
• Citation: 47 Wn.2d 911,290 P.2d 465
• Parties: The STATE of Washington on the relation of Virgil O. FORD and Joseph Z. Mann, Respondent, v. The COUNTY OF KING, State of Washington, James A. Gibbs, William Sears and Dean C. McLean, as Commissioners of the County of King, and Dayton A. Witten, as Manager of King County Airport, Appellants.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 911

47 Wn.2d 911

290 P.2d 465

The STATE of Washington on the relation of Virgil O. FORD and Joseph Z. Mann, Respondent, v. The COUNTY OF KING, State of Washington, James A. Gibbs, William Sears and Dean C. McLean, as Commissioners

of the County of King, and Dayton A.

Witten, as Manager of King

County Airport, Appellants.

No. 33328.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

Nov. 25, 1955.

Charles O. Carroll, V. D. Bradeson, Seattle, for appellants.

Wright & Wright, Seattle, for respondent.

DONWORTH, Justice.

This is a mandamus action brought by two former county employees against King county, its commissioners, and the manager of the county airport to compel their reinstatement as employees and to recover back pay. The trial court entered a judgment granting the relief prayed for, and the county and its officers have appealed.

There is no dispute as to the material facts. No error is assigned to the findings of fact. The errors claimed relate solely to seven conclusions of law entered by the trial court. These assignments of error raise one principal question of law, to wit, the proper interpretation and application of the veterans' preference act, RCW 73.16.010 and 73.16.015, to the facts of this case.

The two former county employees (herein referred to as respondents) are honorably discharged soldiers of the United States, having served during the first World War.

In 1947, the county inaugurated a fire and security protection force under Leo H. Smith, as chief security officer, to patrol the King county airport (Boeing Field). At that time, the force consisted of five men besides Smith. The number of persons so employed was later increased from six to twelve. One appellant was first employed in 1949, and the other in 1950. Both were dismissed, effective December, 31, 1953, when the force was reduced from twelve men to six in an economy move after a number of airlines had discontinued using the county airport.

The county's method of selecting the men to be retained and those to be dismissed is described in finding No. 5, as follows:

'* * * That of those discharged on December 31, 1953 three persons, including the relators, were veterans and three persons were non-veterans. That of those retained in employment on December 31, 1953 three were veterans and three were non-veterans. That all six retained employees were senior in service as firemen and patrolmen to the relators, all six retained persons having been employed in 1947, while the relator Ford was employed in 1949 and the relator Mann in 1950. That one discharged employee was discharged for health reasons, with the promise by the chief in charge of employment that upon restoration of his health he would be re-instated to displace one of the six retained employees, and that this discharged employee for health reasons was junior in point of service as Fireman and Patrolman to both relators, although he had been injured in county employment at another job at King County Airport. That the chief in charge of employment of firemen and patrolmen, acting under the authority of the respondent Witten, considered that in selecting the individuals to be retained and to be discharged he was applying principles of seniority in service.'

The veterans' preference act was originally enacted in 1895, Laws of 1895, chapter 84, § 1, and has, with certain minor amendments, been continuously in effect in this state for sixty years. As last amended, Laws of 1951, chapter 29, p. 59, the act now reads:

'Section 1. Section 73.16.010 of the Revised Code of Washington derived from section 1 of chapter 84 of the Laws of 1895 as last amended by section 1 of chapter 141 of the Laws of 1943 is hereby amended to read as follows:

'In every public department, and upon all public works of the state, and of any county thereof, honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines who are veterans of any war of the United States, or of any military campaign paign for which a campaign ribbon shall have been awarded, and their widows, shall be preferred for appointment and employment. Age, loss of limb, or other physical impairment, which does not in fact incapacitate, shall not be deemed to disqualify them, provided they possess the capacity necessary to discharge the duties of the position involved.

'Sec. 2. Any veteran entitled to the benefits of this act may enforce his rights hereunder by civil action in the courts.'

Parenthetically, the addition of section 2 was apparently prompted by our decision in State ex rel. Breslin v. Todd, 8 Wash.2d 482, 113 P.2d 315.

The basic language of the act providing that 'In every public department, and upon all public works of the state, and of any county thereof, honorably discharged' exservicemen designated therein 'shall be preferred for appointment and employment', provided they possess the capacity necessary to discharge the duties of the position involved, has appeared in each of the four amendments of the 1895 law.

Appellants' main contention that the trial court erred in holding that the act applied to respondents is founded on the theory that nonveteran employees had seniority rights to employment by the county, and that such rights are equivalent to an employee's status under the classified civil service laws or charter provisions. Numerous decisions of this and other courts of last resort are cited and analyzed which relate to such civil service situations.

We are unable to find that such decisions have any bearing on the problem before us, because the county has no civil service system. Appellants' witness, Smith, testified that the county could hire and discharge employees at will. Even in the absence of such...