STATE EX REL. FORESTRY, FIRE v. Tooele Co.

Decision Date18 January 2002
Docket NumberNo. 20000493.,20000493.
Citation44 P.3d 680,2002 UT 8
CourtUtah Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Utah, By and Through DIVISION OF FORESTRY, FIRE & STATE LANDS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TOOELE COUNTY, Utah; Six Mile Ranch Company; Craig S. Bleazard; Mark C. Bleazard; and John C. Bleazard, Defendants and Appellees.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Annina M. Mitchell, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Douglas J. Ahlstrom, Tooele, and George S. Young, Brent A. Bohman, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice.

¶ 1 The State of Utah, by and through its Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, appeals from a summary judgment order upholding Tooele County's vacation of its interests in a portion of West Stansbury Road near the Great Salt Lake. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In March 1993, following repeated vandalism to their respective properties on Stansbury Island,1 landowners Six Mile Ranch Company, Craig S. Bleazard, John C. Bleazard, and Mark C. Bleazard (collectively, "the Bleazards") petitioned Tooele County ("the County") to vacate its interests in the northern portion of the main access road to the area, West Stansbury Road. Subsequently, the County published notice of the Bleazards' petition to vacate West Stansbury Road in the local newspaper, the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin. This notice, which appeared in the Transcript-Bulletin once a week from May 18 to June 8, 1993, stated in pertinent part:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Tooele County Commission will conduct a public hearing [on] June 15, 1993, ... concerning a proposal to vacate approximately eight (8) miles of the northerly portion of the Tooele County road located along the West side of Stansbury Island. A petition from landowners whose property adjoins the majority of this County road was filed with Tooele County asking that this road be vacated. One land owner in the same area is not included in the petition for vacation and, therefore, the Tooele County Commission, pursuant to its own order, has included the remainder of the County road running through these properties for consideration to be vacated.
The legal description of the County road considered for vacation is as follows:
Commencing along the South line of Section 16, Township 1 North, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and continuing North through Sections 6, 9, 4 and 5 of the said Township and Range; and thence running through Sections 32, 29, 20, 21, 16 and 9 of Township 2 North, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

In addition to its notice in the Transcript-Bulletin, the County mailed written notice of the proposal to various property owners with land abutting West Stansbury Road, but it did not send written notice to the State of Utah ("the State").

¶ 3 Shortly thereafter, on June 15, 1993, the County held a public hearing concerning the Bleazards' petition. Approximately one month later, on August 17, 1993, the County enacted by a two-to-one vote Tooele County Ordinance 93-9, vacating the County's interest in West Stansbury Road pursuant to the description of the road published in the County's prior notice.

¶ 4 On June 11, 1999, the State filed suit in the Third District Court for Tooele County challenging the validity of Ordinance 93-9 pursuant to sections 27-12-102.3 and -102.4 of the Utah Code. Specifically, the State alleged that in adopting the ordinance, the County did not adhere to the notice requirements of section 27-12-102.4 because it did not mail the State written notice of the proposed vacation. At the time the County adopted Ordinance 93-9,2 section 27-12-102.4 provided:

No county road shall be ... vacated [pursuant to a landowner petition], unless notice of the pendency of the petition ... be given by publishing in a newspaper published or of general circulation in such county once a week for four consecutive weeks preceding action on such petition or intention, or, where no newspaper is published in the county by posting the notice in three public places therein for four consecutive weeks preceding such petition, and by mailing such notice to all owners of record of land abutting the county road proposed to be vacated addressed to the mailing addresses appearing on the rolls of the county assessor of the county wherein said land is located.

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp.1993). The State argued that it was entitled to notice under this provision because West Stansbury Road crossed and abutted sovereign lands located below the meander line3 of the Great Salt Lake, lands owned by the State since 1896 in conjunction with Utah's entry into the Union. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 12-13, 91 S.Ct. 1775, 29 L.Ed.2d 279 (1971).

¶ 5 Subsequently, on September 3, 1999, the State moved for summary judgment on the ground that the County had not complied with section 27-12-102.4's notice requirements. According to the State, section 27-12-102.4 required the County "to give notice by mail to abutting landowners in addition to publication in a newspaper or posting in three conspicuous places," and the County's failure to provide mailed notice rendered its vacation of the road null and void. In response, the County argued that the State was not entitled to mailed notice under section 27-12-102.4 because, according to the County, the State did not "appear [as an owner of record] on the rolls of the county assessor" and was not "an owner of record of land abutting the road to be vacated."

¶ 6 On December 15, 1999, the Bleazards filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In their motion, the Bleazards contended, among other things, that the County's failure to mail the State notice of its proposal to vacate West Stansbury Road was not fatal to Ordinance 93-9 because section 27-12-102.4 "only require[d] written notice when notice by publication is not available." The Bleazards further argued that the State "was not a landowner listed on the rolls of the County assessor," and thus, section 27-12-102.4 did not require the County to mail the State notice of the proposed vacation. Finally, the Bleazards asserted that even if section 27-12-102.4 required counties to provide mailed notice in addition to notice by publication, the State was not entitled to mailed notice because the County's interests in West Stansbury Road "terminate[d] nearly [one] half mile from the nearest sovereign land."

¶ 7 Following the parties' respective motions for summary judgment, the district court conducted a hearing to consider whether the County's failure to mail the State notice of the proposed vacation of West Stansbury Road was improper. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that although "a question of fact [existed] as to whether the road [reached] to the meander line . . . and whether the State [was] an abutting landowner" of the road, the County had complied with section 27-12-102.4 because publishing notice in the Transcript Bulletin was "sufficient" under the statute. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the County and the Bleazards in an order dated May 8, 2000. Interpreting section 27-12-102.4 to require either (1) notice by publication or (2) notice by posting and mailing, the court ruled: "[Section] XX-XX-XXX.4 did not require that written notice be provided to the abutting landowners when notice by publication has been made[.]" The court further held that even if section 27-12-102.4 mandated mailed written notice, the County was not required to send such notice to the State because "it was not an abutting property owner on the rolls of the Tooele County Assessor." The State now appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tooele County and the Bleazards.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also, e.g., Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 368 (Utah 1996)

. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we afford "no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); see also, e.g., Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ¶ 15, 13 P.3d 581. Likewise, a district court's interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that we review for correctness. Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT 76, ¶ 5, 31 P.3d 537; see also, e.g., Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997).

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, the State raises two issues. First, the State argues that the district court erroneously interpreted section 27-12-102.4 of the Utah Code by (1) construing the provision as requiring counties to send abutting landowners mailed notice of a proposed road vacation only when notice by publication is not available, and by (2) reading the provision as requiring counties to send mailed notice to parties who own abutting land only if that ownership is recorded on the rolls of the county assessor. Second, the State contends that the court erred by refusing to grant summary judgment in the State's favor because, under a proper interpretation of section 27-12-102.4, counties are required to provide abutting landowners mailed notice of a proposed vacation, and the County failed to serve the State with such notice. We address each issue in turn.

I. MAILED NOTICE

¶ 10 When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince "the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). To discern the legislature's intent and purpose, we look first to the "best evidence" of a statute's meaning, the plain language of the act. Id.; see also, e.g., City of Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, ¶ 36, 28 P.3d 697

; Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24...

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