State ex rel. Frazier v. Hrko

• Decision Date: 07 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. 25136.,25136.
• Citation: 510 S.E.2d 486,203 W.Va. 652
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, ex rel. Robert FRAZIER and Lindy Lee Frazier, By Robert Frazier, her next friend, Petitioners, v. The Honorable John HRKO, Judge of the Circuit Court of Wyoming County, West Virginia; Eastern Associated Coal Corporation, a West Virginia Corporation; Pocahontas Land Corporation, a Foreign Corporation; Chris Cline, individually and as president of Pioneer Fuel Corporation; Pioneer Fuel Corporation, a West Virginia corporation; Top Flite Coal Company, Inc., a West Virginia corporation; and Justin Construction Company, a West Virginia corporation, Respondents.

510 S.E.2d 486

203 W.Va. 652

STATE of West Virginia, ex rel. Robert FRAZIER and Lindy Lee Frazier, By Robert Frazier, her next friend, Petitioners, v. The Honorable John HRKO, Judge of the Circuit Court of Wyoming County, West Virginia; Eastern Associated Coal Corporation, a West Virginia Corporation; Pocahontas Land Corporation, a Foreign Corporation; Chris Cline, individually and as president of Pioneer Fuel Corporation; Pioneer Fuel Corporation, a West Virginia corporation; Top Flite Coal Company, Inc., a West Virginia corporation; and Justin Construction Company, a West Virginia corporation, Respondents.

No. 25136.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted September 8, 1998.

Decided December 7, 1998.

Stuart Calwell, Esq., Mary McQuain, Esq., Calwell & McCormick, Tom Wilson, Esq., Wilson Law Offices, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Petitioner.

Scott W. Andrews, Esq., Offutt, Fisher & Nord, Huntington, West Virginia, Attorney for Respondent Top Flite Coal Company, Inc.

Donald O'Dell, Esq., Lamp, O'Dell, Bartram, Entsminger, Levy & Trautwein, Huntington, West Virginia, Attorney for Respondent Pioneer Fuel Corporation.

William R. Slicer, Esq., Shuman, Annand & Poe, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for Respondent Eastern Associated Coal Corporation.

STARCHER, Justice:

This petition for a writ of prohibition arises from a lawsuit in which the petitioner, Robert Frazier, alleged he was injured on the job through the negligence of his employer, a company (or possibly two companies) that had been declared in default of the employer's obligations under the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"). Under the Act, if an employer fails to abide by certain statutory requirements, then the employer forfeits any protections provided by the Act, may be subjected to common-law liability, and is prohibited from relying on any common-law defenses.

The petition raises the following question: may a trial court submit to a jury the question of whether an employer is in default of its obligations under the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act in a personal injury lawsuit, when the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Commissioner has previously issued an order finding the employer to be in default? We hold that when an employer is declared to be in default of its workers' compensation obligations by the Commissioner, the Commissioner's ruling cannot be collaterally attacked and is binding in subsequent proceedings considering the same issue.

As set forth below, we grant the petitioner a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from submitting the question of the petitioner's employer's default to the jury.

I. Facts and Background

The respondents in this case are Pioneer Fuel Corporation ("Pioneer") and Top Flite Coal Company, Inc. ("Top Flite"). The petitioner argues that in February 1989, both companies were owned by, and under the direction and control of, Chris Cline.¹ The respondents contend that Pioneer leased coal mining rights at the Edna Ruth Mine # 1 in Wyoming County, West Virginia, and that Pioneer then contracted with Top Flite to perform the work of extracting the coal.

The petitioner alleges in his petition that in February 1989 he was employed by both Pioneer and Top Flite. On February 22, 1989, the petitioner was operating a bulldozer at the Edna Ruth Mine # 1—at night in rainy, foggy conditions, and next to a highwall. An earth slide occurred. Rocks, mud, and debris fell off the highwall and onto the cab of the bulldozer. The petitioner was severely injured and incurred over $28,000 in medical bills.

Shortly after the accident, the petitioner filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The claim form submitted by the petitioner contains a section that was "to be completed by the employer." That section indicates that Pioneer was the petitioner's employer. On March 3, 1989, the petitioner's claim was ruled compensable by the Commissioner, and the ruling notes that Pioneer was the petitioner's employer. Pioneer did not appeal the Commissioner's ruling.

On January 8, 1990, a representative for Pioneer mailed a letter to the Commissioner saying that the petitioner "entered the wrong employer on his original" claim form and that the incorrect information was accidentally duplicated by the employer's representative who completed the employer's portion of the form, and asked that the Commissioner note that the "correct employer is Top Flite Coal Company, Inc." The Commissioner subsequently entered an order finding that respondent Top Flite was the correct employer. Top Flite similarly did not appeal this ruling.

In February 1991, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Wyoming County seeking damages from respondents Pioneer and Top Flite (and from numerous other defendants that have since settled). The complaint alleged various theories in tort.² In the complaint, the petitioner alleged that he was only employed by Top Flite, and that he was injured through the deliberate intent of his employer. See W.Va. Code, 23-4-2 [1994], infra at note 4.³ Pioneer and Top Flite filed a consolidated answer to the complaint, and asserted that Top Flite was entitled to the immunity from liability provided to employers who contribute to the Workers' Compensation Fund. See W.Va. Code, 23-2-6 [1991], infra section III.

The petitioner alleges that Pioneer and Top Flite failed to respond to discovery requests concerning whether they were in "good standing" with the Workers' Compensation Fund. Shortly before the May 11, 1998 trial date, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request,⁴ the petitioner received documents from the Workers' Compensation Division indicating that Top Flite was in default of its obligations under the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act at the time of the petitioner's work-related injury.

Upon receiving the documents, on May 7, 1998 (4 days before trial) the petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment on two issues. First, the petitioner sought an order declaring that because Top Flite was default of its statutory obligations under the Act, Top Flite was not entitled to assert the immunity provided by the Act. Second, the plaintiff sought an order, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 23-2-8 [1991] that would prohibit Top Flite from asserting three common-law defenses at trial: comparative negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine.

On the first day of trial, the petitioner advised the trial court that the Commissioner had issued orders declaring that both Top Flite and Pioneer were in default to the Workers' Compensation Fund on the date the petitioner was injured, and presented the court with evidence from the Workers' Compensation Division supporting this contention.⁵ The petitioner argued that he intended to present a "simple" negligence case against both Pioneer and Top Flite, and argued that he would not present any evidence that either company acted with the statutorily-defined "deliberate intent" in causing his injuries. The petitioner asked that the trial court grant a partial summary judgment against both Pioneer and Top Flite and prohibit both companies from relying upon the workers' compensation immunity provision and from asserting the aforementioned common-law defenses.

The petitioner asserted that whether the respondents were in default of their obligations under the Act was a question of law. The petitioner also asserted that the issue of default should not be presented to the jury because to do so would place upon the petitioner the burden of proving both a negligence action and a deliberate intent action at the same time.⁶

The trial court denied the motion for partial summary judgment and required the petitioner to prove workers' compensation default to the jury as a question of fact.⁷

The petitioner then sought the instant writ of prohibition from this Court.

II. Standard of Review

We must first determine whether prohibition is appropriate in the instant case. "The rationale behind a writ of prohibition is that by issuing certain orders the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction, thus making prohibition appropriate." State ex rel. Allen v. Bedell, 193 W.Va. 32, 36, 454 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1994) (Cleckley, J., concurring). As such, "writs of prohibition ... provide a drastic remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." 193 W.Va. at 37, 454 S.E.2d at 82. More specifically,

... this Court will use prohibition ... to correct only substantial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in contravention of a clear statutory, constitutional, or common law mandate which may be resolved independently of any disputed facts and only in cases where there is a high probability that the trial will be completely reversed if the error is not corrected in advance.

Syllabus Point 1, in part, Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979).

There are five factors that this Court will consider in determining whether to issue a writ of prohibition:

In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all...