State ex rel. Gareau v. Stillman, 69-251
| Decision Date | 30 April 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 69-251,69-251 |
| Parties | , 47 O.O.2d 187 The STATE ex rel. GAREAU, v. STILLMAN et al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Michael R. Gareau, North Olmsted, for relator.
John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and John L. Dowling, Cleveland for respondents.
The controversy in this case revolves around the meaning of the phrase 'calendar year' as used in Section 3513.191, Revised Code.
It is relator's contention that such phrase has a well-defined and customary meaning of from January 1 to December 31.
Respondents urge that such phrase merely means the passage of 365 days. Respondents argue that a liberal construction should be given to such phrase to enable persons to become candidates for public office.
It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words in a statute should be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning, and be given the meaning ordinarily attributed to them unless a different intention appears in the statute. See 50 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 156, Statutory Construction, Section 181.
The words 'calendar year' are commonly and ordinarily accepted as meaning the period of time from January 1 through December 31. People ex rel. Shaklee v. Milan, 89 Colo, 556, 5 P.2d 249; Metzer v. Connally Realty Co., 75 Ga.App. 274, 43 S.E.2d 169; Newman v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 31 N.J. 279, 157 A.2d 314; State v. Van Gunten, 84 Ohio St. 172, 95 N.E. 664.
In construing any legislative enactment, consideration of the legislative proceedings is helpful in determining the meaning and purpose of the act.
The legislative proceedings in relation to Section 3513.191, Revised Code, show that it was enacted in its present form in 1955. As originally introduced this section read, in part, as follows: '* * * he voted as a member of a different political party within the next preceding two years.' However, the Ohio Senate Journal (Volume 126, page 277) shows that the bill was amended in the Senate by inserting the word 'calendar.' The two-year period was later amended in the same bill to four years.
Thus, in the instant case an examination of the legislative history of the section clearly shows that the General Assembly knowingly and intentionally used the words 'calendar year' in this section.
It is obvious that the amendment in the Senate must have been made with a purpose. The only purpose of changing the general word 'year,' which means a period of 365 days and which is susceptible of different...
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...so far as the specific points on the calendar at which a “year” can be said to begin and end. See State ex rel. Gareau v. Stillman, 18 Ohio St.2d 63, 247 N.E.2d 461, 462 (1969) (when used with reference to “a period of 365 days,” the “word ‘year’ ... is susceptible of different meanings so ......
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