State ex rel. General Refractories Co. v. Industrial Com'n of Ohio

• Decision Date: 05 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-392,88-392
• Citation: 541 N.E.2d 52,44 Ohio St.3d 82
• Parties: The STATE, ex rel. GENERAL REFRACTORIES COMPANY, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 82

44 Ohio St.3d 82

541 N.E.2d 52

The STATE, ex rel. GENERAL REFRACTORIES COMPANY, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO et al., Appellees.

No. 88-392.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted April 4, 1989.

Decided July 5, 1989.

Syllabus by the Court

The filing of an application for allowance of an additional condition supported by evidence which contemplates the payment of workers' compensation benefits meets the requirement of an application for compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.52.

On or about December 1, 1981, appellee-claimant, Eugene Smith, was injured in the course of and arising out of his employment with appellant, General Refractories Company, a self-insured employer. His workers' compensation claim was recognized for "left inguinal strain."

On March 23, 1982, Dr. A.S. Miller, appellee's physician, submitted a report to appellant indicating that appellee has "[a]septic necrosis right femoral head [hereinafter 'necrosis']." He indicated that the necrosis may be due to the industrial injury of December 1, 1981, and would prevent appellee from returning to work until approximately May 3, 1982. In a May 4, 1982 letter to appellee, appellant acknowledged receipt of Dr. Miller's report and stated that it was unable to pay workers' compensation benefits because necrosis was a nonallowed condition.

On June 23, 1983, ostensibly in response to appellant's denial of his claim for the necrosis condition, appellee filed a motion with the Industrial Commission, which read in pertinent part:

"Now comes claimant by and through his attorney and moves that his claim be additionally allowed for Aseptic Necrosis right Femoral Head and for cause submits the report of Dr. A.S. Miller, D.O., dated May 6, 1982 and April 20, 1982. Claimant asks that this claim be set for hearing."

After a hearing, the commission's district officer allowed the claim. The regional board of review affirmed.

On May 15, 1985, appellee filed another motion with the commission requesting that he be awarded compensation for temporary total disability from March 16, 1982 through August 15, 1985. The hearing officer conducted a hearing and issued the following order:

"This claim was previously allowed for: Left inguinal strain; aseptic right femoral head.

"The District Hearing Officer allows claimant's C-86 filed 5/15/85. The District Hearing Officer finds claimant's C-86 filed 6/23/83 for additional allowance of aseptic necrosis right femoral head is construed as an application for compensation for the period 3/1/82 to 4/15/83.

"Temporary total compensation is ordered paid from 3/16/82 through 8/4/85 inclusive, based upon the reports of Dr. Miller, Dr. Baker, and Greenville Hospital.

"Temporary total compensation 8/5/85 to the present and continuing is denied based upon the 8/5/85 report of Dr. Dominic, Industrial Commission physician, who states claimant can return to his former position of employment as a greenbrick setter."

The regional board of review and the commission affirmed.

Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, contending that the commission abused its discretion by awarding appellee temporary total disability compensation for a back period in excess of the two-year period prior to May 15, 1985 in contravention of R.C. 4123.52. Appellant alleged that appellee did not file his application for award of temporary total disability compensation until May 15, 1985 and therefore is not entitled to compensation for the period March 16, 1982 to May 15, 1983. The court of appeals denied the writ.

Appellant appeals to this court as a matter of right.

Arter & Hadden, Douglas M. Bricker and Michael L. Maxfield, Columbus, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Merl H. Wayman, Columbus, for appellee Industrial Commission.

Robert J. Perry & Associates and Joseph C. Mastrangelo, Columbus, for appellee-claimant.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

The sole issue before this court is whether appellee-claimant's motion of June 23, 1983 for allowance of an additional condition of "[a]septic necrosis right femoral head" could be construed as an application for compensation within the meaning of R.C. 4123.52.

R.C. 4123.52 provides in pertinent part:

"The jurisdiction of the industrial commission over each case shall be continuing, and the commission may make such modification or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is justified. * * * [T]he commission shall not make any such modification, change, finding, or award which shall award compensation for a back period in excess of two years prior to the date of filing application therefor."

" * * * The purposes of * * * [the] statutory limitation on the prosecution of compensation claims are that such claims be prosecuted promptly * * * while the facts are available; and that the ultimate liability under such claims be established promptly so that it may be enforced by the * * * [Industrial Commission] for the benefit of the fund." State, ex rel. Hammond, v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 144 Ohio St. 477, 481-482, 30 O.O. 100, 101-102, 59 N.E.2d 745, 746-747. With the statutory provision and its purpose in mind, we now turn to the question posed.

Appellant contends that the June 23, 1983 motion may not be construed as an application for compensation within the purview of R.C. 4123.52 because appellee-claimant did not make a request therefor. R.C. 4123.52 does not state how an application for compensation must be made. The fact that the application in question did not expressly request compensation is not conclusive of whether it was for compensation. The character of the application is to be determined not only from its contents, but also from the nature of the relief sought and how the parties treated the application. See Nichols v. Ohio Collieries Co. (1944), 75 Ohio App. 474, 31 O.O. 278, 62 N.E.2d 636. This view accords with statutory dictates and this court's long-established position of giving a liberal interpretation to the Workers' Compensation Act in...