State ex rel. Gneckow v. Hostetter

• Decision Date: 05 June 1937
• Docket Number: 35364
• Citation: 105 S.W.2d 928,340 Mo. 1177
• Parties: State of Missouri at the relation of Cora M. Griffin Gneckow, Relator, v. Jefferson D. Hostetter, William Dee Becker and Edward J. McCullen, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

105 S.W.2d 928

340 Mo. 1177

State of Missouri at the relation of Cora M. Griffin Gneckow, Relator, v. Jefferson D. Hostetter, William Dee Becker and Edward J. McCullen, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals

No. 35364

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 5, 1937

Opinion quashed.

J M. Massengill and John P. Griffin for relator.

(1) The scope of the writ of certiorari to review the decisions of an appellate court is limited to the finding of a conflict between the Court of Appeals' opinion and the last controlling opinion of this court on the subject, so as to secure uniformity and harmony in the law, and this court will examine any pleading, instruction or contract referred to in the opinion. State ex rel. Kroger Gro. & Bak. v Haid, 323 Mo. 9, 18 S.W.2d 480; State ex rel. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 282 S.W. 48. (2) The respondents' opinion approving the holding that the testimony of Kirk, the administrator, and W. R. Griffin brother of the insured, and F. B. Rauch, a creditor of the estate, of what the insured said to them during his lifetime about his opinion of the divorce and the effect of it, and that the relator had no interest in his property, and that he was under no obligation to her, was hearsay and self-serving declarations, and the opinion is in conflict with the last controlling decisions of this court in holding this testimony admissible. Baker v. Keet-Rountree D. G. Co., 318 Mo. 969, 2 S.W.2d 741; Pursifull v. Pursifull, 257 S.W. 118; Townsend v. Schaden, 275 Mo. 244, 204 S.W. 1076; Littig v. Urbauer-Atwood Heating Co., 292 Mo. 226, 237 S.W. 785; McFarland v. Bishop, 282 Mo. 551, 222 S.W. 147; O'Day v. Annex Realty Co., 191 S.W. 46. (3) Oral evidence was not admissible to contradict the written policy, and the approval of this testimony is contrary to and in conflict with the ruling of this court. Standard Fire Proofing Co. v. St. Louis E. M. Fire Proofing Co., 177 Mo. 559, 76 S.W. 1010. (4) The decree of divorce was objected to by the relator because it did not refer to this insurance or any insurance, and did not have any effect on this insurance, and there was no evidence as the respondents' opinion stated as to a change of the beneficiary from the relator; and in addition to not being admissible the hearsay testimony of the witnesses or the self-serving declarations of what the insured thought the effect of the decree was, which is approved by respondents' opinion could not estop the relator to claim the proceeds of this insurance, and the decision is in conflict with the controlling decisions of this court on this point. Sutton v. Dameron, 100 Mo. 150, 13 S.W. 500; Noell v. Remmert, 326 Mo. 148, 30 S.W.2d 1015.

Blanton & Montgomery for respondents.

(1) This suit is in equity since under a bill of interpleader. Harris Banking Co. v. Miller, 190 Mo. 659, 89 S.W. 629; Blood v. Woodmen of the World, 140 Mo.App. 542, 120 S.W. 700; Taylor v. Perkins, 171 Mo.App. 248, 157 S.W. 122; Brown v. Curtin, 52 S.W.2d 392, 330 Mo. 1156. (2) Equity cases are tried de novo on appeal, and appellate courts rarely ever reverse a case because of improper ruling on the admission of evidence but exclude all testimony improperly admitted and make their findings considering only the competent evidence. Badaracco v. Badaracco, 202 S.W. 374; Nordquist v. Nordquist, 14 S.W.2d 588, 321 Mo. 1244; Jacks v. Link, 236 S.W. 11, 291 Mo. 282; Blackiston v. Russell, 44 S.W.2d 27, 328 Mo. 1164; Lanphere v. Affeld, 99 S.W.2d 39. (3) The Supreme Court will not quash an opinion of the Court of Appeals in the absence of an affirmative showing that the Court of Appeals followed a contrary principle of law, or a similar state of facts. State ex rel. v. Haid, 61 S.W.2d 955; State ex rel. v. Trimble, 279 S.W. 65, 312 Mo. 322; State ex rel. v. Cox, 46 S.W.2d 851, 329 Mo. 292; State ex rel. v. Trimble, 12 S.W.2d 730, 321 Mo. 671; State ex rel. v. Haid, 37 S.W.2d 438, 327 Mo. 217; State ex rel. v. Trimble, 62 S.W.2d 758, 333 Mo. 207. (4) The Courts of Appeal are not bound by obiter remarks of the Supreme Court, but only by rulings of said court on matters in issue before it for decision. City of Mountain View v. Farmers Tel. Co., 243 S.W. 157, 294 Mo. 623; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 145 S.W. 803, 241 Mo. 231; State ex rel. v. Higbee, 43 S.W.2d 831, 328 Mo. 1066; State ex rel. v. Insurance Co., 80 S.W.2d 882, 336 Mo. 406.

OPINION

Gantt, J.

Original action in certiorari. Relator seeks to have quashed respondents' opinion in Cora M. Griffin Gneckow v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. In that case plaintiff (relator here) sought to recover on defendant's policy on the life of her former husband, Edward L. Griffin. She is named as beneficiary in the policy.

It was ordered that the amount due on the policy be paid into court. The order was made under a bill of interpleader filed by defendant company in which it alleged that both plaintiff and the administrator of the estate of Edward L. Griffin, deceased, claimed the insurance. The defendant company complied with said order and claimants interpleaded, each claiming said insurance.

The policy was issued on June 20, 1916, and plaintiff was named as beneficiary. On October 6, 1926, plaintiff was divorced from insured. The decree embodied a property settlement between plaintiff and her husband, the insured. The administrator contended that the property settlement revoked the name of plaintiff as beneficiary in the policy; that plaintiff having accepted property under the settlement was estopped to claim the insurance; and that on the death of Edward L. Griffin, April 23, 1933, the insurance became payable to his estate. Plaintiff contended that in granting the divorce the court was without jurisdiction to decree to her specific property; that the insurance was not property in the sense mentioned in said decree, and that on the death of said Griffin the insurance became payable to her as beneficiary under the policy.

Over plaintiff's objections, the chancellor below permitted witnesses to testify that after the divorce the insured said that the divorce decree was a complete settlement of all property rights between plaintiff and himself, including all...