State Ex Rel. Goodwin v. Milburn
| Decision Date | 21 January 1935 |
| Citation | 158 So. 884,118 Fla. 211 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. GOODWIN v. MILBURN, Chief of Police. |
Error to Circuit Court, Palm Beach County; C. E. Chillingworth Judge.
Habeas corpus proceeding by the State, on the relation of Earnest Goodwin, against Robert W. Milburn, as Chief of Police of the District of West Palm Beach. Judgment remanding petitioner to the custody of Robert W. Miburn, and the petitioner brings error.
Affirmed.
Elmore Cohen, of West Palm Beach, for plaintiff in error.
Paul W Potter, of West Palm Beach, for defendant in error.
This case is before us on writ of error to a judgment of the circuit court of Palm Beach county in habeas corpus proceeding wherein the petitioner in the court below plaintiff in error here, was remanded to the custody of the chief of police of the district of West Palm Beach under a judgment of conviction of the municipal court for the violation of an ordinance fixing a license tax of $25 on each and every bus, taxicab, automobile for hire, or jitney not licensed to do business by the State Railroad Commission and which operates over the streets, avenues or boulevards of said city.
This ordinance was enacted by the city commission on the 27th day of September, 1933, and under the charter of the city it is provided that ordinances, such as the one here under consideration, should go into effect ten days after being enacted. There was another ordinance of the city enacted on September 20, 1933, which imposed a license tax of $25 for each company engaged in the business of transporting passengers for hire and wholly within the city. New it appears that the second ordinance taken in pari materia with the first provided one license tax of $25 per annum for any person, firm, or corporation to engage in the business of transporting passengers and an additional license tax of $25 for each vehicle used in such business.
There are two objections raised to the ordinance. The first is that these two ordinances constitute double taxation. This contention is apparently not seriously relied upon or contended for, and we think it is without merit.
The other contention is that this ordinance has never become an ordinance of the district of West Palm Beach because it was enacted by the city commission of the city of West Palm Beach only three days prior to the date upon which the statute abolishing the municipality of West Palm Beach became effective and the same statute creating the district of West Palm Beach became effective October 1, 1933, and no ordinance of the city of West Palm Beach under the terms of the charter of 1923 became effective until ten days after the enactment of the ordinance.
By chapter 16759, Special Acts of 1933, the governmental powers and functions of the old city of West Palm Beach were vested in the district of West Palm Beach thereby created, and sections 62 and 75 of the act gave the same power to impose taxes on business, professions, and occupations, and the power to regulate motor vehicles, hacks, liveries, and other vehicles used or operated as had been vested in the city of West Palm Beach by the provisions of sections 60 and 76 of the Charter Act, chapter 9945, Special Acts of 1923.
Section 149 of chapter 16759, supra, provided as follows:
Section 152 of chapter 16759, supra, provided as follows:
'This Act shall not become effective unless this Act together with its companion bill to abolish the City of West Palm Beach and to create a new municipality of West Palm Beach also be approved by a majority of the registered and qualified electors of the District of West Palm Beach, in Palm Beach County, Florida, actually voting at the election to be held as hereinafter provided; that this Act shall be approved or disapproved as a whole, and shall, if approved, become effective on the first day of October, A. D. 1933.'
That the charter act, supra, became effectice October 1, 1933, is not challenged.
On October 2, 1933, an ordinance was adopted by the lawmaking municipal authority which provides, as pleaded, in part as follows:
It is possible that the ordinance of October 2d last above quoted was not sufficient to include the ordinance here under attack because that ordinance had not then become an ordinance in effect.
The ordinance imposing license tax of $25 upon every bus, taxicab, automobile for hire, or jitney which is not licensed to do business by the State Railroad Commission, and which operates over and upon the streets, avenues, and boulevards of said city, was ordinance No. 275. As heretofore stated, it was enacted on September 27, 1933. Therefore, it was at the date when chapter 16759 became effective an ordinance of the city of West Palm Beach, though it had not then become effective by the running of the period of ten days which was required by the charter to intervene between the date of enactment and the date when such ordinances should become effective.
It is contended that only those ordinances which were effective prior to the date when chapter 16759 was enacted constituted the ordinances of the city of West Palm Beach which became ordinances by operation of section 149 of chapter 16759.
We do not think this contention is tenable. It was the intent, purpose, and accomplishment of the legislative act to carry into as operative under the charter of the district of West Palm Beach all ordinances which had been enacted and stood as ordinances of the city of West Palm Beach when the charter of the district of West Palm Beach should become effective and operative with the same force and effect as they would have continued to be ordinances of the city of West Palm Beach, had the change in name and charter not been enacted by the Legislature.
In State v. City of Miami, 101 Fla. 292, 134 So. 608, 609, we said:
'It is first contended that series T and V should not have been validated because the bonds they were designed to refund were issued subsequent to the enactment of chapter 11855, Acts of 1927.
'This contention is bottomed on the claim that chapter 11855, Acts of 1927, has no prospective effect and authorizes the refunding of no indebtedness, other than that in esse at the date of the passage of that act. It is true that section one of chapter 11855, after enumerating the governmental entities that may refund and the...
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