State ex rel. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Indus. Comm., 2006 Ohio 1526 (OH 3/30/2006)
| Decision Date | 30 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05AP-116.,05AP-116. |
| Citation | 2006 Ohio 1526 |
| Parties | State of Ohio ex rel., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Relator, v. Ronald D. Salmons and Industrial Commission of Ohio, Respondents. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Timothy L. Zix, Lawrence C. Davison and Kristi J. Kmetz, for relator.
Stephen E. Mindzak Law Offices, L.L.C., and Stephen E. Mindzak, for respondent Ronald D. Salmons.
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Dennis H. Behm, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
DECISION
{¶1} Relator, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, commenced this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order which granted temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation to respondent Ronald D. Salmons ("claimant") and ordering the commission to find that he is not entitled to that compensation.
{¶2} This court referred the matter to a magistrate of this court, pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Attached as Appendix A.) The magistrate concluded that the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that claimant was entitled to a period of TTD compensation following the cervical surgery. The magistrate accordingly recommended that this court deny the requested writ. Relator has filed four objections to the magistrate's decision, and the matter is now before this court for a full, independent review.
{¶3} Under its first three objections, relator essentially reasserts arguments that were adequately addressed by the magistrate. These arguments relate to the possible preclusive effect of claimant's inability to work at the time of the disabling event on his ability to receive TTD compensation. Simply stated, relator, relying at least in part upon State ex rel. Eckerly v. Indus. Comm., 105 Ohio St.3d 428, 2005-Ohio-2587, maintains that claimant was ineligible for TTD compensation because he was not working at the time of the disabling event, and any decision to the contrary is erroneous. In her decision, the magistrate succinctly analyzed the relationship between claimant's entitlement to TTD compensation for the cervical condition and the existence of the knee injury, which had prevented claimant from working.
{¶4} In addition, relator disagrees with the magistrate's statement that claimant had a "job" at the time of the disabling event. Relator also states that the issue "is whether the allowed conditions have caused him to be unable to work, and thus lose wages, not whether Mr. Salmon remains nominally on some employment roll." (Relator's Objections, at 7; emphasis sic.) Certainly, under the facts of this case, claimant's precise work status at the time of his cervical surgery does not necessarily fit into an easily defined category. Nonetheless, at the time of the surgery, claimant had not voluntarily abandoned his employment; he had not been working because of his debilitating knee injury. For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in the magistrate's decision, we do not find relator's first three objections to be persuasive.
{¶5} By its fourth objection, relator argues that the magistrate failed to address the issue it raised as to whether the staff hearing officer ("SHO") abused his discretion in not addressing all administratively raised issues. Relator characterizes the "primary issue before the SHO" as "whether Mr. Salmon's neck surgery proximately caused him to be unable to work, and thus lose wages, when he was not working at the time of the disabling event." (Relator's Objections, at 8.)
{¶6} We observe that the SHO addressed claimant's knee condition in his order awarding TTD compensation for the allowed condition. The SHO determined that "necessity for the surgical revision of the allowed cervical condition, the 11/14/2003 cervical laminectomy, and the period of convalescence therefrom constitute a new and distinct period of disability" and "that the same is totally disabling by any definition and distinguishable from and irrespective of any concurrent disability arising from any other condition." (SHO Order, at 2.) "Any other condition" would necessarily include claimant's knee injury. Even though the commission may not have framed and resolved the issues in this matter as relator desired, we find that the SHO order provided a sufficient explanation of the basis for the decision. Accordingly, we find relator's fourth objection to be unpersuasive.
{¶7} Following our independent review of this matter, we find that the magistrate has properly discerned the pertinent facts and applied the relevant law to those facts. Thus, we overrule relator's objections, and adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. In accordance with the magistrate's decision, we deny the requested writ of mandamus.
Objections overruled; writ denied.
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
Rendered on July 27, 2005.
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Timothy L. Zix, Lawrence C. Davison and Kristi J. Kmetz, for relator.
Stephen E. Mindzak Law Offices, L.L.C., and Stephen E. Mindzak, for respondent Ronald D. Salmons.
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Dennis H. Behm, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
{¶8} Relator, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, has filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order which granted temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation to respondent Ronald D. Salmons ("claimant") and ordering the commission to find that he is not entitled to that compensation. Findings of Fact:
{¶9} 1. On January 22, 1992, claimant sustained an injury in the course of and arising out of his employment with relator herein. Claimant's claim has been allowed for the following conditions: "cervical strain; cervical spinal stenosis; cervical foraminal stenosis; disc protrusion C5-6," and "cervical radiculopathy."
{¶10} 2. Claimant returned to work with relator and continued to work until his voluntary retirement on July 1, 1997.
{¶11} 3. The very next day, claimant took a new job with a different employer.
{¶12} 4. On February 14, 2000, claimant sustained a knee injury in the course of and arising out of his employment with his new employer and filed a workers' compensation claim. Claimant has not returned to work since his knee injury.
{¶13} 5. On November 13, 2003, claimant underwent surgical revision surgery for the surgical injury he sustained with relator herein.
{¶14} 6. On January 20, 2004, claimant filed a motion requesting the payment of TTD compensation following the surgery to his neck. Claimant's motion was supported by a C-84 from his treating physician Dr. Robert Nixon, as well as the December 3, 2003 report from Dr. Nixon indicating as follows:
* * * He has been unable to return to work since June of 2000.
I anticipate he will need a full 3 months for healing. His job requires him to walk, climb ladders, and work at heights. He is also off of work due to a knee injury. I will see him back in the office in two months, at which time I anticipate advancing him to a formal physical therapy program. We will complete a C84 to keep him off an additional three months. * * * {¶15} 7. Claimant's application was heard before a district hearing officer ("DHO") on March 1, 2004. The DHO concluded that claimant's July 1, 1997 retirement from relator herein was not a bar to his receipt of TTD compensation because claimant returned to work for a new employer the day after his retirement. However, the DHO denied claimant's request for the payment of TTD compensation for the following reasons:
Claimant continued to work until he had a knee injury on 02/14/2000 (see claim #00-380078). Claimant has not worked since he injured his knee on 02/14/2000. Claimant was given social security disability based on his knee in 2002. DHO asked claimant if all of his neck problems from this claim were to disappear, but his knee problems from the other claim were to remain, could he return to his former position of employment? Claimant responded that he could not. Employer asked claimant if he had any intention of every [sic] working again, and claimant responded, "maybe, if I had a total knee replacement."
In recent cases the Supreme Court has emphasized that temporary total benefits are meant to replace income lost due to the industrial injury. From the evidence discussed above, DHO finds that claimant has lost no income due to this industrial injury. Claimant has not worked since he hurt his knee in another claim. It is clear that regardless of whether or not claimant had surgery on his neck on 11/13/2003, he still would not be working due to problems with his knee. Thus, claimant has not lost any income due to his neck surgery.
Therefore, temporary total benefits are not payable in this neck claim.
(Emphasis sic.)
{¶16} 8. Claimant appealed and the matter was heard before a staff hearing officer ("SHO") on April 22, 2004, and resulted in an order modifying the prior DHO order. The SHO concluded that claimant was entitled to an award of TTD compensation as follows:
Temporary total...
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