State ex rel. Grady v. Vill. of Chesterhill, Case No. 14AP0006

• Decision Date: 04 June 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 14AP0006
• Citation: 2015 Ohio 2216
• Parties: STATE EX REL. REBECCA GRADY Plaintiff - Appellant v. THE VILLAGE OF CHESTERHILL, OHIO, ET AL. Defendants - Appellees
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2015 Ohio 2216

STATE EX REL. REBECCA GRADY Plaintiff - Appellant v. THE VILLAGE OF CHESTERHILL, OHIO, ET AL. Defendants - Appellees

Case No. 14AP0006

COURT OF APPEALS MORGAN COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

June 4, 2015

JUDGES: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J. Hon. John W. Wise, J. Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.

OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Morgan County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 14CV0036

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant

BRIAN W. BENBOW

Benbow Law Offices

605 Market St.

Zanesville, OH 43701

For DefendantS-Appellees

PAUL-MICHAEL LAFAYETTE

DOUGLAS P. HOLTHUS

Poling Law

300 East Broad St., Suite 350

Columbus, OH 43215

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Appellant Rebecca Grady appeals a judgment of the Morgan County Common Pleas Court dismissing her mandamus petition. Appellees are the Village of Chesterhill, Richard D. Wetzel, Sr., Terry Fleming, Ronnie Mayle, Jr., Kathy Smedley, Tonya Tabler, and Chastity Mayle.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} Appellant ran for elected office on November 5, 2013, as council person for the Village of Chesterhill. The term was to commence on January 6, 2014. Appellant's election to the council was certified by the Morgan County Board of Elections on November 25, 2013. Her qualifications were not formally contested prior to the election, nor were the election results formally contested.

{¶3} On January 6, 2014, council held a meeting, at which it resolved not to recognize appellant's election to the position of council person based on council's belief that she was not qualified to run for the office. Council believed she did not meet the residency requirement, as she had not lived in the village for a period of one year prior to the election.

{¶4} The oath of office was administered to appellant on January 15, 2014, by the Common Pleas Court judge in Morgan County; however, council continued to refuse to seat her as a council person because she was not a resident of the village for a period of one year prior to her election. At the February council meeting, council formally declared the position to be vacant.

{¶5} Appellant commenced an action in mandamus to compel the council to recognize her election. Following an evidentiary hearing in the Common Pleas Court, the court found that appellant "did not clearly prove that she had been a resident of the Village for the year immediately preceding November 5, 2013."

{¶6} Appellant assigns two errors on appeal:

{¶7} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE PETITIONER'S CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION IN MANDAMUS AS BEING CONCLUSIVE TO THE ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE CITY COUNCIL OF CHESTERHILL. THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED BY DENYING PETITIONER'S WRIT OF MANDAMUS WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE VILLAGE OF CHESTERHILL HAD THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO IGNORE AN ELECTION RESULT WITHOUT HAVING FIRST HAVING INITIATED A TIMELY ELECTION CONTEST PURSUANT TO R.C. 3515.08. THIS STATUTE IS THE SOLE REMEDY PROVIDED BY STATUTE FOR THE CORRECTION OF ALL ERRORS, FRAUDS AND MISTAKES THAT MAY OCCUR IN AN ELECTION INCLUDING THE LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OF A CANDIDATE. THE TRIAL COURT ACCORDINGLY ERRED WHEN IT CONDUCTED A DE FACTO ELECTION CONTEST, A COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON PETITIONER'S CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION, WHEN IT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO DO SO IN THAT A TIMELY ELECTION CONTEST HAD NOT BEEN FILED. THE TRIAL COURT ACCORDINGLY ERRED IN ALLOWING A COLLATERAL ATTACK UP ON AN ELECTION RESULT IN MANDAMUS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO DO SO.

{¶8} "II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO GIVE ANY WEIGHT TO PETITIONER'S INTENT, WHICH WAS THAT 7355 MARION STREET, CHESTERHILL, OHIO WAS HER RESIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT DECISION IN HUSTED V. BRUNNER. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER DID NOT RESIDE AT 7355 MARION STREET, CHESTERHILL, OHIO WAS THEREFORE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. THE TRIAL COURT ACCORDINGLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAD RESIDED IN THE VILLAGE OF CHESTERHILL FOR THE REQUIRED ONE-YEAR PERIOD PRIOR TO HER ELECTION TO CHESTERHILL CITY COUNCIL AND WAS THREFORE (SIC) QUALIFIED TO ASSUME HER ELECTED POSITION."

I.

{¶9} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that the court erred in dismissing her petition in mandamus, as appellees failed to challenge the election by a statutory election contest. She argues that because she held an unchallenged certificate of election, she had a clear legal right to be seated on the village council, and the court erred in undertaking an analysis of whether she met the residency requirement to run for council.

{¶10} Our standard of review on a dismissal of a writ of mandamus is de novo. State v. Budgake v. Canton, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013CA00111, 2014-Ohio-903, ¶8, citing Athens County Commissioners v. Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, 4th Dist. Athens No. 06CA49, 2007-Ohio-6895. A de novo standard of review requires an independent review of the trial court's decision without any deference to the trial court'sdetermination. Id., citing Brown v. County Commissioners of Scioto County, 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993).

{¶11} For a court to grant a writ of mandamus, the relator must establish: (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief; (2) a clear legal duty to perform these acts on the part of the respondent; and (3) the lack of a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Neff v. Corrigan, 75 Ohio St.3d 12, 1996-Ohio-231.

{¶12} The trial court found that R.C. 731.44 vests the village council with the authority to determine the qualifications of its members, and the court could not substitute its judgment for that of the council.

{¶13} R.C. 731.44 provides in pertinent part, "The legislative authority of a municipal corporation shall be the judge of the election and qualification of its members." The Ohio Supreme Court in the past interpreted this section to give city legislatures exclusive jurisdiction over election contests involving these bodies. E.g., State, ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney v. Berry, 47 Ohio St. 232, 24 N.E. 206 (1890); State ex rel. Holbrock v. Egry, 79 Ohio St. 391, 87 N.E. 269 (1909).

{¶14} However, each of these cases was decided prior to the enactment of the predecessor to R.C. 3515.08, which authorizes an election contest of "any public office." In determining that a common pleas court had jurisdiction over a city council election contest, the Ohio Supreme Court stated:

R.C. 3515.08 authorizes an election contest of 'any public office.' With certain exceptions not pertinent here, a court of common pleas, for the county where the election took place, hears anddecides such a contest. In light of this broad unrestricted grant of jurisdiction to courts, it is inconceivable that the General Assembly intended R.C. 731.44 to deprive courts of jurisdiction over election contests such as these. Further, when statutes dealing with the same subject conflict, the later enacted controls. R.C. 1.52. Here, R.C. 3515.08 is the later enactment. Consequently, we conclude that R.C. 3515.08 conferred jurisdiction upon the court of common pleas to hear this case." Hitt v. Tressler, 4 Ohio St.3d 174, 176, 447 N.E.2d 1299, 1302 (1983).

{¶15} Further, well-established principles of statutory construction require that specific statutory provisions prevail over conflicting general statutes. State v. Volpe, 38 Ohio St.3d 191, 193, 527 N.E.2d 818, 820 (1988). R.C. 1.51 codifies this rule of statutory...