State ex rel. Grant v. Prograis
| Citation | 979 S.W.2d 594 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Tennessee |
| Decision Date | 29 August 1997 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee, ex rel., Sheila GRANT, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Dr. Lawrence Joseph PROGRAIS, Sr., Defendant/Appellant. |
John Knox Walkup, Attorney General and Reporter, Lisa Cowan, Child Support Services of Davidson County, Nashville, for Defendants/Appellees.
Charles R. Ray, Nashville, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
In this paternity/child support case, the respondent, Lawrence Joseph Prograis, has appealed from non-jury a judgment of the Juvenile Judge of Davidson County awarding to the petitioner, Sheila Veleria Grant, a judgment for $120,313.00 delinquent child support.
The appellant presents two issues for review as follows:
1. The Trial Court erred in holding that the doctrine of laches does not apply to the instant case.
2. The Trial Court erred in not deviating from the child support guidelines on the basis of economic hardship.
The appellee presents the issues in the following form:
1. Awards made by the Trial Court pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-2-108 for child support prior to the order for paternity and support are discretionary. Absent a finding of abuse of discretion, the Trial Court's award should not be disturbed.
Was the Trial Court's award of child support for the time period preceding the order of paternity and support an abuse of discretion?
On August 24, 1994, a "Petition to Establish Paternity and Set Support" was filed in Juvenile Court, by "Child Support Services." The caption and first sentence of the petition were:
Dr. Lawrence Joseph Prograis, Sr.
and
Comes now the Petitioner, State of Tennessee ex rel, Sheila Veleria Grant, by and through Child Support Services for Davidson County, Tennessee pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA) Section 36-2-101 et seq, and respectfully shows to this Honorable Court as follows:
1. That the Mother, Sheila Veleria Grant, is a resident of Davidson County, Tennessee.
2. That the Mother, Sheila Veleria Grant, and the Respondent, Dr. Lawrence Joseph Prograis, Sr., although not married to each other, had sexual intercourse on or about October, 1976, in the State of Tennessee.
3. That the Mother, Sheila Veleria Grant, and the Respondent Mustafa Abadal-Khallaq, had sexual intercourse on or about September, 1976, in the State of Tennessee.
4. That as a result of said sexual intercourse with one of the Respondents, the Mother, Sheila Veleria Grant, gave birth to the following live infant.
WAKEELA A. GRANT born on July 26, 1977
5. That the aforementioned minor child now resides with the Mother, and is a public charge of the State of Tennessee.
6. The Petitioner and/or the State of Tennessee is/are entitled to child support and a judgment for back support and all necessary expenses as provided in TCA 36-2-108(b).
The petition further alleged that the mother of the minor was Sheila Grant and the father was either the respondent, Prograis or the respondent Abadal-Khallaq; that the child was a public charge; and that "The petitioner and/or the State of Tennessee is/are entitled to back child support as provided by TCA § 36-2-108(b)." (Emphasis supplied)
The petition prayed "that the petitioner and/or the State of Tennessee be granted a judgment for back support" and birth expenses and that Sheila Veleria Grant be granted custody and current child support.
The petition is signed by counsel on behalf of "Child Support Services of Davidson County" the nature and identity of which is not disclosed in the petition.
Thereafter, on an illegible date, the Respondent, Lawrence J. Prograis filed an answer under the following caption:
State of Tennessee ex rel
Sheila V. Grant (Mother) and
Makeela A. Grant, a minor
397 Kingview Dr.
On March 20, 1995, a Juvenile Court Referee entered an order adjudging appellant to be the father of Wakeela A. Grant, born on July 26, 1977. The caption above this order lists the Petitioner as "State ex. rel. Sheila Veleria Grant," (omitting Makeela A. Grant as shown in the complaint).
The record does not disclose any proceeding authorizing this change at this stage of the proceedings.
On April 25, 1995, the Referee entered a wage assignment order for $477.10 each two weeks. The caption of this order reads as follows:
State of Tennessee
In the Matter of:
Sheila Grant vs.
On June 1, 1995, the "Child Support Services of Davidson County" addressed to the Clerk of the Juvenile Court the following letter:
This is to advise your office that the AFDC case corresponding to the above-styled case in your court has been closed by the local office of the Department of Human Services. The Family will receive their last AFDC check on 05/01/95. This correspondence will authorize you to release child support payments to the family.
Your continued cooperation in the Title IV-D Child Support Program is greatly appreciated.
On June 26, 1995, the same "Child Support Services" moved the Juvenile Court to set the cause for hearing. The caption on this motion read as follows:
On November 22, 1995, the Referee entered an order under the same caption and reading in pertinent part as follows:
2. The birth certificate of the child, Wakeela Aminah Grant, born on July 26, 1977 shall be changed to reflect that the Respondent is the father of the child.
3. The State of Tennessee paid $210.00 for blood testing and the Respondent shall reimburse the State for that amount.
It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:
1. The State of Tennessee is granted a judgment against the Respondent in the amount of $122,355.00 plus $210.00 for blood test reimbursement for a total judgment of $122,565.00 as of April 30, 1995. Said judgment includes any credits referenced herein.
2. Beginning November 7, 1995, the Respondent shall liquidate the judgment granted herein at the rate of $2,242.00 per month (plus Clerk's fee) which shall be payable in increments of $1,034.77 (plus $51.74 as the Clerk's lawful commission) for a total of $1,086.51 per two weeks continuing until the judgment is liquidated.
6. The Clerk shall disburse arrearage payments to:
Tennessee Department of Human Services
Fiscal Services Section
Lawrence Prograis
IV-D # 3274519 01
P.O. Box 198243
10. Any money paid by the Respondent to the petitioner, or anyone, directly, and not paid through the Clerk of the Court, will be considered a gift from the Respondent, and the Respondent will not receive any credit for said direct payments in calculating whether or not child support arrears exist, regardless of to whom the clerk is ordered to disburse payments.
On November 17, 1995, the respondent, Prograis filed a motion, pertinent portions of which were:
Dr. Lawrence Joseph Prograis, Sr.
and
Mustafa Abadal-Khallaq
RESPONDENTS
MOTION TO RECONSIDER INTERIM ORDER
Comes Lawrence Prograise (sic), through counsel, and would move this Honorable Court to reconsider it's Final Order in this case.
On November 30, 1995, substitute counsel filed the following notice:
Docket No.
Comes the undersigned, Charles R. Ray, and gives notice that he is the lead counsel of record for the Respondent in this matter.
On the same date substitute counsel filed motions to alter or amend and to set aside the judgment under the same caption.
Both motions were overruled by the Referee.
On December 13, 1995, "Child Support Services of Davidson County" addressed the following letter to the Clerk of the Juvenile Court:
Dear Sir:
Re: Notice of AFDC Case Closure
SHEILA VELERIA GRANT
397 Kingview Dr.
Lawrence Joseph Prograis Sr.
This is to advise your office that the AFDC case corresponding to the above-styled case in your court has been closed by the local office of the Department of Human Services. The Family will receive their last AFDC check on 5/1/95. This correspondence will authorize you to release child support payments to the family any time after the month cited above.
Your continued cooperation in the Title IV-D Child Support Program is greatly appreciated.
On the same date, the respondent, Prograis, filed the following motion:
Docket No.
MOTION TO VACATE ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF CURRENT CHILD SUPPORT
AND APPLY TOWARD ARREARAGE
Comes the Respondent, Lawrence Joseph Prograis, through undersigned counsel and respectfully moves the court to vacate the prior order for payment of current child support to Wakeela A. Grant pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-2-108(b) on the grounds that on July 26, 1995, Ms. Grant reached the age of majority. Respondent further requests that all child support paid after July 26, 1995, be applied to the amount ordered to be paid as arrearage.
On the same date and caption, the same respondent filed the following motion:
Notice of Appeal of the Referee's Order
On December 13, 1995, Referee Robert Greene denied Respondent Lawrence Prograis Rule 59 motion to alter or amend...
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