State ex rel. Green v. Power

• Decision Date: 08 January 1902
• Citation: 63 Neb. 496,88 N.W. 769
• Parties: STATE EX REL. GREEN v. POWER, SHERIFF.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

63 Neb. 496

88 N.W. 769

STATE EX REL. GREEN

v.POWER, SHERIFF.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Jan. 8, 1902.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The purpose of the constitutional provision that “no bill shall contain more than one subject, and the same shall be clearly expressed in the title,” was intended to prevent surreptitious legislation, and not to prohibit comprehensive titles. The test is not whether the title chosen by the legislature is the most appropriate, but whether it fairly indicates the scope and purpose of the act. State v. Bemis, 64 N. W. 348, 45 Neb. 724.

2. A legislative enactment the title of which is, “An act to provide for the better protection of the earnings of laborers, servants, and other employees of corporations, firms, or individuals engaged in interstate business,” comprehends legislation providing for the punishment of those who violate the provisions of the act by doing the things therein declared unlawful.

3. A complaint drawn under the provisions of section 531c of the Code of Civil Procedure is fatally defective, and charges no violation of the law, if it fail to charge that the complainant is the head of a family, and that the wages sought to be affected by the acts complained of are the wages exempt by law to laborers, etc., for not exceeding a period of 60 days.

Appeal from district court, Douglas county; Baker, Judge.

Application by the state, on the relation of Meyer Green, for a writ of habeas corpus directed to John Power, sheriff. From an order denying the writ, relator appeals. Reversed.Alex Altschuler, for appellant.

F. N. Prout, Atty. Gen., Norris Brown, Dep. Atty. Gen., and Geo. W. Shields, for appellee.

HOLCOMB, J.

The petitioner applied for and was denied a writ of habeas corpus by one of the judges of the district court of the Fourth judicial district. By proceedings in error he brings his case here for review of the proceedings had and ruling made on his said application. After a preliminary hearing on a complaint for violating the provisions of section 531c of the Code of Civil Procedure, relative to exemptions of 60 days of wages of laborers, mechanics, and clerks who are heads of families, he was ordered to enter into recognizance for his appearance at the next term of the district court, and, in default of such recognizance, was duly committed to the jail of the county until such term should be holden.

It is argued and assigned as error that the petitioner's detention is unlawful, because the provisions of the act under and by virtue of which he is held are invalid, not being embraced within the title of the act of which they form a part, and because there are two subjects included in the act, both being in contravention of section 11, art. 3, of the constitution, which declares that “no bill shall contain more than one subject, and the same shall be clearly expressed in the title.” It is also claimed that the complaint on which the petitioner is held to answer in the district court the charge preferred against him does not state any offense, nor charge a crime against the laws of the state.

With reference to the error first assigned, the title of the act is as follows: “An act to provide for the better protection of the earning of laborers, servants, and other employees of corporations, firms, or individuals engaged in interstate business.” By the first section it is declared unlawful for a creditor of the persons sought to be protected to dispose of his or its claim or to institute suits, and by any process seek or attempt to seize, attach, or garnish the wages of such person or persons earned within 60 days, for the purpose of avoiding the effect of the laws concerning exemptions. By the last section it is provided that the party injured by a violation of the provisions of the act may recover the amount of the debt, with costs, expenses, and a reasonable attorney's fee, and that the person, firm, or corporation guilty of the violation of the act shall be liable by prosecution to punishment by a fine not exceeding $200 and costs of prosecution. It is this latter portion, relating to a punishment by fine, which it is claimed is unconstitutional and void because not embraced within the purview of the title. The object of the act, as expressed by its title, is to protect the exempt wages of laborers and others engaged in like services who are heads of families from being seized, and the owner deprived thereof, by the process of garnishment or attachment or otherwise; to afford to the persons entitled to such exempt wages immunity from seizure or attempted seizure of their wages so exempt, and due to them from their employer. To accomplish this object, it is declared unlawful, by any of the means mentioned, to undertake to reach such exempt wages; and for the purpose of enforcing such provisions, and to make the law effective, two remedies were created,--one a civil and the other a criminal liability,--both of which may be resorted to for the purpose of accomplishing the object of the act; i. e. the protection of the employé in the wages due him, which the law declares exempt from seizure. There is but one object to be accomplished, and that is protection. This is secured by resorting to means that will effectively prevent the prohibited acts, and the legislature doubtless believed this could best be accomplished by imposing a liability both civil and penal. One may be, and probably is, as efficacious as the other. Both are fairly comprehended by the title used by the legislature in expressing the subject regarding which the legislation is to be had. A civil liability alone as to those pecuniarily irresponsible was probably regarded as an insufficient deterrent. The fact that a double remedy is provided does not mean that there are embraced in the act two distinct subjects. In a great deal of the legislation we meet with, two or more remedies are given for the purpose of effectuating the object sought to be attained, and yet such legislation would not be obnoxious to the constitutional provision that but one subject shall be expressed in the title of the act. Nor do we find any constitutional objection on the ground urged, that the provisions of the act for punishment by fine and costs of prosecution are not embraced within the scope and subject as expressed in the title. To protect the person around whom the statute throws the strong arm of the law means “to keep as from harm”; “preserve in safety; guard; shield; defend; said of both persons and things, with wide range of meaning.” Stand. Dict. The words used as expressing the object of the act are of a most comprehensive kind, and suggest to the mind that all reasonable means may be resorted to in order to prevent any encroachment on the rights of those who come within the ægis of the statute. If the law actively interposes and gives to the injured party a civil remedy, may...