State ex rel. Grievance Committee of State Bar Ass'n v. Tanner

Decision Date12 January 1907
Citation49 Or. 31,88 P. 301
PartiesSTATE ex rel. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF STATE BAR ASS'N v. TANNER.
CourtOregon Supreme Court

Proceedings by the state on the relation of grievance committee of the State Bar Association for the disbarment of Albert H. Tanner. Suspension ordered for 90 days.

Frank S. Grant, for plaintiff.

W.W Cotton and C.E.S. Wood, for defendant.

PER CURIAM.

This is a proceeding instituted by the grievance committee of the State Bar Association for the removal of Albert H. Tanner, an attorney of this court. The information charges that on February 8, 1905, the grand jury of the United States inquiring for the District of Oregon, returned an indictment against Tanner, charging him with the crime of perjury; that upon his arraignment Tanner entered a plea of guilty, but that no further proceedings were had in such action until July 17, 1906, when, on motion of the government, the indictment was dismissed for the reason that Tanner had been pardoned by the President of the United States. It is then averred, as conclusions of law rather than as facts, that the plea of guilty amounted to a conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude, and that the pardon did not absolve Tanner from the consequences of such conviction or restore him to his right to hold public office. Tanner answered, admitting the facts as stated in the information but denying the conclusions of law therein, and for a further and separate answer alleged:

"That after this respondent had pleaded guilty to said indictment, the Honorable Charles B. Bellinger, District Judge of the United States for the District of Oregon, and having full jurisdiction of the matter, suspended sentence and all further proceedings in the matter, and nothing further was done, save and except that this respondent was granted a full and unconditional pardon for said offense by the President of the United States, and, before said pardon was issued, this respondent was called as a witness in the case of John H. Mitchell, and, being duly sworn as a witness, was objected to by the said Mitchell on the ground that this respondent had been convicted of a felony under the provision of section 5392, Revised Statutes of the United States [[[U.S.Comp.St.1901, p. 3653], and the presiding judge at said trial, Judge De Haven, ruled that this respondent was a competent witness, for the reason that no judgment or conviction had ever been pronounced in the matter, and this respondent alleges that he has never been convicted of any felony within the meaning of sections 1067 and 1057 of the Laws of Oregon, known as 'Bellinger & Cotton's Code.'

"And for a further and separate answer and defense this respondent alleges that said alleged perjury was committed not in the actual trial of any cause, but during the appearance of this respondent before a grand jury of the United States, sitting at Portland, Oregon, to investigate certain alleged criminal acts of John H. Mitchell, Senator of the United States, and that this respondent appeared before said grand jury only as a citizen, and said alleged perjury did not occur in any professional matter, or in the discharge of any professional duty to any court or client.

"And for a further and separate answer and defense, this respondent admits, without any reservation whatever, that in testifying before the grand jury which sat to investigate the charges against Senator John H. Mitchell to facts other than those which were the strict and absolute truth, this respondent made a greater mistake and committed a wrong which will follow him through his entire career, and this respondent does not, by this answer, or by any subsequent proceeding which he shall take in this matter, intend to belittle the gravity of his offense, but, in extenuation of this offense, he shows to this honorable court the substantial facts of the matter, as follows:

"This respondent had been a close and intimate friend of Senator John H. Mitchell since 1882, and his partner in the practice of the law since 1890, and that said Senator Mitchell had been the close friend, for a lifetime, of this respondent's father-in-law, and, at the time Senator Mitchell returned to Oregon from Washington and appeared to testify before the grand jury investigating the charges against him at Portland, Oregon, Senator Mitchell assured this respondent that these attacks against him were the result of political intrigue and the persecution of his enemies in the political faction opposed to him. He represented to said respondent that, at the worst, the practice of taking money for appearances before the department had at one time been customary and proper, and that the charges themselves were simply an accusation of a breach of the written law, and not a breach of any inherent morality, and he implored me, in the most pathetic manner, to stand between him and disgrace and ruin in his old age, after a lifetime of public service, and he represented that his fate was in my hands, and mine alone.

"Senator Mitchell was a man of a most amiable character, and respondent felt for him a warm friendship and a sympathy which he cannot express, and he felt that he was under the obligations of loyalty to him which justified his joining him in his effort to protect himself in his old age from the assaults of political enemies. He was made to feel, and did feel, that, if he refused to protect him in his extremity, he would occupy the position of an ingrate and a traitor, and he desires to say, as a part of his sworn answer, that it was a situation difficult to...

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6 cases
  • Conduct of Carstens, In re
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oregon
    • May 22, 1984
    ...of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. What is a proper sanction? What this court said in 1907 in the case of Ex parte Tanner, 49 Or. 31, 36, 88 P. 301 (1907), is still appropriate. We in effect said: Proceedings for the discipline of an attorney are not to punish the attorney for the ......
  • State ex rel. Montgomery v. Estes
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oregon
    • October 3, 1922
    ...The statute appears with the same heading in Lord's Oregon Laws as section 1091. This court, in an opinion rendered in Ex parte Tanner, 49 Or. 31, 88 P. 301, stated that interpretation of the language of the act was involved in doubt, but suggested that the statute probably meant: "That an ......
  • Conduct of Sonderen, In re
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oregon
    • March 24, 1987
    ...rather than the actual entry of a judgment of conviction. Compare State v. Smith, 298 Or. 173, 691 P.2d 89 (1984). In Ex Parte Tanner, 49 Or. 31, 35-6, 88 P. 301 (1907), this court stated that:"It is very questionable whether a mere plea or verdict of guilty is a conviction within the meani......
  • State v. Bock
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oregon
    • January 12, 1907
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