State ex rel. Haddox v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 2011–1622.
| Decision Date | 12 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2011–1622.,2011–1622. |
| Parties | The STATE ex rel. HADDOX, Appellee, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, Appellant, et al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
David W. Goldense and Libert Pinto, Cleveland, for appellee.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Patsy A. Thomas, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
[Ohio St.3d 307]{¶ 1} This case involves the question of an injured truck driver's eligibility to receive temporary-total-disability compensation after he was discharged from employment. The driver was injured in 2005 in a traffic accident for which he was cited. This was his third moving violation in one year, and as a result, he was dropped from his employer's liability insurance policy. Without insurance coverage, he could no longer work as a truck driver, and the employer fired him.
{¶ 2} In 2006, the Industrial Commission initially concluded that he was not eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation, because his discharge was a voluntary abandonment of employment. A year later, a staff hearing officer concluded that his discharge was not voluntary abandonment under the recently decided State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 249, 2007-Ohio-4916, 874 N.E.2d 1162 (), and approved a subsequent request for temporary-total-disability compensationbased on additionally allowed conditions.
{¶ 3} The commission exercised continuing jurisdiction and concluded that the staff hearing officer had made a clear mistake of law by not considering the commission's initial finding of voluntary abandonment as res judicata as to the second request. The commission also determined that the staff hearing officer had misapplied Gross because the injured worker's discharge was due to his lack of insurance, not his industrial injury. Thus, according to the commission, he had voluntarily abandoned his employment and was not eligible to receive temporary-total-disability benefits.
{¶ 4} The court of appeals concluded that the commission had abused its discretion, and it issued a writ of mandamus that ordered the commission to [Ohio St.3d 308]award benefits or reconsider the denial of benefits from the date of the injury, in accordance with Gross.
{¶ 5} For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals granting the writ of mandamus.
{¶ 6} The claimant-appellee, George H. Haddox, was a truck driver for Forest City Technologies, Inc. On December 20, 2005, he was injured in a motor vehicle accident within the course and scope of his employment. His workers' compensation claim was allowed for “sprain lumbar region.”
{¶ 7} This was Haddox's third accident in the calendar year 2005. As a result, his employer's liability insurance would no longer cover him. Forest City terminated his employment in January 2006.
{¶ 8} Haddox filed a request for temporary-total-disability compensation to begin on the date he was injured, December 20, 2005. A staff hearing officer denied the request. The hearing officer concluded that Haddox's discharge constituted a voluntary abandonment of employment because Haddox had violated a company policy that required termination of employment for a third traffic violation. The commission refused to hear Haddox's appeal.
{¶ 9} The commission later approved Haddox's claim for two additional conditions of substantial aggravation of lumbar spondylolisthesis and spondylosis. Haddox filed a second request for temporary-total-disability compensation beginning September 4, 2007, based on the additional conditions.
{¶ 10} A district hearing officer denied the request, finding that Haddox's discharge was related to his inability to perform his duties as a truck driver for the company, not due to his injuries. A staff hearing officer reversed, relying on the statement in State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 249, 2007-Ohio-4916, 874 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 19, that the voluntary-abandonment doctrine “ ‘has never been applied to preinjury conduct or conduct contemporaneous with the injury.’ ” The staff hearing officer awarded compensation because Haddox's discharge was causally related to acts that occurred contemporaneously with or before his injuries.
{¶ 11} The commission refused further review.
[Ohio St.3d 309]C. Third Application for Temporary–Total–Disability Dating Back to Original Injury
{¶ 12} Haddox filed a third request for benefits for temporary total disability, asking for compensation dating back to his initial injury, based on the order approving his second application. A district hearing officer concluded that the commission had previously adjudicated the issue of voluntary abandonment for the original claim and that it was res judicata. The hearing officer rejected Haddox's argument that the previous orders could be vacated on the basis of Gross. A staff hearing officer agreed.
{¶ 13} On March 6, 2008, the commission refused Haddox's appeal.
D. Employer's Request for Reconsideration of the Order Awarding Temporary–Total–Disability Compensation for Additional Conditions
{¶ 14} The employer asked the commission to invoke its continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52 and reconsider the award of temporary-total-disability compensation based on the additional conditions (Haddox's second application). According to the employer, the order was based on a clear mistake of law because the finding of voluntary abandonment in the initial denial of compensation was res judicata.
{¶ 15} On March 7, 2008 (the day after the commission had refused Haddox's appeal from the denial of his second application), the commission entered an interlocutory order and set the matter for further hearing to evaluate whether the staff hearing officer had made a mistake of law that would warrant the commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction over the issue of Haddox's voluntary abandonment as res judicata and to consider the application of Gross on his eligibility for temporary-total-disability compensation.
{¶ 16} On June 2, 2008, the commission determined that the staff hearing officer had made a clear error of law by not relying on res judicata to deny the compensation requested in his second application. The commission granted reconsideration to correct the error and denied Haddox's current request based on the additional conditions. In the alternative, the commission determined that even if res judicata did not apply, Haddox had voluntarily abandoned his employment. According to the commission, a representative of the employer had testified that Haddox was terminated because he could no longer be insured as a truck driver on the employer's group liability policy due to his three moving violations. The commission noted that although the allowed injury occurred simultaneously with the third moving violation, Haddox's loss of earnings was caused by the lack of insurance, not his injury.
[Ohio St.3d 310]E. Haddox's Mandamus Action
{¶ 17} Haddox filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus asking the Court of Appeals for Franklin County to require the commission to order temporary-total-disability compensation beginning on the date of his initial injury. Haddox alleged that according to Gross, he was entitled to compensation because the loss of his job was related to his injury, so his departure from employment was not voluntary.
{¶ 18} The court of appeals concluded that res judicata did not apply and that the commission had abused its discretion when it vacated the award for the additional conditions. Because the moving violations that resulted in Haddox's inability to be insured had occurred prior to and contemporaneously with his injury, the court held that his discharge could not be considered a voluntary abandonment making him ineligible for temporary-total-disability compensation.
{¶ 19} Applying Gross to the facts of this case, the appellate court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate the denials of temporary-total-disability compensation that were based on abandonment of employment, to reinstate one award of compensation, and to redetermine the remaining motions for compensation on the medical evidence. 2011-Ohio-3923, 2011 WL 3451706, ¶ 9, 12–13, 16.
{¶ 20} The commission's appeal as of right is now before the court.
{¶ 21} We must determine whether the commission abused its discretion when it exercised continuing jurisdiction for the purpose of correcting what it considered a clear mistake of law. Our review addresses the follow issues: Was the commission's initial finding of voluntary abandonment res judicata for all future applications for temporary-total-disability compensation, or did State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm. apply? Did the commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction (over the order deciding the second request for benefits for temporary total disability) extend to modify the initial order denying compensation?
{¶ 22} The purpose of temporary-total-disability compensation is to compensate an injured employee for lost earnings during the period of disability while the injury heals. State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 35;State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm., 34 Ohio St.3d 42, 517 N.E.2d 533 (1987). To qualify for temporary-total-disability compensation, an injured worker must demonstrate that he or she is medically unable to return to the former position and that the industrial injury is the reason for the loss of earnings. State ex rel. McCoy at ¶ 35.
[Ohio St.3d 311]{¶ 23} When the employee...
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