State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 24519.

• Decision Date: 05 June 1933
• Docket Number: 24519.
• Citation: 23 P.2d 1,173 Wash. 249
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HAMILTON, Atty. Gen., v. MARTIN et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

23 P.2d 1

173 Wash. 249

STATE ex rel. HAMILTON, Atty. Gen., v. MARTIN et al.

No. 24519.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 5, 1933

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John A. Wilson, Judge.

Action by the State, on the relation of G. W. Hamilton, Attorney General, against Clarence D. Martin, Otto A. Case, and Cliff Yelle, individually and as the State Finance Committee of the State of Washington. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

TOLMAN STEINERT, and MILLARD, JJ., dissenting.

G. W Hamilton, J. H. Secrest, George Downer, John W. Hanna, all of Olympia, for appellant.

Richard B. Ott, of Ritzville, Earl W. Benson, of Walla Walla, and A Emerson Cross, of Seattle, amici curiae.

Grinstead Laube, Laughlin & Meakim, of Seattle, and E. W. Anderson and Yantis & Brodie, all of Olympia, for respondents.

HOLCOMB Justice.

Appellant commenced this action in the court below to permanently enjoin and restrain respondents, who constitute the state finance committee, from enforcing, carrying out, and administering the provisions of chapter 65, page 336, Laws of 1933, which authorizes the state finance committee to execute, issue, and sell from time to time general obligation bonds of the state in the sum of $10,000,000.

In appellant's complaint the constitutionality of the act is challenged, alleging that it violates eight separate sections of our state Constitution and further alleging that in many of its provisions it conflicts with other existing laws and therefore was inoperative and void.

A general demurrer interposed by respondents was presented and after argument sustained by the court below. Appellant refusing to further plead, the action was dismissed, from which judgment this appeal is taken.

Chapter 65, page 336, Laws of 1933, is referred to as the 'Bond Act' and chapter 8, page 103, Laws of 1933, which is an interrelated act, is referred to as the 'Relief Act.'

In section 1 of the Bond Act, designated the preamble, the Legislature sets forth the conditions which lead to its enactment. It recites a number of reasons therefor, among others, that: 'Discontent, social unrest and incipient insurrection exist. Acts of insurrection are occurring. * * * A critical emergency calling for constructive action is presented; otherwise catastrophe impends. * * * It is imperative that existing unemployment and distress be in some measure allayed. * * * This obligation is upon the state. Legislation is essential for its fulfillment.'

Section 2 authorizes the creation of a state debt and the issuance and sale of bonds in the sum of $10,000,000 to carry out the purposes and provisions of chapter 8, Laws of 1933, prescribes the terms of such bonds and the manner of their sale. Respondents, who are members of the state finance committee, are charged with the duty of issuing and selling bonds.

Section 3 appropriates the proceeds of the bonds for the purpose of paying expenses incurred under and carrying out the provisions of chapter 8, supra.

Section 4 authorizes temporary loans from the general fund in anticipation of the issuance and sale of the bonds.

Sections 5 and 6 provide for the retirement of the bonds. Section 7 is the emergency clause.

The retirement provisions appropriate the equivalent of four-tenths of 1 cent a gallon of the liquid fuel tax from the motor vehicle fund for primary retirement and interest purposes and any deficiency is authorized to be raised by general tax levy.

There is no provision made for the submission of the bonds to the people of the state for their approval or rejection.

The Relief Act, which is interrelated with and referred to in the Bond Act, has for its purposes as determined from its title, first, to relieve the people of the state from hardships and suffering caused by unemployment, which is identical with one of the objects sought to be obtained by the enactment of the Bond Act. The Relief Act further creates what it terms an emergency relief administration and defines its duties. It makes an appropriation in the sum of $20,000 or so much thereof as might be necessary for setting up the machinery for the operations of the act.

Both acts were passed with an emergency clause attached.

Appellant first recites the provisions of section 1, art. 7, of Amendment 14 to our state Constitution reading: 'All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and shall be levied and collected for public purposes only.'

Subdivision (b) of Amendment 7 to our state Constitution is next set out, reading: '(b) Referendum. The second power reserved by the people is the referendum, and it may be ordered on any act, bill, law, or any part thereof passed by the legislature, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions.'

It is further alleged that the Bond Act violates sections 1, 2, and 3 of article 8, of our Constitution, which read:

'§ 1. Limitation of State Debt.--The state may, to meet casual deficits or failure in revenues or for expenses not provided for, contract debts, but such debts, direct and contingent, singly or in the aggregate, shall not at any time exceed four hundred thousand dollars ($400,000), and the moneys arising from the loans creating such debts shall be applied to the purpose for which they were obtained, or to repay the debts so contracted, and to no other purpose whatever.

'§ 2. Powers Extended in Certain Cases.--In addition to the above limited power to contract debts, the state may contract debts to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or to defend the state in war, but the money arising from the contracting of such debts shall be applied to the purpose for which it was raised, and no other purpose whatever.

'§ 3. Special Indebtedness, How Authorized.--Except the debt specified in sections one and two of this article, no debts shall hereafter be contracted by or on behalf of this state, unless such debt shall be authorized by law for some single work or object to be distinctly specified therein, which law shall provide ways and means, exclusive of loans, for the payment of the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal of such debt within twenty years from the time of the contracting thereof. No such law shall take effect, until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people and have received a majority of all the votes cast for and against it at such election, and all moneys raised by authority of such law shall be applied only to the specific object therein stated, or to the payment of the debt thereby created, and such law shall be published in at least one newspaper in each county, if one be published therein, throughout the state, for three months next preceding the election at which it is submitted to the people.'

It cannot be doubted that the indebtedness and tax appropriated to its payment, being for the relief of state-wide unemployment and poverty, are for a public purpose and permissible under amendment 14, supra, if otherwise valid. Rust v. Kitsap County, 111 Wash. 170, 189 P. 994; Rummens v. Evans, 168 Wash. 527, 13 P.2d 26; Kruesel v. Collin, 170 Wash. 233, 16 P.2d 442; 21 R. C. L. 701.

Nor can it be doubted that the title to chapter 65, the Bond Act, which is general rather than restrictive in its scope, sufficiently complies with the constitutional provision as to titles to enactments. In re Hulet, 159 Wash. 98, 292 P. 430, and cases cited.

Neither can it be doubted that the emergency clauses are valid under our Seventh Amendment, if the legislation is otherwise valid, since, if the emergency justifying the legislation is not necessary and valid, it is palpably plain that the legislation is such that it could not be enacted without submitting to a popular vote for approval, under our Constitution, art. 8, § 3.

The principal question to be determined is, Are the bonds valid without popular submission and approval, within the meaning of section 2, art. 8, of our Constitution?

An act of the Legislature is only to be overthrown by virtue of some specific limitation or prohibition in the paramount law. Where a doubt exists the act is sustained. State ex rel. Case v. Howell, 85 Wash. 294, 147 P. 1159, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1231; State ex rel. Short v. Hinkle, 116 Wash. 1, 198 P. 535; State ex rel. Campbell v. Stewart, 54 Mont. 504, 171 P. 755, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1101; Baker v. Hill, 180 Ark. 387, 21 S.W.2d 867; Hovey v. Foster, 118 Ind. 502, 21 N.E. 39.

It must be remembered also that the Governor is a part of the legislative authority of the state and the Governor approved the legislation we have now Before us, thus approving both the necessity for the combined legislation and the emergency existing. As was said in Gottstein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 P. 595, 608, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1008: 'The courts are not the sole guardians of the Constitution, and, while it is necessary that each department of the government heed the mandates of that instrument, it is no less important that the courts should not reach out beyond their constitutional sphere to question and draw to themselves duties and powers which belong to the other departments of the government.'

Our Constitution also provides that: '* * * The governor shall have power to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the state to suppress insurrections and repel invasions.' Article 10, § 2.

In a contingency under this provision of the Constitution where it was shown only that there were dangers of destruction to life and property in two communities in one county in the...