State ex rel. Harris v. Laughlin

• Decision Date: 31 October 1881
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. HARRIS v. LAUGHLIN.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

75 Mo. 147

THE STATE ex rel. HARRIS

v.LAUGHLIN.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1881.

Prohibition.

WRIT AWARDED.

Joseph R. Harris for relator.

John W. Dryden for respondent.

NORTON, J.

We are asked in this case to issue a writ of prohibition forbidding the respondent, the judge of the St. Louis criminal court from doing or permitting any act to be done under an order made by said court on the 20th day of February, 1882, directing a special venire returnable on the 14th day of March, 1882, to issue to the sheriff of the city of St. Louis, to summon 100 men from the county outside the city of St. Louis, for the trial of the cause of the State v. John D. Shea, upon an indictment for murder alleged to have been committed in the city of St. Louis, and pending in said court. We are also asked to forbid said judge from permitting any citizens of said county of St. Louis from being sworn as jurors in said cause.

1. COURTS: St. Louis county: constitutional law

It is contended on the part of respondent that the prayer of the petitioner should be denied, because said St. Louis criminal court by virtue of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 15th and 18th sections of the act establishing said court, passed on the 29th day of November, 1855, obtained the jurisdiction, which it is claimed said court is about to exercise, and that it has never been deprived of the jurisdiction thus conferred. On the other hand, while it is admitted by counsel for the State that the sections of the act creating the said criminal court did confer upon it the jurisdiction claimed, it is contended that such jurisdiction was taken away from said court by an act of the general assembly passed on the 28th of April, 1877, (Acts 1877, p. 207,) dividing the State into judicial circuits. That act declares that the “State is hereby divided into judicial circuits, each circuit to consist of the counties, and to be numbered as hereinafter set forth * * Section 9. The Eighth judicial circuit shall consist of the city of St. Louis * * Section 20. The Nineteenth judicial circuit shall consist of the counties of St. Louis, St. Charles, Lincoln and Warren.” It is claimed by counsel for the State that sections 24 and 25, article 9, and section 24, article 6, of the constitution of 1875, conferred upon the general assembly the power to pass the above act. Counsel for respondent deny this, and argue with great earnestness and ability, that the said act of April 28th, 1877, in so far as it undertakes to place St. Louis county in the Nineteenth judicial circuit, and make the city of St. Louis the Eighth judicial circuit, is unconstitutional and void.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: rules of construction.

No question is ever presented to a court of last resort of a more delicate and important character than one which calls upon it to pass upon the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. In the solution of such a question when presented, resort should not be made to mere verbal criticisms, subtle distinctions, abstract reasoning or nice differences in the meaning of words: and in its consideration the maxim that “he who sticks to the letter” in the construction of a law, “sticks in the bark” is peculiarly applicable; qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice. “No rule is better settled than that acts of the legislature are presumed to be constitutional till the contrary plainly appears, and it is only when they manifestly infringe upon some provision of the constitution that they can be declared to be void for that reason. In cases of doubt every possible presumption not directly and clearly inconsistent with the language and subject matter is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act.” State v. Able, 65 Mo. 362; Stephens v. St. Louis Nat. B'k, 43 Mo. 385; State v. Cape Girardeau, etc., R. R. Co., 48 Mo. 468. These observations are made as indicating the proper rule for our guidance in solving the question presented.

In support of the position taken that the said act of April 28th, 1877, is void, it is argued that by virtue of section 24, article 9 of the constitution, the Eighth judicial circuit was made to consist of the county and city of St Louis, and that it was beyond the power of the legislature to change it, as was done by said act, inasmuch as under section 24, article 6 of the constitution, said Eighth circuit was excepted from the operation of the power therein conferred upon the legislature to divide the State into judicial circuits. Said section 24, article 9, which it is claimed irrevocably (except by constitutional amendment) fixed the county and city of St. Louis into one circuit, is as follows: “The county and city of St. Louis, as now existing, shall continue to constitute the Eighth judicial circuit, and the jurisdiction of all courts of record, except the county court, shall continue until otherwise provided by law.”

It is argued that the words in said section “until otherwise provided by law,” relate exclusively to the subject matter of the jurisdiction of all courts of record within the Eighth circuit as therein defined, except the county court, and not to the territorial jurisdiction of such courts, and that while the general assembly might change and alter the jurisdiction of such courts as to subject matter it could not change their jurisdiction territorially. It is contended that inasmuch as said section 24 consists of two clauses, the phrase “until otherwise provided by law,” according to the grammatical construction of the sentence, applies only to the next preceding clause. In support of this view we have been cited to Broom's Legal Maxims, page 679, where it is said “that relative words must ordinarily be referred to the next antecedent when the intent upon the whole deed doth not appear to the contrary and when the matter itself doth not hinder it, the last antecedent being the last word which can be made an antecedent so as to have any meaning.” The same writer says in the same connection: “But, although the above general proposition is true in strict grammatical construction, yet there are numerous examples in the best writers to show that the context may often require a deviation from this rule, and that the relative may be connected with nouns which go before the last antecedent and either take from it or give it some qualification.”

If the grammatical construction of said section 24 is alone to be considered in construing it, and we are not to look at the circumstances which gave origin to the section, nor to the context, nor to the end to be accomplished by it, the interpretation contended for would be at least plausible, if not correct. When, however, these things are taken into account, we think the construction contended for by respondent cannot be maintained. Said section 24, establishing, as it does, a judicial circuit, and relating, as it does, to the continuation of the jurisdiction of all courts of record therein, except the county court, we would expect to find it in article 6 of the constitution, which is devoted to the “judicial department,” but instead of finding it there we find it at the close of article 9, which treats of “counties, cities and towns,” and preceded by four sections devoted exclusively to the county and city of St. Louis, which said sections fully provided for and authorized the adoption of a scheme and charter, which, if adopted, would bring about a new order of things in both city and county, disintegrate the county, separate the city from the county, making each independent of the other, one to exist as a city and the other as a county. The city was to be invested with all the property in its limits hitherto belonging to the county, and was to assume all the indebtedness of the county, collect the State revenue and perform all other functions in relation to the State as if it was a county. This new order of things would leave the city of St. Louis in the possession and with the ownership of the court house and jail, and necessitate on the part of St. Louis county the location of a county seat, and the erection of necessary buildings in which to hold its courts for the administration of civil and criminal law. The evident purpose of those sections was a complete divorcement of the city and county, and to make two separate and distinct parts of what had always before been one; one of these parts to be a county, the other a city, in many respects clothed with the attributes of a county, each independent of the other. It was known by the framers of the constitution that it would go into effect, if adopted, on the 30th day of November, 1875, and that the scheme and charter authorized by said sections could be adopted, as in fact they were adopted, and went into effect in October, 1876, before any legislature elected under said constitution could be convened. It was also known that if the scheme and charter should be adopted, the territory outside of the limits of the city of St. Louis, as enlarged, would at once become a county, and that the city of St. Louis would thereafter be no part of the county, but a city, at least in name, in the State, independent of the county, and without being in any county in the State, but still bearing the same relation to the State as a county, except it was to have no county court. To meet this novel and anomalous state of affairs, and to provide temporarily the means for the administration of civil and criminal law in this dissevered and disintegrated territory, in which, without some additional provision, neither civil nor criminal laws could have been administered, said section 24 was incorporated, and was evidently intended to apply to the condition of things that would exist after the adoption of the scheme. That such was the intention was evidenced by the fact that it continued the jurisdiction of all courts of record, except the county court, and it certainly was not intended to discontinue the jurisdiction of the county court in the city of St. Louis except...