State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of Duluth

• Decision Date: 09 May 1893
• Citation: 55 N.W. 118,53 Minn. 238
• Parties: STATE EX REL. HART ET AL. v COMMON COUNCIL OF CITY OF DULUTH ET AL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

53 Minn. 238

55 N.W. 118

STATE EX REL. HART ET AL.vCOMMON COUNCIL OF CITY OF DULUTH ET AL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 9, 1893.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Where the power of a municipal body to remove from office is not discretionary, but only for cause, after notice and hearing, the proceedings are judicial in their nature, and may be reviewed on certiorari.

2. On such review the court will inspect the record to see whether the body had jurisdiction, and kept within it, and whether the charges preferred were sufficient in law, and will examine the evidence, not for the purpose of weighing it, but to ascertain whether it furnished any legal and substantial basis for the removal.

3. Such bodies being essentially legislative and administrative, their proceedings, even when judicial in their nature, are not to be tested by the strict legal rules which prevail in courts of law. If they keep within their jurisdiction, and the evidence furnishes a legal and substantial basis for their decision, it will not be disturbed for mere informalities or irregularities which might amount to reversible error in the proceedings of a court.

4. “Sufficient cause” means “legal cause,” and must be one that specially relates to and affects the administration of the office,-one touching the qualifications of the officer, or his performance of its duties.

5. While the charges need not be stated with the formal exactness required in pleadings in courts, yet they should contain a specification of facts constituting a cause for removal, with reasonable precision, sufficient to inform the incumbent of the particular grounds upon which the charges are based.

6. The sufficiency and reasonableness of the charges are questions of law for the court.

7. The city charter of Duluth vests the power of removing the fire commissioners from office exclusively in the common council, and a resolution of that body preferring charges against such commissioners, and fixing a time and place of hearing, is not one which requires the approval of the mayor.

8. The charges in the case considered, and held insufficient.

Certiorari in the name of the state, on relation of James Hart, Jr., and others, against the common council of the city of Duluth and others, to review and quash the action of respondents in removing relators from the office of fire commissioners. Judgment for relators.

B. C. Rude and A. L. Thurman, for relators.

J. D. Holmes, for respondents.

MITCHELL, J.

By the charter of the city of Duluth, all powers and duties connected with, and incident to, the government and discipline of the fire department of the city are vested in three commissioners, called the “Board of Fire Commissioners,” who have entire control of the department, including the appointment and discharge of all employes connected with it, and making their own rules and regulations for the government of the same. These commissioners are, “on nomination of the mayor,” “appointed by the common council,” and hold their office for the term of three years. The charter provides that “any member of said board may at any time be removed by a vote of two thirds of all the members elect of the common council of said city for sufficient cause: *** provided, that the said common council shall previously cause a copy of the charges preferred against such member sought to be removed, and notice of the time and place of hearing the same, to be served on him at least ten days previous to the day so assigned, and opportunity be given him to make his defense personally or by counsel.” It is here sought, by certiorari, to review the proceedings of the common council in assuming to remove the relators from the office of fire commissioners.

1. It is urged by respondents that the power of removal from office conferred on the common council is purely administrative and quasi political, and therefore that their proceedings cannot be reviewed on certiorari. That this power may not be “judicial,” in the sense that it can only be conferred upon the courts, in whom all judicial power is vested under the constitution, has nothing to do with the question; for there is nothing now better settled than that certiorari will lie to review the quasi judicial acts and proceedings of municipal officers and bodies. Neither is there anything better settled than that while the incumbent has no vested right of property, as against the state, in a public office, yet his right to it has always been recognized by the courts as a privilege entitled to the protection of the law, and that proceedings, in all cases where the amotion from office is for cause, upon notice and hearing, are adversary and judicial in their nature, and may be reviewed on certiorari. We think there is practically no conflict in the authorities on this point, the only difference among them being merely as to what they will review on such a writ. Some courts, restricting the writ to its original common-law office, hold that it brings up for review only the record, and not the evidence, and hence that they will not look into the evidence at all, but merely inspect the record, to see whether the inferior tribunal had jurisdiction, and had not exceeded it, and had proceeded according to law, or, as expressed in one case, whether the tribunal “had kept within its jurisdiction, or whether the cause assigned was a cause for removal under the statute.” Other courts hold that the evidence may be brought up, not for the purpose of weighing it, to ascertain the preponderance, but merely to ascertain whether there was any evidence at all to sustain the decision of the inferior tribunal,-whether it furnished any legal and substantial basis for the decision. The latter is the doctrine of this court as to the office of the writ of certiorari. But, while this is so, we recognize the prime importance of each department of government avoiding anything like improper interference with the others in the discharge of their functions; also, that while city councils and other municipal bodies may not have the power to remove from office except for cause, yet, this power being designed to insure...