State ex rel. Hart v. Gleeson, 26355.

• Decision Date: 11 February 1937
• Docket Number: 26355.
• Citation: 64 P.2d 1023,189 Wash. 292
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HART v. GLEESON et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

64 P.2d 1023

189 Wash. 292

STATE ex rel. HART v. GLEESON et al.

No. 26355.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

February 11, 1937

Appeal from Superior Court, Grays Harbor County; J. M. Phillips Judge.

Proceeding by the State, on the relation of George W. A. Hart, against Francis J. Gleeson and others, as commissioners of Grays Harbor county, and Grays Harbor county, a municipal corporation, for writ of mandate directing county and board of commissioners to investigate relator's application for relief to the blind and to issue and deliver to him warrants on county treasury for amount of relief found to be due. From a judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandate, the defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Paul O Manley, of Montesano, for appellants.

J. E Stewart, of Aberdeen, for respondent.

STEINERT Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Grays Harbor county wherein a peremptory writ of mandate was granted directing the county and its board of commissioners forthwith to investigate relator's application for relief to the blind and to issue and deliver to him warrants upon the county treasury for the amount of relief found to be due, according to law.

The application upon which this proceeding is brought sets forth facts showing that the respondent relator is a blind person within the meaning, and entitled to the benefits, of chapter 106, Laws of 1935, p. 259, Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 10007-2 et seq.

Appellants' defense, as disclosed by their answer, was that, for the year 1936, there was levied upon the total assessed value of the property of the county a tax of .2002 mills for the payment of pensions for the blind; that the amount of revenue to be realized from such levy was duly budgeted for the payment of such pensions; that the number of pensions for blind persons already granted by the county would exhaust the budget for that purpose; that appellants could not grant relator's application without exceeding the budget and issuing emergency warrants for the excess; and that, because of other mandatory levies imposed by the statute upon the county, it was impossible for appellants to levy more than .2002 mills for such pensions without seriously curtailing and infringing upon other departments of county government.

The question in this case is whether the defense interposed by appellants is sufficient in law.

Section 2 of chapter 106, Laws of 1935, p. 259 (Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 10007-3), provides that any blind person fulfilling the requirements of that section shall be entitled to the relief provided in the act. Section 4 of the same act (Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 10007-5) provides that if an applicant be found to be entitled to the pension prayed for, the board of county commissioners shall issue an order therefor in a sum not less than $100 per quarter, to be paid monthly from the fund created by the act. Section 7 of the act (Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 10007-9) provides that, in addition to other levies by the county, the board of county commissioners shall also levy a tax of one-fifth of 1 mill on each dollar of assessed value of the property of the county, such tax to be levied and collected for the purpose of creating a fund for relief of the blind in the county.

The duty which the Legislature imposed upon the respective counties of providing relief for the blind to the extent of $400 per annum per person and issuing warrants in the required amount is mandatory, and the performance of such duty is not excused by the exhaustion of the funds levied and budgeted for that purpose.

In State ex rel. Robbins v. Scofield, 184 Wash. 270, 50 P.2d 1022, the argument was made, as it is made here, that the budget had been exhausted. In disposing of that argument we said: 'We see no justification for such an argument. The sovereign power of the state, exercised by its legislative department, placed an imperative duty upon the several counties. When the act of 1935 took effect, it was the duty of the county commissioners to comply with its terms by issuing warrants as the law required, and by proceeding in due course to...