State ex rel. Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Shain

• Citation: 149 S.W. 479,245 Mo. 78
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOPKINS B. SHAIN, Judge, and PETER COURTNEY
• Decision Date: 02 July 1912
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

149 S.W. 479

245 Mo. 78

THE STATE ex rel. HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOPKINS B. SHAIN, Judge, and PETER COURTNEY

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 2, 1912

Writ allowed.

Jones Jones, Hocker & Davis and Montgomery & Montgomery for relator.

(1) The courts of one State will not exercise visitorial power over the internal affairs of a foreign corporation; and they will refuse to grant relief in cases where they cannot compel the performance of their decrees. State ex rel. v Denton, 229 Mo. 187; Clark v. Association, 43 L. R. A. 390; Taylor v. Association, 97 Va. 60; Howard v. Association, 125 N.C. 49; Condon v Mut. Res. Assn., 89 Md. 99; 19 Cyc. 1236-8; Sideway v. Missouri Co., 101 F. 481; 13 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law 849; Fraternal Union v. Lundy, 113 S.W. 185; 14 Cyc 308. (2) Prohibition is the proper remedy under the circumstances disclosed by the record. State ex rel. v. Denton, 229 Mo. 187; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 209 Mo. 177; Appo v. People, 20 N.Y. 531; State ex rel. v. Williams, 221 Mo. 227; State ex rel. v. Elkins, 130 Mo. 105; State ex rel. v. Fort, 210 Mo. 525; State ex rel. v. Sale, 188 Mo. 497; State ex rel. v. Stover, 126 Mo. 655; State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 Mo. 425; State ex rel. v. Withrow, 154 Mo. 397; State ex rel. v. Oloe, 152 Mo. 466; State ex rel. v. Denton, 128 Mo.App. 314; State ex rel. v. Spencer, 166 Mo. 271; State ex rel. v. Dillon, 96 Mo. 56; State ex rel. v. Dearing, 180 Mo. 69; State ex rel. v. Barnett, 111 Mo.App. 558.

Orville M. Barnett for respondent.

(1) No exercise of visitorial power over the internal affairs of foreign corporation would be required to prove allegations of petition below. Pfeffer v. Ins. Co., N. Y. L. J., July 28, 1911, p. 1851; Harrison v. Ins. Co., 63 Misc. N. Y. 93, affirmed 201 N.Y. 35; Castagnino v. Mutual Reserve, 157 F. 29; Guilford v. Western Union, 59 Minn. 332; Straus v. Mutual Reserve, 126 N.C. 971; Ebert v. Mutual Reserve, 81 Minn. 116; Benjamin v. Mutual Reserve, 146 Cal. 34; 19 Cyc. 1238 (3); 13 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 849 (14); Pierce v. Ins. Co., 145 Mass. 56; Art. 12, Ch. 21, R. S. 1909. (2) The courts of Missouri are not without power over foreign insurance companies should an injunction be granted and that injunction ignored. R. S. 1909, Sec. 7069; 22 Cyc. 1022; Eureka Co. v. County, 116 U.S. 410; 22 Cyc. 1012. (3) A demurrer to the petition will not lie because some of the relief prayed is beyond the power of the courts to grant. Liese v. Meyer, 143 Mo. 547; Crosby v. Bank, 107 Mo. 436; Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161; McGlothlin v. Henry, 44 Mo. 350; 31 Cyc. 297. (4) The policies are Missouri contracts and will be construed according to the laws of Missouri. Daggs v. Ins. Co., 136 Mo. 382; State ex inf. v. Oil Co., 194 Mo. 149.

OPINION

In Banc

Prohibition.

WOODSON J.

-- This is an original proceeding begun in this court by the petitioner, seeking to prohibit the respondent, as judge of the circuit court of Pettis county, from further proceeding with the trial of the case of Peter Courtney against the Hartford Life Insurance Company (a mutual concern), pending in said court.

The substance of the charges made in the petition in that case is that the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant, by which it insured his life, for a certain sum, evidenced by a certificate of membership, dated January 27, 1882, for and in consideration of the premiums stated in a table of rates stated in said certificate, which rates vary according to the age of the insured and the amount of outstanding insurance in force at the time each quarterly assessment is made.

Said table of rates is as follows:

"Table of Graduated Rates for Death Losses for Every $ 1,000 of a Total Indemnity of $ 1,000,000.

Age.

Rate.

Age.

Rate.

Age.

Rate.

15 to 21

$ 0.65

35

$ 0.97

49

$ 1.40

22

.67

36

1.00

50

1.47

23

.69

37

1.03

51

1.54

24

.71

38

1.06

52

1.63

25

.73

39

1.09

53

1.72

26

.75

40

1.12

54

1.81

27

.77

41

1.14

55

1.92

28

.79

42

1.16

56

2.03

29

.81

43

1.18

57

2.15

30

.83

44

1.20

58

2.32

31

.85

45

1.22

59

2.50

32

.88

46

1.25

60

2.68

33

.91

47

1.30

34

.94

48

1.35

At the bottom of this table was the following statement:

"These rates decrease in proportion as the total indemnity in force increases above one million dollars in amount, and are calculated so as to cover the usual expense for collecting."

The plaintiff alleges, "that on the 25th day of January 1896, he reached the age of sixty years, and since that date the defendant has fraudulently assessed the plaintiff on each of the five certificates or contracts, which he held in defendant's company, in excess of $ 2.68 for every $ 1000 on a total indemnity of $ 1,000,000, and 'prays judgment against defendant (1) that the defendant be perpetually enjoined from assessing the plaintiff upon his contract at a rate in excess of $ 2.68 per $ 1000 on a total indemnity of $ 1,000,000; (2) that the defendant render an accounting to the plaintiff in excess of said rate since the 25th day of June 1896, with interest upon each excessive payment since the date of said payment, and (3) that the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant for the sum so found to be due the plaintiff upon such accounting, and that the plaintiff have such other and further relief as may to the court seem just and equitable, besides the costs and disbursements of this action.'"

The defendant appearing specially demurred to this petition on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or the subject of the action, nor jurisdiction to grant the relief therein prayed for, which demurrer was overruled by the court, of which the respondent H. B. Shain is the judge.

The petition for the writ filed in this court charges that the circuit court of Pettis county has no jurisdiction of the defendant in that cause for the reason that the remedies sought, if granted, would interfere with and disturb the internal affairs of the petitioner company, a corporation of Connecticut, with its principal office and officers located in that State; also for the reason that said court has no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff in that case.

Shortly after the circuit court overruled the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's petition in that cause, the former filed in this court its petition in this cause for a writ of prohibition.

After due consideration, the preliminary rule was granted and duly served upon the respondent. In due time he filed his return admitting the facts pleaded, but tendered issues of law upon the facts. Thereupon, the petitioner moved for judgment upon the pleadings.

I. The facts of this case are admitted and are embraced within a small compass, and thereupon are predicated, for determination, but two legal propositions, namely: First, has the circuit court of Pettis county jurisdiction to order an accounting of the petitioner's business affairs, and to determine therefrom, whether or not the plaintiff, in the case of himself against the petitioner, pending in said court, has been, and is being charged excessive and illegal premiums upon his policy of insurance; and, second, if so has said court jurisdiction to render judgment for the excessive sums so paid and to enjoin the future collection of said excessive premiums?

The latter proposition depends upon the former, and whichever way that question is disposed of will largely control the disposition of the latter, consequently, we will consider the propositions in the order stated.

Counsel for respondent has with much care and due deliberation, stated the rule, which in his opinion should govern the interpretation of the policy of insurance, in question, regarding the premiums due thereunder, but he cites no authority whatever in support of his position.

It seems to us that learned counsel has misconceived the object and purpose of this proceeding. The questions involved, as previously stated, challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court of Pettis county to pass upon the propositions stated, and not the correctness or incorrectness of the interpretation to be given to the policy of insurance mentioned in the evidence. If it has not the jurisdiction to pass upon those questions, then it would be useless to announce the rule of interpretation which is to govern the policy, for the simple reason that it would have no force or effect whatever, even though it should be conceded that the correct rule should be announced and the proper decree entered.

The principal proposition here presented for determination is not a new one. It has been before this court, and other courts of this country in a number of cases; and so thoroughly and ably has it been considered, that there remains but little, if anything, new, that can be said upon the subject. We will, therefore, be content, with the disposition of the question, by quoting from a few of the opinions of some of the courts passing upon the question.

The case of Clark v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 14 App. District of Columbia, 546, involved this precise question. There the company was a mutual concern, organized under the laws of New York; and the plaintiff who held a certificate of membership therein brought suit in the District of Columbia, against the defendant, charging in the bill that the defendant company had illegally and contrary to the contract of insurance, adopted an arbitrary and unauthorized method of levying assessments, and in pursuance thereto was levying, and was threatening to continue to levy, illegal and excessive assessments against the plaintiff and his co-members; that said illegal and fraudulent assessments had been, and were being made, and enforced as a...