State ex rel. Henderson v. Vill. of New Richmond
| Decision Date | 13 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. CA2019-11-089,CA2019-11-089 |
| Citation | 160 N.E.3d 349,2020 Ohio 4875 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio EX REL. Floyd HENDERSON, et al., Appellant, v. The Village of NEW RICHMOND, Ohio, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Lazarus & Lewis, LLC, Gary R. Lewis, Cincinnati Club Building, Suite 915, 30 Garfield Place, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for appellant.
Schroeder, Maundrell, Barbiere & Powers, Scott A. Sollmann, 5300 Socialville-Foster Road, Suite 200, Mason, Ohio 45040, for appellees.
{¶1} Floyd Henderson appeals the decision of the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his claims against the village of New Richmond, Ohio ("the Village") and other defendants. For the reasons that follow, this court affirms the decision.
{¶2} The following facts derive from Henderson's pleading and its attachments and for purposes of this appeal are presumed true. In 1987, the New Richmond Police Department ("NRPD") hired Henderson as a patrolman. In 2011, NRPD promoted Henderson to the position of police corporal, which was a supervisory position.
{¶3} Henderson remained the only corporal employed by NRPD until November 27, 2018, when the council for New Richmond ("Village Council") voted to adopt Ordinance 2018-18, which authorized the immediate elimination of the position of corporal within NRPD. The ordinance, attached to Henderson's complaint, explained the reasoning behind its passage, which was that the corporal position had originally been intended to act as NRPD's primary investigator but that NRPD's patrol officers had been conducting their own investigations. In addition, the NRPD currently had a total of three supervisory positions to supervise three full-time patrol officers and the police chief informed Village Council there was no practical need for three supervisors. Finally, eliminating the corporal position would result in a cost savings. The ordinance further resolved that the Village would offer the employee currently filling the corporal position a full-time patrolman position.
{¶4} Two weeks after the ordinance's adoption, the police chief asked to meet with Henderson and give him a letter. The letter, attached to the complaint, was addressed to Henderson from the police chief and informed Henderson that pursuant to Ordinance 2018-18, the position of corporal had been eliminated and that the Village was offering him a full-time patrolman position. The offered rate of pay for the patrolman position was a reduction of $3.09 from Henderson's hourly wage as a corporal, resulting in a salary reduction of approximately $6,760. The document ended with a signature line and informed Henderson that he if accepted the offer, he would need to sign the document and return it to the police chief by December 20, or 9 days later.
{¶5} On December 20, Henderson met with the police chief and returned the offer letter. On the signature line, Henderson wrote: "I respectfully object to the terms and conditions of this letter and are protesting same." Henderson told the police chief that he was represented by counsel and provided the chief with his lawyer's business card.
{¶6} The police chief told Henderson that if did not sign the letter he would no longer be an officer with NRPD. Henderson did not sign the letter. The next day, December 21, 2018, the Village's law director sent Henderson a letter memorializing that Henderson's position had been eliminated by Ordinance 2018-18, that Henderson had not accepted the Village's offer of employment as a patrolman and therefore, effective as of the close of business December 20, 2018, Henderson was no longer an employee of NRPD.
{¶7} On January 22, 2019, Henderson filed a pleading styled "consolidated notice of appeal and verified complaint" against the Village, its administrator, mayor, interim police chief, and the six members of the Village Council. With regard to the "notice of appeal," the pleading indicated it was an "administrative-related appeal" from a "final order" of the Village. Henderson attached the "final order" to the complaint, which was the Village law director's December 21, 2018 letter. The pleading further indicated that Henderson's appeal was pursuant to R.C. Chapters 119, 124, 2505, and 2506.
{¶8} The complaint portion of the pleading listed five causes of action. Count one was for a writ of mandamus, alleging that Henderson had a clear legal right to immediate reinstatement to the rank of corporal and its attendant employment benefits and that Henderson had no adequate remedy at law. Count two was titled "Violations of Law" and indicated that Henderson had the right to continued employment with NRPD until he was "removed for cause, in the manner provided by Ohio law." Henderson further alleged that the passage of Ordinance 2018-18 violated the statutes of Ohio, although the pleading did not specify which statutes were violated.
{¶9} Counts three and four alleged facial and as-applied challenges to Ordinance 2018-18, alleging violations of the United States Constitution, the 14th Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and procedural due process. Henderson averred that he had a property interest in continued employment with NRPD and was entitled to due process of law before being deprived of his employment. Henderson further averred that Ordinance 2018-18 was unconstitutional because it did not provide him with a hearing or other meaningful opportunity to be heard. Finally, in count five, Henderson asked the court for a declaratory judgment. Henderson alleged a justiciable controversy existed between him and the defendants and requested that the court issue a "judicial determination construing the legal relationships between the parties."
{¶10} Henderson asked the court to order his reinstatement as a NRPD corporal and to make him whole with respect to various employment-related benefits. Henderson further requested damages and attorney fees.
{¶11} The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. With respect to the appeal portion of the pleading, the defendants argued that Henderson was not entitled to appeal the adoption of Ordinance 2018-18 under any of the cited statutory provisions. The defendants further argued that Henderson was not entitled to relief on any of the counts set forth in the complaint.
{¶12} After the matter was fully briefed, the trial court issued a decision granting judgment on the pleadings. The court agreed that Henderson had no statutory right or other basis to appeal Ordinance 2018-18. With respect to Henderson's request for a writ of mandamus and "violations of law," the court found that Henderson had not established a clear legal right to continued employment as a corporal with NRPD or that the Village violated any laws in the adoption of Ordinance 2018-18. With respect to the two counts alleging violations of due process, the court concluded that Henderson could not demonstrate any property interest in his former position with NRPD, and thus could not demonstrate that he had been unfairly deprived of due process of law when his position was eliminated. Finally, the court found that Henderson was not entitled to a declaratory judgment because he could not demonstrate any justiciable issue.
{¶13} Henderson appeals, raising one assignment of error:
{¶14} THE TRIAL COURT SUBSTANTIALLY ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF HENDERSON IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
{¶15} Henderson divides his assignment of error into five issues for review. Henderson contends that his appeal was authorized by statute and case law and that his termination was unlawful pursuant to various Revised Code provisions. For purposes of his due process claims, Henderson contends that he had a property right in his former position. Alternatively, Henderson claims to have a clear legal right to reinstatement to the rank of corporal, no adequate remedy at law, and therefore is entitled to a writ of mandamus.
{¶16} The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C), which provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Civ.R. 12(C) motions are specifically for resolving questions of law. Whaley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 92 Ohio St.3d 574, 581, 752 N.E.2d 267 (2001). Therefore, this court's standard of review is de novo. Cyrus v. Home Depot USA, Inc. , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2007-09-098, 2008-Ohio-4315, 2008 WL 3893156, ¶ 18.
{¶17} When considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court is restricted to consider only the allegations in the pleadings and must construe as true all the material allegations in the complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint are in favor of the nonmoving party. Whaley at 581, 752 N.E.2d 267. Dismissal is appropriate under Civ.R. 12(C) when, after construing all material allegations in the complaint in favor of the nonmoving party, the court finds beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious , 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996).
{¶18} Henderson argues that he was entitled to appeal the Village Council's elimination of the NRPD corporal position under R.C. Chapters 2505 and 2506 and that the law director's letter constituted the final order from which he timely appealed pursuant to R.C. 2506.01(A). R.C. Chapter 2506 authorizes appeals to the common pleas court of the administrative decisions of political subdivisions. Auxier Trucking v. Tate Twp. Bd. of Trustees , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2001-01-012, 2001 WL 1652078, *3 (Dec. 24, 2001).1 However, "in order for an administrative act to be appealable under R.C. 2506.01 such act must be the product of quasi-judicial proceedings." M.J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland , 32...
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