State ex rel. Higley v. District Court of Carbon County

Citation281 P. 196,41 Wyo. 1
Decision Date17 October 1929
Docket Number1610
PartiesSTATE OF WYOMING EX REL. D. R. HIGLEY v. DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY, ET AL. [*]
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

ORIGINAL proceedings in prohibition by the State of Wyoming on the relation of D. R. Higley against the District Court of the Second Judicial District of Wyoming for the County of Carbon and V. J. Tidball, judge thereof, to restrain said court from exercising jurisdiction in a case wherein defendants, made application for a change of venue which application was later withdrawn by leave of court.

Application Denied.

For the relator there was a brief by D. R. Higley of Rawlins Wyoming.

Questions of jurisdiction resulting from applications made for change of venue are quite generally divided into two classes; those in which an application for change of judge, or change of venue is addressed to the discretion of the court, and those where, under the statute, something is left to the discretion of the court, and the statute is not mandatory in operation. Perkins v. McDowell, 3 Wyo. 204; Huhn v Quinn, 21 Wyo. 51; State v. Court, 269 P. 35. Where the statute is mandatory, the function of carrying the change into effect is ministerial. Robison v. Lumber Co., (Ida.) 186 P. 922; State v. Court, (Mont.) 240 P. 388; Brady v. Times-Mirror Co., (Cal.) 39 P. 209; Gordon, et al. v. Conor, et al., (Idaho) 51 P. 747; Krumdick v. Krump, (Cal.) 32 P. 800; Miles v. Wright, (Ariz.) 194 P. 88. In some jurisdictions the court granting the change, does not lose jurisdiction until the papers are transferred and the change perfected. Mudge v. Hull, (Kas.) 43 P. 242; Simpkins v. Parsons, (Okla.) 151 P. 588. But in those states the application is addressed to the discretion of the court, and the practice provided by statute differs from Wyoming. Jones v. Ins. Co., 109 P. 1077; 112 P. 826; Jones v. Ins. Co., 116 P. 484. Where the court is divested of jurisdiction by operation of the statute, and there is no statutory procedure to restore its jurisdiction, it logically follows that jurisdiction could only be acquired by a competent court on a proper order for change in accordance with the statute. To hold otherwise would permit the discretion of the court to intervene in a mandatory matter, but would make the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the caprice of a litigant and encourage dilatory practices. Where an attempt is made to disqualify more than one county, the parties must be given an opportunity to be heard, if they so desire. State v. Dist. Court, (Wyo.) 269 P. 40. This is an exercise of the discretion of the court arising out of the necessity of the case and is in harmony with the proposition that the court is, on proper application, for a change of venue, divested of all jurisdiction of a judicial character over the cause.

For the defendants there was a brief by Dillon, Ellery and Spencer and J. C. O'Mahoney of Cheyenne, and Thos. W. O'Hara of Rawlins.

The defendants in the case of D. R. Higley v. C. W. Jeffrey and E. A. Kell, applied for a change of venue from Carbon county on grounds of local prejudice. Defendants thereafter and before any order had been made for a change of venue, withdrew their application for such change by leave of court, to which plaintiff objects. Plaintiff's objections were overruled, and plaintiff now seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain the exercise of jurisdiction in said cause by the court wherein the action was brought. A change of venue is a personal privilege which may be waived. Kingsbury v. Vreeland, 144 P. 887; Brewing Co. v. Ward, 102 N.E. 395; Dembitz v. Co., 132 N.Y.S. 593. An application once made, may be withdrawn by the applicant. State v. Shain, 248 S.W. 591. An application may be abandoned by failure to comply with the statute. Bridge Co. v. Gage, 111 N.W. 1084; Kirby v. U. P. R. R. Co., 119 P. 1042; Kramer v. Pixton, 268 P. 1029. Failure to support application by compliance with the statute amounts to a waiver of the right. Oettinger v. Hill Livestock Co., 86 S.E. 957. There should be no question of defendant's right to withdraw their application for a change of venue. State v. Court, 193 P. 678; Hosmer v. New York Buyers, 258 S.W. 853. Failure to comply with the statute Sec. 6421 is deemed an abandonment thereof. Plaintiff seeks a change of venue and to accomplish by indirection that which he cannot obtain under the statute. The application for a writ of prohibition should be denied.

BLUME, Chief Justice. KIMBALL and RINER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

BLUME, Chief Justice.

An application on the relation of D. R. Higley has been presented for a writ of prohibition against the District Court of the Second Judicial District and V. J. Tidball, judge thereof. Before acting upon the application, it was deemed advisable to call for briefs and a list of the authorities bearing upon the point in question here. These briefs and authorities have been furnished by counsel for the respective interested parties. The facts are as follows: On December 20, 1928, the relator, as administrator of the estate of Katherine Ruth Higley, deceased, commenced an action for damages in the District Court of Carbon county against C. W. Jeffrey and E. A. Kell, as defendants. Answers in the cause were filed on March 15 and 16, 1929, and a reply thereto on March 27, 1929. On March 28, 1929, C. W. Jeffrey, and on April 4, 1929, E. A. Kell, filed an application for a change of venue in the cause on the ground of local prejudice. These applications were in due form and within the time required by statute. On July 26, 1929, and before any order had been made to change the venue, the defendants in the cause above mentioned filed a withdrawal in writing of their respective applications therefor. They were permitted to do so by an order of the District Court entered on September 6, 1929, over the objection, however, of the relator, and it was ordered by the court that the cause stand for further proceedings in the District Court of Carbon county. The application for a writ of prohibition is based on the theory that when the applications for a change of venue were filed, the District Court of Carbon county lost jurisdiction of the cause, except only to make an order changing the venue, and that the applications for such change could not be subsequently withdrawn by the parties who made them.

The relator relies upon the language used in the case of Perkins v. McDowell, 3 Wyo. 203, 19 P. 440, where the court said that the statute provides that when an affidavit is filed by a party setting out the prejudice of the people of the county in the terms required by the statute the change must be granted; that the statute is mandatory and leaves nothing to the discretion of the court. And he also points to the case of Huhn v. Quinn, 21 Wyo. 51, 58, 128 P. 514, which involved a change of judge and wherein it was said that if a proper affidavit is filed, it divests the presiding judge of further jurisdiction other than to call in another district judge of the state to preside in the trial of the case. Authorities are cited also from other jurisdictions in which the holding is similar to that in the two cases above mentioned. These cases, however, must be construed in the light of the fact that the applicant for a change of venue persisted in his demand and never withdrew it, while in the instant case the applications were withdrawn before any action was taken thereon, and hence these cases are not in point. It has often been held that the right to a change of venue is a personal privilege which may be waived. State v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 253, 193 P. 678; Hosmer v. New York Buyers', (Tex. Civ. App.) 258 S.W. 853; Dembitz v. Orange County Traction Co., 147 A.D. 583, 132 N.Y.S. 593; Kingsbury v. Vreeland, 58 Colo. 212, 144 P. 887; Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Ward, 56 Ind.App. 155, 102 N.E. 395, 105 N.E. 58; State ex rel. v. Shain, 297 Mo. 369, 248 S.W. 591. And while Section 6419, Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1920, which provides for a change of venue on account of local prejudice, is mandatory, the statute itself provides a method by which the application may be abandoned, for Section 6421, Wyo. Comp. Stat....

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT