State ex rel. Hildebrandt v. Fitzgerald

• Decision Date: 16 February 1912
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HILDEBRANDT v. FITZGERALD, Register of Deeds.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

117 Minn. 192

134 N.W. 728

STATE ex rel. HILDEBRANDT

v.FITZGERALD, Register of Deeds.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 16, 1912.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Olin B. Lewis, Judge.

Petition by the State, on the relation of Henry A. Hildebrandt, for writ of mandamus to Michael W. Fitzgerald, Register of Deeds of the County of Ramsey. Judgment for relator, and respondent appeals. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

Chapter 328, Laws 1907 (Rev. Laws Supp. 1909, ss 1038-25 to 1038-33), construed, and held, that it was the intention to constitute all mortgages upon real estate a class for the purpose of taxation, and that a mortgage given to secure an indebtedness of $50 or less is within the operation of the law, and taxable thereunder.

As so construed, the law is constitutional.

Hermon W. Phillips, for appellant.

William G. White, for respondent.

BUNN, J.

The relator presented to the district court for Ramsey county a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, as registrar of titles of said county, to register a mortgage made by the Midway Realty Company to relator October 24, 1911, to secure an indebtedness of $50. The petition alleged that the title to the land mortgaged was registered under the Torrens act, that the mortgage was tendered to respondent, as registrar of titles, for registration, together with the fees for filing and registering the same, and that respondent refused to file or register such mortgage. Upon this petition an alternative writ of mandamus was issued as prayed. Respondent answered, admitting the allegations of the petition, but alleging as his reason for refusing to register the mortgage that the registration tax thereon provided by chapter 328, Laws 1907 (Rev. Laws Supp. 1909, §§ 1038-25 to 1038-33), had not been paid; that the mortgage had not been presented to the county treasurer for the payment of such tax, or for the placing on the mortgage of the indorsement of the county treasurer that the mortgage is exempt from such tax; and that neither the indorsement that the tax had been paid or that the mortgage was exempt was ever placed upon the mortgage. To this answer relator demurred. The trial court sustained this demurrer, and judgment was entered that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue. From this judgment, respondent appealed to this court.

The question for our decision is that: Is a mortgage for $50 or less taxable under chapter 328, Laws of 1907? The decision of the trial court that the mortgage in question was not taxable under this law was based upon the language of section 2 of the act, reading as follows: ‘A tax of fifty cents is hereby imposed upon each one hundred dollars, or major fraction thereof, of the principal debt or obligation which is or in any contingency may be secured by any mortgage of real property situate within this state which mortgage is recorded or registered on or after April 30, 1907.’ It is not only admitted by both counsel, but asserted, that if the construction placed on the law by the trial court is correct, the law is unconstitutional, because there is no basis for a classification of mortgages for the purposes of taxation according to the amount of the debt secured thereby. Counsel for relator insists that this construction is necessary, and that the law is and should be declared unconstitutional; while counsel for the respondent in the court below urges the unconstitutionality of the law, if the trial court's construction is upheld, as an argument for a construction of the law which would make it valid.

This law was held constitutional after exhaustive arguments in Mutual Benefit Insurance Co. v. County of Martin, 104 Minn. 179, 116 N. W. 572. The chief attack made against the law in that case was that it provided for a classification that was improper and illegal under the amendment to the Constitution adopted in 1906 providing that ‘taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects.’ This court held that the law declared that ‘mortgages upon real estate shall constitute a class,’ and that such a classification was a reasonable one, suggested by essential difference of nature, situation, or circumstances, between a mortgage on real estate, and notes, bonds, or unsecured debts. The contention in that case that the tax was not uniform upon all subjects of the same class was held unfounded. Justice Elliott said: ‘Under this provision all property belonging to the same class must be treated alike. There must be no discrimination between the subjects of the class. The same means and methods must be applied impartially to all the constituent elements of the class. The amount of the debt secured by the lien furnishes the normal and natural standard for measuring the amount of tax which shall be paid when a mortgage is recorded under the statute.’ While it does not appear to have been urged in the above case that the law did not apply to mortgages securing debts of $50 or less, the decision clearly proceeds upon the basis that the act provides a uniform tax upon all mortgages, and therefore that the constitutional requirement that ‘all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects' was satisfied. It is to us quite apparent that this constitutional requirement is not satisfied if any mortgages are omitted from the operation of the act. It was again held that chapter 328, Laws 1907, was constitutional in State v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank, 114 Minn. 95, 130 N. W. 445, 851, though the precise point here urged was not there presented. While these decisions do not necessarily preclude our declaring the act invalid on a ground not argued in those cases, yet we should be very reluctant to reach a result opposed to the results reached in such cases, both of which were thoroughly argued and considered. There can be no doubt of the beneficial character of the act. Its objects are well stated in the Martin County Case. For these reasons it would be extremely unfortunate if we were now obliged to hold the law unconstitutional.

[1] We approach the construction of the act in question under the guidance of certain familiar rules. In the first place, the intent of the Legislature is to be ascertained from the language of the entire act, read in the light of the object evidently in view; that is, doing away with the inequality and injustice that often resulted under the old system. Secondly, the elementary rule that every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature, and that the court should not declare it unconstitutional, except when satisfied after the most careful consideration that it conflicts with some provision of the state or federal Constitution. Thirdly, the rule, peculiarly applicable here, that if the act is reasonably susceptible of two different constructions, one of which will render it...