State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen
Decision Date | 25 May 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 10553,10553 |
Citation | 75 S.E.2d 223,138 W.Va. 116 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE ex rel. HINKLE, v. SKEEN, Warden. |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Circuit courts have original and general jurisdiction of all crimes and misdemeanors.
2. A circuit court having acquired jurisdiction of a capital offense by virtue of an indictment charging a defendant under eighteen years of age with murder, and also having acquired jurisdiction of the person, does not lose jurisdiction of the offense or of any included offense, or of the person, by accepting a plea of guilty of murder of the second degree. Jurisdiction in the court continues for the purpose of sentencing the defendant for the offense to which he entered a plea of guilty.
3. The exclusive jurisdiction granted to juvenile courts by Code, 49-5-3, as amended, dealing with trials of persons under eighteen years of age, charged with having committed criminal offenses, relates only to trials of such persons as to charges of juvenile delinquency, not to trials and punishment for criminal offenses.
4. An infant charged with a crime may waive any right to object to the jurisdiction of the court that could be waived by an adult.
Peter Barrow, Jr., Richwood, for petitioner.
John G. Fox, Atty. Gen., and T. D. Kauffelt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.
In a petition apparently prepared without aid of counsel, filed in this Court on January 7, 1953, Clyde Dixon Hinkle, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, a prisoner confined in the West Virginia State Penitentiary, prayed a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, directed to the defendant, Oral J. Skeen, Warden. This Court, believing that the petition possibly raised questions of importance as to petitioner's rights, awarded the writ and made the same returnable February 10, 1953. Filed with the petition was an affidavit of petitioner showing that he had no means of employing counsel and, at the time of awarding the writ, this Court appointed counsel to assist the petitioner in the prosecution of this proceeding. On motion of counsel for petitioner, the hearing was continued to February 24, 1953, at which time petitioner was in court with counsel. The Attorney General of the State appeared on behalf of the defendant and filed a demurrer to the petition. Defendant also answered the petition. It was agreed at bar, however, that no question of fact existed. The matter was submitted on the pleadings, briefs and oral arguments of counsel for the parties.
The petitioner alleges that he is unlawfully detained, for the following reasons:
The demurrer to the petition assigns the following grounds:
'1. The petition shows on its face that petitioner was indicted for the crime of murder in the Circuit Court of Nicholas County and plead guilty to second degree murder before said court.
Petitioner having admitted at bar that the demurrer should be sustained as to Points 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the petition, we need not give further consideration to the questions therein attempted to be raised.
The record discloses that petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in the Circuit Court of Nicholas County on the 17th day of November, 1942, for murder, which was alleged to have been committed by him on the ___ day of August, 1942. The indictment charges that the crime was committed feloniously, wilfully, maliciously, deliberately and unlawfully. On November 23, 1942, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to murder of the second degree and, on December 2, 1942, was sentenced by the Circuit Court of Nicholas County to the West Virginia State Penitentiary, for a term of from five to eighteen years. Petitioner was born June 4, 1927, and therefore was between the ages of fifteen and sixteen years at the time the crime was alleged to have been committed. At the time he entered the guilty plea he was represented by two competent attorneys, appointed by the court to defend him against the charges contained in the indictment. The State, through the prosecuting attorney of Nicholas County, agreed that the plea of murder of the second degree be accepted. It is not contended that the circuit court, in the criminal proceeding, was advised as to the age of petitioner. The petitioner, in his petition, says that he was 'treated throughout the proceedings from time of arrest, conviction and the pronouncement of judgment, as an adult of legal age.'
The questions to be answered relate to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Nicholas County. Could that court sentence the petitioner, a juvenile, on a plea of second degree murder, or was that court required, by the statutes dealing with juvenile delinquents, to certify the matter to a juvenile court for preliminary action? Assuming that the circuit court acquired jurisdiction of the criminal cause of action by virtue of the indictment charging murder of the first degree, a capital offense, did that court lose jurisdiction upon its acceptance of the plea of murder of the second degree, a noncapital offense? Assuming that the statute, Code, 49-5-3, attempts to vest in juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear all criminal charges, not capital in their nature, against juveniles, is such provision constitutional?
By Chapter 1, First Extraordinary Session, 1936, Acts of the Legislature, now part of Chapter 49, of the official Code, there was provided a comprehensive system of child welfare throughout the State. Article 5 thereof, now Code, 49-5, as amended, dealt with juvenile courts. Section 1 of that article, as amended, provides: No 'court of record in addition to the circuit court' exists in Nicholas County. The pertinent part of Section 2 of Article 5 reads: '* * * A person subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court may be brought before it by either of the following means and no other: (a) By petition praying that the person be adjudged neglected or delinquent; (b) Certification from any other court before which such person is brought, charged with the commission of a crime.'
Of primary importance in consideration of the questions is Section 3, which we quote:
'Except as to a violation of law which if committed by an adult would be a capital offense, the juvenile court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal charges including a charge of violation of a municipal ordinance, against a person who is under eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense.
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