State ex rel. Hirt v. Marion Superior Court

• Decision Date: 22 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 483S142,483S142
• Citation: 451 N.E.2d 308
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, ex rel. Donna M. HIRT, Relator, v. The MARION SUPERIOR COURT and the Honorable B. William Keithley, as Special Judge Thereof, Respondents.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 308

451 N.E.2d 308

STATE of Indiana, ex rel. Donna M. HIRT, Relator, v. The MARION SUPERIOR COURT and the Honorable B. William Keithley, as Special Judge Thereof, Respondents.

No. 483S142.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 22, 1983.

Max L. McCausland, Timothy O'Connor, Indianapolis, for relator.

Robert P. Thomas, Deputy Pros. Atty., Indianapolis, for respondents.

GIVAN, Chief Justice.

Relator Donna M. Hirt petitioned this Court for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition to compel the Respondent to dismiss a petition entitled "In the Matter of Donna Marie Parks [Hirt]." Relator also sought to have this Court order the Respondent to refrain from attempting to exercise jurisdiction over her in any way, insofar as such an attempt was based on her alleged operation of a motor vehicle in Marion County on June 7, 1980. We heard argument on the petition on February 23, 1983, and subsequently denied the petition. We hereby ratify the denial of the petition for a writ.

The record shows Relator was arrested shortly after midnight on June 7, 1980, when a police officer found her outside her car in an allegedly intoxicated state at the intersection of 21st Street and Drexel Avenue in Indianapolis. The officer found one Marie Compton had been riding a Moped motorbike through that intersection when Relator struck Ms. Compton. Ms. Compton subsequently died from her injuries.

On June 23, 1980, the Marion County prosecutor filed a criminal information in the Marion County Superior Court, Criminal Division, charging Relator as defendant with violation of I.C. Sec. 9-4-1-54 [Burns 1982 Supp.], Driving While Intoxicated and Causing the Death of Another. Subsequently it was discovered Relator was a juvenile at the time of the accident. On August 27, 1980, the record shows the court found it had no jurisdiction in the matter. The cause was ordered transferred to the Juvenile Division of the Respondent court.

The next procedural move in the case was on November 17, 1981, when the Marion County prosecutor filed a petition in the Respondent court entitled "In the Matter of Donna Parks [Hirt]." The record shows the filing of this petition by the prosecutor was for the purpose requesting authorization to file a subsequent petition alleging Relator's delinquency. See I.C. Sec. 31-6-4-9 [Burns 1980 Repl.]. The statute allegedly violated is identified in this petition as I.C. Sec. 35-42-1-5 [Burns 1979 Repl.], Reckless Homicide.

On April 14, 1982, Relator filed a Motion to Dismiss the November 17 petition. It is this motion that is the subject matter of Relator's petition for a writ. This motion was premised on Ind.R.Cr.P. 4(C), which reads:

"(C) Defendant discharged. No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of this rule. Any defendant so held shall, on motion, be discharged."

Relator contends since the original "charge" in this case was the criminal information filed by the prosecutor in the Criminal Division of Marion Superior Court on June 23, 1980, and more than one year has elapsed since that time, she is entitled to an outright discharge.

The Respondent asserts Relator had no rights under CR 4(C) at the time the motion was filed. Its position is that the time limit of CR 4(C) does not begin to run until a charge has been properly filed, and that the filing of a criminal information charging a juvenile with an offense in a court with criminal jurisdiction is an absolute nullity by reason of the court's lack of jurisdiction over the juvenile. The Respondent asserts the proper filing of a charge against Relator did not occur until the petition alleging Relator's delinquency was filed in juvenile court on April 28, 1982. The Respondent points out Relator's motion was filed twelve days before this date and thus was totally premature.

The Respondent cites as principal authority for its position State ex rel. Hunter v. Juvenile Court of Marion County, (1974) 261 Ind. 624, 308 N.E.2d 695. In that case an affidavit was filed against the juvenile Relator charging him with murder on April 30, 1973. The Relator was held in custody. Subsequently the grand jury found him to be a juvenile, and on July 3, 1973, this information was sent to the Marion County prosecutor. On November 15, 1973, the Relator moved for release in the criminal court in which the criminal charge had been filed. The motion was premised on Ind.R.Cr.P. 4(A), requiring release of a defendant held in jail and not tried within six months after his arrest or the filing of a charge, whichever is later. The Relator sought a writ from this Court to compel the Respondent juvenile court to which the case had been transferred to release him.

We denied the petition for a writ. We held the six month period of CR 4(A) did not begin to run until January 4, 1974, when the prosecutor filed a petition alleging delinquency. We noted that under I.C. Sec. 33-12-2-3 [Burns 1973] (repealed by Indiana Acts 1978, P.L. 136, Sec. 57) the juvenile court of Marion County was invested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles. The criminal affidavit of April 30, 1973, however, was filed in Municipal Court of Marion County, which at the time had no jurisdiction over juveniles. Therefore, we concluded, "[N]o valid charge was filed against Relator until January 4, 1974, at the time the petition for delinquency was filed in Juvenile Court." State ex rel. Hunter, supra, at 627, 308 N.E.2d at 696.

The key to the State ex rel. Hunter case is that a court invested with jurisdiction over a juvenile does not acquire such jurisdiction until a proper charge is filed in that court. See I.C. Sec. 31-5-7-7 [Burns 1973] (repealed by Indiana Acts 1978, P.L. 136, Sec. 57).

Relator asserts the State ex rel. Hunter case cannot be applied in the case at bar due to the reorganization of the Marion Superior Court as codified into law in I.C. Sec. 33-5-35.1-1 et seq. [Burns 1982 Supp.]. Indiana Code Sec. 33-5-35.1-1(a) states in part: "There is established a superior court in Marion County, Indiana consisting of fifteen judges." Further, I.C. Sec. 33-5-35.1-2 states: "The court shall be named and styled Marion Superior Court." Finally, I.C. Sec. 33-5-35.1-4 states in part:

"(a) The court, within and for the county of Marion, has the following jurisdiction:

* * *

* * *

(4) Original and exclusive juvenile jurisdiction."

Relator asserts under this statutory scheme there is no distinction between the various division of the Marion Superior Court. Thus, she argues, accepting that under State ex rel. Hunter, supra, the key act to invoking jurisdiction over the juvenile and tolling CR 4 is the filing of a charge in a court with juvenile jurisdiction, the filing of the criminal information in the Criminal Division of Marion Superior Court on June 23, 1980, was the act that tolled CR 4(C). This argument is premised on the rationale that the "Criminal Division of Marion Superior Court" is, despite its label, a court with original and exclusive juvenile jurisdiction.

An examination of the statute creating the Marion Superior Court and the rules of that court discloses that the petitioner is correct in his reading of the law in this regard. Without question, the statute creates a single superior court with each judge thereof having jurisdiction over all named cases including civil, criminal, probate and juvenile. There is no mention in the statute of separate divisions of that court. When one turns to the rules promulgated by the court itself, we get no help. Yet, it appears from the manner in which the court is actually run, that no attention is paid to the statute and that the courts are operated as separate entities much the same as they were prior to the enactment of the statute. However, due to the manner in which this case was handled, as herinafter described, we find it unnecessary to further wander through this never-never land of elusive jurisdiction.

The Respondent makes a twofold response to Relator's argument. First, it contends the fundamental holding of the State ex rel. Hunter case is that the time limits of CR 4 do not begin to run until a petition authorizing delinquency is filed. That date in this case is April 28, 1982. Second, the Respondent contends the filing of the information on June 23, 1980, in the Criminal Division was an absolute nullity because that court had no jurisdiction over Relator, a juvenile at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. Thus the Respondent contends no time limit of any kind could begin to run from that date since the filing was of no legal effect, for lack of jurisdiction over Relator. The record reflects the Criminal Division eventually determined this was the case. The entry of August 27, 1980, recites, "By agreement of parties and Court not having jurisdiction, cause ordered transferred to Juvenile Court."

We first consider the Respondent's argument that, notwithstanding our decision in State ex rel. Hunter, supra, the Criminal Division had no authority to entertain the June 23 filing of the information because of its lack of jurisdiction over Relator. It is provided in the juvenile code, "A child may not be charged with or convicted of a crime, except a crime excluded by I.C. Sec. 31-6-2-1(b) [Burns 1980 Repl.], unless he has been waived to a court having criminal jurisdiction." Indiana Code Sec. 31-6-3-5(a) [Burns 1980 Repl.]. Turning to I.C. Sec. 31-6-2-1(b) [B...