State ex rel. Hyatt v. Bomar

• Decision Date: 05 June 1962
• Citation: 358 S.W.2d 295,210 Tenn. 249,14 McCanless 249
• Parties: , 210 Tenn. 249 STATE of Tennessee ex rel. Jack HYATT, Petitioner, v. Lynn BOMAR, Warden, Tenn. State Penitentiary, Respondent.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 295

358 S.W.2d 295

14 McCanless 249, 210 Tenn. 249

STATE of Tennessee ex rel. Jack HYATT, Petitioner, v. Lynn BOMAR, Warden, Tenn. State Penitentiary, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 5, 1962.

Vincent E. Wehby, Nashville, for petitioner.

George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., Henry C. Foutch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for respondent.

TOMLINSON, Special Judge.

Hyatt's petition for the writ of habeas corpus is based on the allegation that he is being illegally deprived of his liberty by the Warden of the Penitentiary. He seeks an adjudication to that effect and an aiding order directing his release.

From the action of the trial court denying his application Hyatt has appealed to this Court. The case was heard on bill and answer, so to speak, all facts by reason of these pleadings being agreed to.

When Hyatt was approximately 17 years of age he entered a plea of guilty in the Juvenile Court of Sullivan County to the charge of burglary. That Court ordered his confinement in the State Vocational Training School for Boys at Jordonia. After a few months he made his escape, and remained an escapee for about thirteen months. During at least a part of this escape period he was confined by some juvenile court in Kentucky, in one of its juvenile institutions, presumably because of some offense against the Kentucky Law.

Hyatt was returned to the Tennessee Vocational School on April 28, 1960. On April 30, 1960, the Tennessee Commissioner of Correction formally declared him an incorrigible youth and, as authorized by law when he, the Commissioner, considered that status of the juvenile to prevail, he caused Hyatt's transfer to the State Penitentiary at Nashville. (§ 41-817 T.C.A.)

Upon Hyatt's plea of guilty in the Juvenile Court of Sullivan County, that court committed him to this juvenile vocational school until he should become '21 years of age.' Hyatt attained that age on January 7, 1962, after he was returned to the school on April 28, 1960.

Based upon the fact that the order of the juvenile court directed this juvenile's confinement in the juvenile vocational school until he became '21 years of age,' coupled with the further fact that he had reached that age on January 7, 1962, Hyatt applied for a release from the Penitentiary, on the theory that the term of confinement ordered by the Juvenile Court had expired on January 7, 1962. That was the date of his 21st birthday.

The Warden denied the application on the theory that, notwithstanding the fact that Hyatt had reached his 21st birthday on January 7, 1962, he must, nevertheless then serve the thirteen months that he, as an escapee, remained away from the school.

The Warden's response or answer to Hyatt's petition was that the confinement of Hyatt after he reached his 21st birthday was authorized and required by 39-3811 T.C.A. The hearing judge denied Hyatt's application by reason of that Code Section, 'and the general law applicable to the entire record.'

The reply brief of the State in this Court commendably concedes that Code Section 39-3811 is not applicable, but, with considerable resourcefulness, apparently in keeping with what it quite understandably considers the equities of the situation says in its brief, and in oral argument, that the common law rule on the subject remains in full effect in this State, it not having been expressly repealed within the premises here as to the juvenile court; and that under this common law rule, the further retention of Hyatt to a period equal to the time he remained an escapee is justified.

Whatever may be the merits of the aforestated contention of the State, as to other situations, this Court's view is that such insistence is not applicable here. A juvenile court was entirely unknown to the common law.

In Juvenile Court of Shelby County v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 139 Tenn. 549, 555, 201 S.W. 771, 772, it was held:

'The juvenile court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction * * *

'Great powers are lodged in the juvenile court in its particular field, and proceedings there should be conducted according to the mandates of the statute.'

As will hereinafter appear, the mandate of the Tennessee statute is that the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Juvenile Courts over the person of the individual shall end with the attainment by this person of the age of twenty-one years.

Under the title 'Infants' in 43 C.J.S. § 6 Pages 53-54, the text, citing many decisions in support, is this:

'A juvenile court * * * is a statutory tribunal * * *. Generally, in states where such courts exist, they have jurisdiction over matters relating to the care, control and custody of infants, but can exercise such jurisdiction and powers only as have been conferred on them by the statute creating them; and jurisdiction must be strictly construed, and cannot be enlarged by a provision in the statute requiring the statute to be liberally construed, so that its purposes may be carried out.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Whatever authority the Warden has to imprison Hyatt in this case is derived solely from the order of the Juvenile Court of Sullivan County, and the statute creating that court and defining its powers and jurisdiction. By 37-263 T.C.A. Supplement it provided that when the juvenile court has obtained jurisdiction and control of such child * * * until he or she shall have reached the age of twenty-one years.

'In no case shall a child be committed by a juvenile court beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years.' (Emphasis added.)

It would seem to follow, ipso facto, that the Warden is without authority to extend his commitment of Hyatt for a length of time beyond his 21st birthday. The statute does not give the juvenile court authority to extend his confinement beyond his 21st birthday for escaping. Hence, the Warden is vested with no authority. His authority stems solely here from the juvenile statute.

The only remedy available to the State, under this statute, in a situation akin to the one at Bar, is that afforded by Section 37-264 T.C.A. Supplement dealing with the powers and jurisdiction of Tennessee's Juvenile Courts. That section provides that when a child sixteen, or over, years, has been adjudged delinquent by the juvenile court, and committed to an...