State ex rel. Imel v. Municipal Court of Marion County

• Decision Date: 15 April 1947
• Docket Number: 28296.
• Citation: 72 N.E.2d 357,225 Ind. 23
• Parties: STATE ex rel. IMEL v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF MARION COUNTY et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

72 N.E.2d 357

225 Ind. 23

STATE ex rel. IMEL v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF MARION COUNTY et al.

No. 28296.

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 15, 1947

David M. Lewis and Lewis, Goett and Elliott, all of Indianapolis, for respondents.

Joseph O. Hoffman, of Indianapolis, Cleon H. Foust, Atty. Gen., and Frank E. Coughlin, First Deputy Atty. Gen., Amici Curiae.

YOUNG Judge.

On March 18, 1947, relator shot and killed his stepmother, and on the following day an affidavit was filed in the Juvenile Court of Marion County wherein relator was charged with being a delinquent child by reason of said killing. He was at the time in his fifteenth year. He was released to his father by the Judge of the Juvenile Court.

On the following day, the Prosecuting Attorney for the 19th Judicial Circuit of the State of Indiana caused an affidavit to be filed in the Municipal Court of Marion County, wherein relator was charged with the premeditated murder of his stepmother for which the penalty is death or life imprisonment. A warrant for his arrest was issued upon said affidavit and relator was arrested and taken before the respondent judge, who heard evidence at the conclusion of which relator's counsel made an oral motion for the discharge of relator, which respondent judge took under advisement and placed relator in the custody of the sheriff and continued the case until March 25, 1947. Prior to that date, relator filed his petition herein for a writ prohibiting the respondent judge from continuing the detention and confinement of the relator in the custody of the sheriff and from interfering with or obstructing the order of the Juvenile Court releasing relator to his father and from exercising any further jurisdiction of the relator and further asking that said respondent judge be mandated to order release of relator from the Marion County jail and from the custody of the sheriff and to transfer said cause to the Juvenile Court. A temporary writ was issued by this court.

We are not confronted in this case with any consideration of the soundness of the philosophy or purpose or wisdom of the Indiana statutes having to do with the handling of delinquents under the age of 18 years. Such considerations are for the legislature. Our sole concern is with the construction of those statutes, and relevant statutes with reference to the Municipal Court of Marion County, and determination of the conflicting claims to jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court and the Municipal Court under such statutes and the facts before us.

We start with the thought that the ordinary rules of criminal law and procedure are applicable to a 14 year old boy, unless the legislature has declared otherwise, and the only statutes called to our attention as being pertinent or providing special law or procedure for juvenile offenders are chapters 347 and 356 of the Acts of 1945. §§ 9-3101 et seq. and 9-3201 et seq., Burns' 1945 Cum.Pocket Supp. Chapter 347 creates juvenile courts in Marion and other counties in Indiana and defines their powers and jurisdiction. Section 3 thereof, § 9-3103, Burns' 1945 Cum.Pocket Supp., reads as follows 'The juvenile courts created by this act shall have original exclusive jurisdiction * * * in all cases of delinquent * * * children as defined by law'. (Our italics.)

Chapter 356 of the Acts of 1945 defines delinquent children and fixes procedure where they are concerned, and § 4 thereof, § 9-3204, Burns' 1945 Cum.Pkt.Supp., so far as material to this case, defines a delinquent child as any boy or girl 'under the full age of eighteen [18] years who * * * commits an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment.' § 13 of the Act provides that if a charge of a criminal nature is made against a boy or girl under the age of 18 years in any other court than the juvenile court such case shall be transferred to the juvenile court, excepting, however, cases wherein children are charged with violation of law, which, if committed by an adult, would be a capital offense.

So we find the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, for the purposes of the case, limited to delinquent children as defined by law, and we find that the words 'delinquent children', as defined by the act, do not include a child who has committed an act which, if committed by an adult would be a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment. And § 13 of Chapter 356 of the Acts of 1945, § 9-3213 Burns' 1945 Cum.Pkt.Supp., provides that where such an offense is charged the provisions for removal to juvenile courts are inoperative, thereby leaving the prosecution of persons under the age of 18 years charged with such offenses to the courts which would have jurisdiction thereof and to the procedure which would prevail if there were no juvenile court act.

We do not believe it was the intent of the legislature, as disclosed by the language used in the statutes referred to, to give the juvenile court jurisdiction of juveniles charged with premeditated murder.

It seems to us, therefore, that under the facts in this case the juvenile court was without jurisdiction. People v. Murch, 1934, 263 N.Y. 285, 189 N.E. 220, is in accord with this conclusion.

Relator further contends that the Municipal Court of Marion County is without jurisdiction as a committing magistrate in felony cases. With this we can not agree. The Act of 1925, which created the municipal cour...