State ex rel. Jeffrey v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 21 December 1955
• Docket Number: No. 34432,34432
• Citation: 164 Ohio St. 366,131 N.E.2d 215
• Parties: , 58 O.O. 152 The STATE ex rel. JEFFREY, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Ohio et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 366

164 Ohio St. 366

131 N.E.2d 215, 58 O.O. 152

The STATE ex rel. JEFFREY, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Ohio et al., Appellees.

No. 34432.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 21, 1955.

Traxler & Beil, Youngstown, for appellant.

C. William O'Neill, Atty. Gen., Paul Tague, Jr., Columbus, Harrington, Huxley & Smith and C. Kenneth Clark, Youngstown, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The right of an injured employee to compensation and medical benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act is governed strictly by the provisions of that act and may not be changed by the Industrial Commission or even by the General Assembly subsequent to the accrual of the right. The right to payment for medical and hospital expenses is a substantive right, measured by the provisions of the act in force at the time the cause of action accrues, which is the time the injury is received. Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Kamrath, 118 Ohio St. 1, 160 N.E. 470; State ex rel. Schmersal v. Industrial Commission, 142 Ohio St. 477, 52 N.E.2d 863. The cause of action is the right to participate in the State Insurance Fund or the right to receive benefits payable by a self-insuring employer.

The amendment of Section 1465-89, General Code, by which the requirement of 'unanimous approval' by the members of the commission for the payment of additional medical and hospital expenses was eliminated, is prospective in effect; not retroactive, as claimed by relator. State ex rel. Bessler v. Industrial Commission, 157 Ohio St. 297, 105 N.E.2d 264.

Since the right is substantive, and the statute in effect when relator's cause of action arose required the unanimous approval of the commission for the payment of such additional expenses, relator is not entitled to the relief sought.

Another reason for denying relator the relief sought is that his action was commenced on June 22, 1949, by the filing of his original application for compensation and was a pending action when the amendment of Section 1465-89, General Code, above referred to, was passed, and the amendment does not expressly provide that it shall apply to pending actions. Section 26, General Code, Section 1.20, Revised Code; State ex rel. Thompson v. Industrial Commission, 138 Ohio St. 439, 35 N.E.2d 727.

Relator urges further that, even though the unanimous action of the commission is required to make its order effective, the failure of the commission to act unanimously in favor of the allowance for additional benefits constituted an abuse of discretion. This court does not...