State ex rel. Jones v. Sargent
Decision Date | 11 January 1910 |
Parties | STATE EX REL. JONES v. SARGENT ET AL. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Pottawattamie County; N. W. Macy, Judge.
Quo warranto proceedings to test the validity of the defendants' appointments as members of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Council Bluffs and to oust the defendants from their positions as such. Relator pleads that he was and is Chief of the Fire Department of the aforesaid city, and that defendants were threatening to interfere with him in the discharge of his duties. The trial court dismissed the petition, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Saunders & Stuart, for appellant.
Jerry Sullivan and S. B. Wadsworth, for appellees.
Relator was duly chosen chief of the fire department of the city of Council Bluffs in the year 1906, and at the time of the commencement of this suit was acting as such. On or about April 8, 1907, the then mayor of said city appointed defendants B. M. Sargent, a Republican, and Hubert Tinley and L. Zurmuehlen, Democrats, as members of the board of fire and police commissioners for the city under the provisions of Acts 32d Gen. Assem. p. 24, c. 29, and Acts 29th Gen. Assem. p. 16, c. 31, all appearing now as chapter 2A, title 5, of the Code Supplement of Iowa. It is alleged that the law under which the appointments were made is unconstitutional and void, and that the members so appointed were not qualified to serve. It is further alleged that defendants were about to interfere with plaintiff in the performance of his duties as fire chief, and that their act in so doing was without authority of law. That the exact questions presented may be fully understood, we here quote the provisions of the statutes involved:
“Sec. 679a. * * * There is hereby created and established a board of police and fire commissioners in cities of the first class and cities under special charter which, according to any state or national census heretofore or hereafter taken, are shown to have a population of more than twenty thousand.
Sec. 679b. Said board of police and fire commissioners shall consist of three members, who shall be citizens of the state of Iowa and who shall have been residents of the city in which they are appointed for more than five years next preceding their appointment; they shall, except as hereinafter specified, hold their office for six years and until their respective successors have been appointed and qualified. All vacancies in such board by death, resignation, removal, or for any other cause, shall be filled as soon as practicable in the same manner as provided for appointment. Said commissioners shall receive no compensation for their services.”
It will be observed that the law applies only to cities having a population of more than 20,000; that the mayor shall appoint the board thereby created, which shall consist of three members, who shall be citizens of the state and residents of the city for more than five years next preceding their appointment; and that they shall be selected from the two leading political parties, so that so far as practicable two members shall be of the dominant political party and one of the next in numerical strength, as shown by the votes cast at the last state or national election. It is conceded in argument that the city of Council Bluffs had a population exceeding 20,000 when the appointments were made, that the two dominant political parties were the Republican and Democratic, and that the Republican party was the dominant one in the city as shown by the last preceding election. It also appears that, while two Democrats were named instead of two Republicans, the place was offered by the mayor to four Republicans before he named the second Democrat, and that these four men declined the appointment and refused to serve as members of the commission. We quote this admission from the record:
The exact points relied upon for a reversal are so succinctly stated in the brief of appellant's counsel that we here quote therefrom as follows: These we shall take up in order.
The general qualifications for appointment are stated in section 679b as follows: They shall be citizens of the state and residents of the city for more than five years next preceding their appointment. That defendants possessed these qualifications is admitted. But it is further provided in section 679d that “they shall be selected from the two leading political parties, so that, as far as practicable, two members of the board shall be members of the dominant political party and one member of the board shall be a member of the political party next in numerical strength as shown by the votes cast at the last state or national election.” It will be observed that this last provision does not go to the qualifications for the office. It says they shall be selected by the mayor in the manner directed, and contains a qualification to the effect that so far as practicable they shall be made up as directed. Manifestly some discretion is left in the appointing power, and primarily he is to determine whether it is practicable to have the board selected as indicated. In the absence then of proof, either direct or circumstantial, that the mayor was guilty of some fraud or collusion or was acting perversely and in open disregard of the law, his discretion cannot be interfered with by the courts. It seems that he offered the position to four Republicans before selecting the second Democrat, and evidently was endeavoring to find a proper appointee of the Republican faith. The proffer of the place was not accepted, and the mayor then turned to a second Democrat, who, we must assume, in the absence of a showing to the contrary was deemed better fitted than some Republicans who might be induced to accept. As the members appointed were each and all qualified and as there is no showing of any fraud or favoritism on the part of the mayor or any intentional disregard of the law or abuse of discretion, we are not justified in sustaining the first point made by appellant's counsel. Sanborn v. Mason City, 114 Iowa, 189, 86 N. W. 286, is not in point. If there were no qualifications upon the duty to select two from the majority and one from the minority party, we might have a different situation. But here there are certain qualifications, and a discretion is vested in the mayor with regard to this very matter.
2. Claim is made that, as the statute limits the appointees to membership of the two leading political parties, it is unconstitutional and void because it grants...
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