State ex rel. Kafka v. Dist. Court of Ramsey Cnty.

• Decision Date: 19 February 1915
• Docket Number: No. 18941[173].,18941[173].
• Citation: 151 N.W. 144,128 Minn. 432
• Parties: STATE ex rel. KAFKA v. DISTRICT COURT OF RAMSEY COUNTY et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

128 Minn. 432

151 N.W. 144

STATE ex rel. KAFKA

v.DISTRICT COURT OF RAMSEY COUNTY et al.

No. 18941[173].

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 19, 1915.

Certiorari by the State, on the relation of Gustave Kafka, against the Districk Court of Ramsey County and others, to review a judgment entered on relator's appeal, confirming an assessment in eminent domain proceedings. Judgment affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Where several persons have separate estates or interests in a single tract or parcel of land taken in condemnation proceedings, the proper mode of reaching a fair valuation of the property, and of ascertaining the damages of those interested, is to treat the property as though the entire estate and all interests therein were in a single person, and to find the value and damage in gross, leaving the apportionment of the award to be thereafter made according to the previous interests of the parties in the property.

Neither a separate assessment of damages to the several interests in the property nor a subsequent apportionment of the gross award is essential to the validity of the assessment, unless such is required by statute.

Section 251 of the St. Paul City Charter in force in 1913 makes the compensation awarded a public charge, so that it may be recovered by the property owner with sufficient certainty to comply with the constitutional requirement of security of compensation.

Section 247 of the Charter, providing that ‘if the lands and buildings belong to different persons, or if the land be subject to lease, the damages done to such persons, respectively, may be awarded to them by the board of public works, less the benefits resulting to them, respectively, from the improvement,’ held not to require the board either to make a separate assessment of relator's interest in the property as lessee, or subsequently to apportion to him his share of the gross award.

Nor was such required under the terms of sections 251 and 253.

Payment by the city of the gross award to the fee owner did not deprive relator, as lessee, of his constitutional right of security of compensation for the taking of his property; for, while his right of recovery against the fee owner does not fulfill the constitutional guaranty, the fund must be deemed as still in the hands of the city, subject to be brought into court for apportionment at the instance of relator, of whose claim the city had notice before paying the fee owner. Durment, Moore & Oppenheimer, of St. Paul, for appellant.

O. H. O'Neill and J. P. Kyle, both of St. Paul, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari to review a judgment entered on relator's appeal confirming an assessment made by the board of public works of the city of St. Paul, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain. The findings of the trial court forming the basis of the judgment are unchallenged, and may thus be summarized:

In 1913 relator was in possession, as lessee, of the ground floor of a building abutting on Robert street, with the right of so continuing for four years longer. In that year the city took some of the land underlying the building for the improvement of this street. The proceedings therefor were in all things regular up to the time of the assessment by the board of public works, and the latter had jurisdiction to make the assessment of damages caused by the taking and the benefits accruing from the improvement. While these matters were pending and before confirmation of the assessment, relator seasonably claimed that a separate award of damages to his leasehold interest be made to him; but the board refused and, instead, fixed a fair valuation of the property as a whole and fairly and impartially assessed a sum in gross as damages and compensation for the taking, including all interests therein. No apportionment of this amount was made between relator and the fee owners, and later the city paid to and the latter accepted the entire sum so awarded. Judgment confirming the assessment was ordered and entered.

Section 250 of the city charter provides that, on appeal to the district court from an order of the board of public works confirming an assessment:

‘The only question to be passed upon shall be whether the said board of public works had jurisdiction in the case, and whether the valuation of the property specified in the objections is a fair valuation, and the assessment, so far as it affects such property is a fair and impartial assessment. The judgment of the court shall be either to confirm or annul the assessment in so far as the same affects the property appropriated aforesaid of the said appellant.’

Relator contends that the procedure adopted by the board was irregular and not in accordance with the charter, wherefore his property was appropriated without just compensation first paid or secured, in violation of Const. art. 1, § 13, that the assessment, in so far as it affects his property, was unfair and not impartial; and that he was entitled to a separate award or at least an apportionment of his interest in the gross amount allowed, so that he could either receive it or have its correctness reviewed on appeal; and, further, that without such apportionment he is without remedy to recover his compensation, the relief demanded upon these premises being that the district court should remit the award for reassessment.

[1][2] For the purposes of discussion, it will be assumed that relator had valuable rights in the property condemned, entitling him to substantial compensation, and that he took all necessary preliminary steps to protect them. This brings us directly to the consideration of his claims as outlined above, in the course of which the inquiry obviously must be limited to matters pertinent within the limitations imposed by section 150 of the Charter upon the scope of the hearing on the appeal. The other relevant provisions of the charter are as follows:

Section 243: ‘The said board of public works, in making said assessment, shall determine and appraise to the owner or owners the value of the real estate appropriated for the improvements, and the damage arising to them respectively from the condemnation thereof, which shall be awarded to such owners respectively, as damages, after making due allowance therefrom for any benefit which such owners may respectively derive from such improvements.’

Section 247: ‘If the lands and building belong to different persons, or if the land be subject to lease, the damages done to such persons, respectively, may be awarded to them by the board of public works, less the benefits resulting to them, respectively, from the improvement.’

Section 251: ‘The city of St. Paul shall thereupon cause to be paid to the owner of such property the amount of damages over and above all benefits which may have been awarded therefor within six (6) months after date of the confirmation of such assessment, with interest at the rate of seven (7) per cent. per annum.’

Under the ruling of Moritz v. St. Paul, 52 Minn. 409, 415, 54 N. W. 370, these provisions do not purport to require the board of public works to assess the damages or apportion the award separately to each person, unless, as has been suggested, a contrary conclusion is justified by the difference in the wording of the charters under which the assessment there involved and the one here in question were respectively made, whereby, it is insisted, under the latter the damages to the persons should be considered instead of to the property, as under the former. It is settled, however, that condemnation proceedings are in rem, against the property, for which the award, when made, stands as belonging to those formerly having interests in the property and in the same proportion. Smith v. St. Paul, 65 Minn. 295, 297, 68 N. W. 32;Eyre v. Faribault, 121 Minn. 233, 141 N. W. 170. And we are not persuaded that the proceedings were intended to be otherwise, especially...