State ex rel. Kansas City v. Ellison
Decision Date | 01 April 1920 |
Parties | THE STATE ex rel. KANSAS CITY v. JAMES ELLISON et al., Judges of Kansas City Court of Appeals |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Writ quashed.
E. M Harber and A. F. Smith for relator.
(1) The trial court erred in refusing to give the peremptory instructions asked by the defendant, and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming its rulings in that regard is at variance with controlling decisions of this court. (a) A person has a right to use only that part of public property to which he is invited, either expressly or by implication. There being no invitation, express or implied, to use that part of the park on which plaintiff was playing at the time of his injury, the city is not responsible for his injury,. Ely v. St. Louis, 181 Mo. 729; Glaser v Rothschild, 221 Mo. 185. (b) The city had, and exercised, the right to restrict by ordinance the use of its parks as playgrounds. The ordinance offered in evidence made it unlawful to use that part of the park on which plaintiff was playing at the time of his injury. The plaintiff has never questioned the validity of this ordinance, and it must therefore be given full force and effect. Roper v Greenspon, 272 Mo. 296. (c) The wall in question was not such an "attractive nuisance" as to constitute an invitation to plaintiff to play upon it. O'Hara v Laclede Electric Co., 244 Mo. 404, 407; Kelly v. Benas, 217 Mo. 1; Buddy v. Union Terminal Ry. Co., 207 S.W. 821. (2) Plaintiff's instructions assumed against the defendant facts which were at issue; they were so worded as to confuse the questions at issue, and thus mislead the jury; they placed upon the defendant the duty to exercise a degree and amount of care not required by law, and they submitted issues not properly before the jury. The decision of the Court of Appeals approving the giving of these instructions is contrary to controlling decisions of this court. James v. Mo. Co., 107 Mo. 484; Ganey v. Kansas City, 259 Mo. 663; Hipsley v. K. C. Co., 88 Mo. 354; Baustian v. Young, 152 Mo. 325; Young v. Webb City, 150 Mo. 341, and cases supra.
Isaac B. Kimbrell and Martin J. O'Donnell for respondent.
(1) The opinion of the Court of Appeals, in construing the ordinance mentioned in the opinion, is not in conflict with any prior decision of this court for the reason that this court has never construed said ordinance. State ex rel. v. Sturgis, 276 Mo. 599. (2) The opinion is not in conflict with that of this court in Ely v. St. Louis, 181 Mo. 723, for the reason that this court in that case found that the place alleged to be a public street in that case was not, while here the opinion finds that the coping from which plaintiff fell was included in the public park and that plaintiff had been invited to use the coping and that he fell into the chasm or precipice which the defendant negligently failed to fence. Under the authorities the verdict was therefore for the right party. Healy v. City, 211 S.W. 59; Kuenzell v. City, 212 S.W. 876; Carey v. City, 187 Mo. 715; Capp v. St. Louis, 251 Mo. 256; Jenson v. City, 181 Mo.App. 359; Longwell v. City, 203 S.W. 657. (3) The claim by relator that this is a "turntable case" and that this court has concluded not to allow a child to recover in the future when he invokes that doctrine is contradicted by the opinion which expressly finds that the plaintiff was using the park and the coping, which was part of same, under the rules provided by the park board and at the invitation of relator. Furthermore, the turntable doctrine, though badly bent by some recent decisions of this court, is not yet broken. Carey v. City 187 Mo. 715; Bjork v. City, 135 P. 1009; Price v. Water Co., 58 Kan. 551; Pekin v. McMahon, 45 Am. St. 114, 154 Ill. 141. (4) Even had the trial court in its instructions assumed that certain facts put in issue by the pleadings were conclusively established by the evidence, yet an opinion approving such instructions would not conflict with the prior decisions of this court, but would be strictly in accord with same. Fullerton v. Fordyce, 121 Mo. 113; Davidson v. Transit Co., 211 Mo. 356; Donovant v. Co., 188 Mo.App. 93; Ragan v. Railway, 144 Mo. 623; Setebier v. Railway, 203 Mo. 702. (5) This court on certiorari cannot properly quash a judgment of the Court of Appeals for failure to reverse because of the giving of instructions, for it often happens that the appellate court finds that the verdict is for the right party, and in such case the statute and the common law prohibits a reversal because an erroneous instruction may have been given. Thompson on Charging the Jury, secs. 117, 118; Sec. 2082, R. S. 1909; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 270 Mo. 589. (6) The relator's abstract of the record does not include the judgment of the trial or appellate court, nor does it include the record entries of the Court of Appeals, and consequently this court on scrutinizing the record will dismiss the case on its own motion. State ex rel. Pedigo v. Robertson, 181 S.W. 987; Huston v. Allen, 236 Mo. 645; Hays v. Foos, 223 Mo. 423.
OPINION
In Banc
Certiorari.
Certiorari to the Kansas City Court of Appeals. By this proceeding it is sought to have this court quash the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the case of Russell Barnett, by next friend, respondent, v. Kansas City, appellant.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals neither outlines the petition nor answer in the case, although reference, in a way, is made to both. Nor is the substance of the instructions considered by the opinion set out with clarity in the opinion. In the opinion we find this brief reference to the instructions:
The evidentiary facts of the case are thus set out in the opinion:
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