State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown

Decision Date08 January 1951
Docket NumberNo. 42100,42100
Citation361 Mo. 618,235 S.W.2d 304
PartiesSTATE ex rel. O'KEEFE v. BROWN, Judge.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Seiler, Blanchard & Van Fleet, Joplin, for relator.

John R. Caslavka, Greenfield, for respondent.

HOLLINGSWORTH, Judge.

This is an original proceeding in prohibition. A provisional rule was issued to respondent, the Honorable O. O. Brown, Judge of the Circuit Court of Dade County, to prevent him from assuming jurisdiction over the person of relator, on the ground of improper venue, in the case hereinafter mentioned. The essential facts are either admitted in the return or agreed to in a stipulation filed herein.

Harvey G. Tucker was injured in Vernon County, in a three-car collision between his automobile, a passenger bus operated by Crown Coach Company, a corporation, and an automobile driven by relator. Relator is a resident of Gentry County. Tucker is a resident of Dallas County. Crown Coach Company is a Missouri corporation with its registered agent, registered office and principal place of business in Jasper County.

Tucker brought suit in the Circuit Court of Dade County against Crown Coach Company and relator for $42,000 damages allegedly sustained as a result of the joint and concurring negligence of Crown Coach Company and relator. Summons was issued and served on relator in Gentry County. Summons for Crown Coach Company was issued and directed to the sheriff of Cole County and by him served on the Secretary of the Public Service Commission, under the provisions of Section 5735, Mo.R.S.A., as amended, Laws 1943, p. 862.

Relator, by timely motion, challenged jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Dade County over his person on the ground of improper venue, asserting that since there were two defendants venue was governed by Section 871, Mo.R.S.A., and that the action was not filed in the county where the plaintiff resided and where either defendant might be found, nor in the county where either defendant resided. The motion was overruled and relator brought prohibition on the same ground.

Crown Coach Company is a motor carrier engaged as a common carrier of persons under the provisions of Article 8, Chapter 35, Mo.R.S.A., relating to the transportation of persons and property by motor vehicle. Its registered office, registered agent and principal place of business are in Jasper County, Missouri. It operates motor bus lines in the counties of Jackson, Cass, Bates, Vernon, Barton, Jasper, Newton, McDonald, Dade, Greene, Henry, Benton, Hickory and Dallas.

It is stipulated that respondent will proceed to try the suit brought by Tucker against Crown Coach Company and relator, being case No. 9666 in the Circuit Court of Dade County, unless prohibited from so doing by this court.

Relator's contention is that Section 871, Mo.R.S.A., controls venue in this case. This contention is based upon the admitted fact that relator is a resident of Gentry County and the further contention that Crown Coach Company is a resident of Jasper County. The second clause of Section 871 provides: 'Suits instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought: * * * when there are several defendants, and they reside in different counties, the suit may be brought in any such county; * * *.'

A well considered opinion in the case of State ex rel. Columbia National Bank of Kansas City v. Davis, 314 Mo. 373, 284 S.W. 464, 470, holds: 'Our conclusion, therefore, is that the second subdivision of section 1177 R.S.1919 (871, Mo.R.S.A.), fixes the venue of civil actions against corporations where they are joined as defendants with one or more other defendants, and that section 1180 (874, Mo.R.S.A.) fixes such venue only in actions where the corporation defendant is the sole defendant.' To the same effect is the later case of State ex rel. Henning v. Williams, 345 Mo. 22, 131 S.W.2d 561, 563 and 564.

The legal residence of Crown Coach Company is fixed by the location of its registered agent, registered office and principal office, which, according to the agreed statement of facts, is Jasper County. Section 4997.10, Mo.R.S.A., Laws 1943, p. 410, Sec. 10, specifically provides: 'The location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all purposes to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.' See also: St. Charles Sav. Bank v. Thompson & Gray Quarry Co., Mo.Supp., 210 S.W. 868, 871; State ex rel. Juvenile Shoe Corporation v. Miller, 217 Mo.App. 16, 272 S.W. 1066, 1067, et seq.; Bank of Malden v. Wayne Heading Co., 198 Mo.App. 601, 200 S.W. 693, 695; 18 C.J.S., Corporations, Secs. 176 and 177. This rule applies with equal force to venue statutes. State ex rel. Columbia National Bank v. Davis, supra, 284 S.W. loc. cit. 470; State ex rel. Henning v. Williams, supra, 131 S.W. loc. cit. 563.

Respondent contends, however, that Section 5735 is a special venue statute and authorizes joinder of relator as a codefendant in this case. This section, as amended, Laws 1943, p. 862, reads as follows: 'Suit may be brought against any motor carrier or contract hauler, as defined in Article 8, Chapter 35, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939, in any county where the cause of action may arise, in any town or county where the motor carrier or contract hauler operates, or judicial circuit where the cause of action accrued, or where the defendant maintains an office or agent and service may be had upon such motor carrier or contract hauler whether an individual person, firm, company, association, or...

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20 cases
  • Willey v. Fyrogas Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 8, 1952
    ...Mrs. Willey seeks to maintain the venue of her action in Jackson County. Section 508.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.; State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown, 361 Mo. 618, 621, 235 S.W.2d 304, 306. Ruud does not question as a general proposition or rule the appropriateness of the venue in this action. State......
  • Sperry Corp. v. Corcoran
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 20, 1983
    ...advocated a construction which would permit common questions to be decided on one lawsuit rather than two. State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown, 361 Mo. 618, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo.1951), is sometimes cited for the proposition that the joinder rule "is not a venue statute." That case involved an atte......
  • State ex rel. Reeves v. Brady
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 10, 1957
    ...remedy of prohibition where there was no proper venue to confer jurisdiction over the person of a defendant. See State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown, 361 Mo. 618, 235 S.W.2d 304; State ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 361 Mo. 1029, 238 S.W.2d 393; State ex rel. Campbell v. James, Mo.Sup., 263 S.W.2d......
  • State ex rel. Smith v. Gray
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 24, 1998
    ...343, 351 (Mo. banc 1962); State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 364 Mo. 589, 265 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Mo. banc 1954); State ex rel. O'Keefe v. Brown, 361 Mo. 618, 235 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Mo. banc Although the 1943 law changed the rule for general and business corporations, it expressly does not apply t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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