State ex rel. Kelley v. Board of Educ. of Clearcreek Local School Dist.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-682,89-682
• Citation: 52 Ohio St.3d 93,556 N.E.2d 173
• Parties: STATE ex rel. KELLEY, Appellee, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CLEARCREEK LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 93

52 Ohio St.3d 93

556 N.E.2d 173

STATE ex rel. KELLEY, Appellee, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CLEARCREEK LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.

No. 89-682.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 28, 1990.

Decided June 27, 1990.

Syllabus by the Court

A certified teacher who has attained continuing service status in one school district, and who has served at least two years as an administrator in a second school district, is entitled to a continuing service contract as a teacher in the second school district if the administrative contract is not renewed. (R.C. 3319.02 and 3319.11, construed; State, ex rel. Specht, v. Painesville Twp. Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. [1980], 63 Ohio St.2d 146, 17 O.O.3d 89, 407 N.E.2d 20, approved and followed.)

The court of appeals, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Summit County in State, ex rel. Davis, v. Meister (May 2, 1984), Summit App. No. 11463, unreported, 1984 WL 6153, certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.

The facts of this cause were stipulated by the parties in the trial court.

Plaintiff-appellee, Donald A. Kelley, was hired by defendant-appellant, Board of Education of the Clearcreek Local School District, as an assistant principal in August 1984. Prior to his employment with defendant, plaintiff had been a teacher with continuing service status (i.e., tenure) in the Middletown School District. In March 1988, defendant decided not to renew plaintiff's contract as an administrator. Since plaintiff did not have continuing service status as an assistant principal, he requested that defendant issue him a continuing service contract as a teacher. Upon defendant's refusal to offer plaintiff the requested teaching contract, plaintiff commenced this action in the court of common pleas seeking a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, an injunction and monetary damages.

The matter came for a hearing on plaintiff's complaint for a preliminary injunction on June 24, 1988. At that time, the parties agreed that the trial court should proceed to judgment on the issue of tenure based upon the stipulated facts and written arguments of counsel. After due consideration, the trial court found, inter alia, that R.C. 3319.11, and not R.C. 3319.02, is applicable to the instant factual context. The court further found the decision in State, ex rel. Specht, v. Painesville Twp. Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 146, 17 O.O.3d 89, 407 N.E.2d 20, to be controlling, and held that plaintiff is entitled to a continuing service contract as a teacher with the defendant. The court therefore issued the requested writ of mandamus to require the defendant to employ the plaintiff under a continuing service contract as a teacher.

Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. In finding that amended R.C. 3319.02 did not supersede this court's prior decision in Specht, supra, the appellate court opined as follows:

"When the legislature amended R.C. 3319.02 in 1987, it could easily have reversed the holding in Specht by specifying that only a teacher who becomes an administrator in the same district in which he obtained tenure can retain that right. This it did not do. Thus, the legislative inaction confirms that the Supreme Court accurately determined the legislative intent by its decision in Specht." (Emphasis sic.)

Lindhorst & Dreidame and Edward S. Dorsey, Cincinnati, for appellee.

Ennis, Roberts & Fischer Co., L.P.A., and J. Michael Fischer, Cincinnati, for appellant.

SWEENEY, Justice.

The determinative issue before this court is whether plaintiff is entitled to a continuing service contract as a teacher from the defendant school board. Since we are of the opinion that R.C. 3319.11 and our prior decision in Specht, supra, are controlling in this cause, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals below.

R.C. 3319.11 (now R.C. 3319.11[B] ) provides in relevant part that "[t]eachers eligible for continuing service status in any school district shall be * * * those teachers who, having attained continuing contract status elsewhere, have served two years in the district * * *."

In Specht, supra, this court held in relevant part:

"The obtaining of a continuing contract of employment as a teacher is expressly provided for in R.C. 3319.11. This section clearly provides for a situation as in the instant cause. It allows a teacher, who has attained tenure in a different school district and has also served two years in the school district in dispute, to obtain a continuing contract of employment as a teacher." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 149-151, 17 O.O.3d at 91-92, 407 N.E.2d at 23.

The defendant school board contends that given the amendments to R.C. Chapter 3319 that were not before this court when the Specht decision was handed down (Am.Sub.H.B. No. 769, 138 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3582, 3584-3589, effective Oct. 10, 1980), it appears that R.C. 3319.02 now controls and governs the employment of school district administrators as completely and comprehensively as R.C. 3319.11 does for teachers.

R.C. 3319.02 now provides in relevant part:

"(C) * * * When a teacher with continuing service status becomes an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or other administrator with the district with which he holds continuing service status, he retains such status in his nonadministrative position as provided in sections 3319.08 and 3319.09 of the Revised Code." (Emphasis added.)

The defendant argues that R.C. 3319.02 is more specific than R.C. 3319.11 and thus controls the rights of tenured teachers who become administrators. It is defendant's contention that the General Assembly intended to protect only a certain class of administrators (i.e., tenured teachers who are hired as administrators in the same school district), and that the new language of R.C. 3319.02 as emphasized above is the legislature's response to the factual situation presented in Specht, supra. Defendant submits that if the Specht decision is still controlling in this factual context, then the new language of R.C. 3319.02 would be rendered meaningless.

In our view, defendant's arguments are not persuasive. In order to accept appellant's contention that R.C. 3319.02 supersedes R.C. 3319.11 and also Specht, one would have to infer that where a person switches from a teaching position to an administrative position in different school districts, R.C. 3319.02 would preclude the administrator from obtaining a continuing contract as a teacher because he or she changed employer school districts.

We do not believe that this is what the General Assembly intended when it revised R.C. 3319.02. First of all, as this court reiterated in Specht, repeals by implication are disfavored as a matter of judicial policy in this state. Id. at 148, 17 O.O.3d at 91, 407 N.E.2d at 22. Second, as noted by the court of appeals below, the General Assembly, when it again amended R.C. 3319.02 in 1987, could have easily reversed our ruling in Specht merely by stating that only a teacher who becomes an administrator in the same district in which he or she obtained tenure may be able to retain such a right. Since the legislature did not promulgate such a minor revision in the law, it is apparent that the General Assembly is comfortable with the interpretation rendered by this court in Specht, supra. Moreover, this court also declines any invitation to engage in judicial legislation by essentially adding the word "only" to the relevant language of R.C. 3319.02.

We further reject defendant's argument that R.C. 3319.02 and 3319.11 are "separate and autonomous" statutes with the former addressing the employment of administrators, and the latter addressing the employment of teachers. As we noted in Specht, supra, R.C. 3319.09 ¹ defines the term "teacher" as used in R.C. 3319.11 expansively, and includes administrators who are certified to teach as well as regular classroom teachers. Thus, given the expansive definition of "teacher" in R.C. 3319.09, we believe that the transfer of tenure rights upon employment in a new school district as set forth in R.C. 3319.11 applies to administrators and regular classroom teachers alike.

In any event, we do not believe that the amended language in R.C. 3319.02 necessarily defines a class of persons to whom it applies while excluding all others. In this vein, defendant argues that teachers who have acquired tenure rights as teachers in one school district relinquish such teacher tenure rights upon accepting an administrative position in another school...