State ex rel. Kierskey v. Kelly

• Decision Date: 05 May 1902
• Citation: 31 So. 901,80 Miss. 803
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE, EX REL. ABRAHAM KIERSKEY v. ROBERT M. KELLY

31 So. 901

80 Miss. 803

STATE, EX REL. ABRAHAM KIERSKEY v. ROBERT M. KELLY

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 5, 1902

FROM the circuit court of Warren county. HON. FRANK E. LARKIN Judge.

The state, suing on the relation of Kierskey, appellant, was plaintiff in the court below; Kelly, appellee, was defendant there. The suit was a quo warranto proceeding to determine which of the parties had been elected to the office of city assessor of Vicksburg. The case was once before in the supreme court, and the former decision is reported, Kelly v. State, ex rel. Kierskey, 79 Miss. 168. After the cause had been remanded on the former appeal the case was again tried in the court below, the trial resulting in a judgment in favor of defendant, Kelly, from which Kierskey appealed to the supreme court, and Kelly prosecuted a cross appeal. After the record was filed in the supreme court, on this the second appeal, Kelly, the appellee, moved the court to dismiss the appeal, showing as the basis of the motion that the appellant, Kierskey, had accepted, since the appeal had been prosecuted, a federal office, to wit, the office of assistant postmaster at Vicksburg, and had entered upon the discharge of his duties as such assistant postmaster. Section 266 of the constitution of 1890 is as follows:

"SECTION 266. No person holding or exercising the rights or powers of any office of honor or profit, either in his own right or as a deputy, or while otherwise acting for or in the name or by the authority of another, under any foreign government, or under the government of the United States, shall hold or exercise in any way the rights and powers of any office of honor or profit under the laws or authority of this state except notaries, commissioners of deeds, and United States commissioners."

Motion overruled.

Catchings & Catchings, W. J. Voller and John Brunini, for the motion.

Proceedings by quo warranto to recover possession of an office can only be prosecuted by one claiming to be entitled to the office. If the court decides in his favor, he is entitled to the office on qualifying as the law prescribes. Code 1892, § 3522.

If at the time of the institution of this suit by Kierskey he had been appointed to and accepted the office as assistant postmaster, a plea to that effect would necessarily have been a bar to its further consideration. He would not in such case have been entitled to the office, and even if it could have been proven that he had received the highest number of legal votes, judgment could not have been rendered in his favor. The circuit court could not have put him in possession of an office which he was not entitled to hold. For the same reason, if pending the proceedings in the circuit court he had been appointed to and accepted the office of assistant postmaster, a plea to that effect would have been good. The same rule must apply at this stage of the proceedings. If this court could consider and pass upon the merits of his appeal, and should reverse the judgment of the court below it would still remain that the circuit court could not place him in possession of the office. For this reason this court will not enter into a consideration of the question as to whether the finding of the circuit court was correct or not. It would be a vain and useless proceeding from which no benefit could result to the appellant.

That the defense can now be interposed has been many times decided in cases in which a real controversy pending an appeal had ceased to exist. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651; and the many cases therein cited.

In State v. Vann, 127 N.C. 243, where pending appeal from a judgment in an action for the recovery of an office, the term expired, rendering futile any further judgment, the supreme court declined to determine the merits of the case, simply for the purpose of deciding who should pay the costs. To the same effect is Daniels v. Prossey, 16 Wash. 585; McWhorton v. Northcutt, 58 S.W. 720; Robinson v Eubanks, 87 Tex. 562; Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co v. Galveston County, 59 S. W., 589; Bishop v. State, 149 Ind. 223; State v. Thompson, 122 N.C. 493.

It may be argued upon the authority of Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 25 Cal. 94, that one cannot resign an office unless he is in possession of it. All statements in support of such proposition, no matter where found, rest upon this case, and that too although the announcement of the court was based upon the peculiar language of the constitution or statutes of California. We submit that it is not sound law that one cannot resign an office unless he is in possession of it. An office is an entity which exists whether there be an incumbent or not. It is scarcely correct to say that an office can be resigned. When one surrenders an office, to use the ordinary expression, he surrenders his right to hold, and not the office itself. It would seem necessarily to be true, that a man can resign or surrender his right to hold an office, in as much as there is no means by which he can be compelled to hold it. His right is the right to hold the office, and this right he may resign, or surrender or abandon just as he may give up any other right which he may possess.

Kierskey's acceptance of the office of assistant postmaster was equivalent to a resignation, or surrender or abandonment of the right possessed by him under the charter of the city to hold the office until his successor should be duly qualified. It would be a remarkable distinction which would hold that the effect of his acceptance of the office of assistant postmaster was to create a resignation or surrender or abandonment by him of his right under the charter to hold the office until his successor should be duly qualified, but that it did not disturb, in any particular, his right to assert and maintain through the courts, that he was elected to the office of city assessor, and to demand that he be put in possession of that office. Packenham v. Harper, 66 Ill.App. 96.

Our constitution goes considerably beyond the doctrine announced by the courts with regard to incompatible offices.

One holding an office of profit, under the government of the United States, is not merely inhibited by the constitution front holding an office of profit, under the laws of this state, but he is inhibited from exercising, in any way, the rights of any office of profit under the laws of this state.

One of the rights of the office of city assessor is the right to institute proceedings by quo warranto to recover possession of the office from an adverse claimant, and to be put in possession of it. One of the rights is the privilege of recovering in an action all damages that may have accrued in consequence of withholding, from the person elected, the possession of the office. In instituting this proceeding, if we assume that Kierskey was elected as he claims, he was exercising one of the rights pertaining to the office. No man can institute a suit to recover an office and prosecute the same successfully, unless the office belongs to him. The right to institute such suit, therefore, is a right pertaining to the office, within the meaning of the constitution. It will be seen, therefore, that our constitution is sweeping in its provisions, and goes far beyond the doctrine established with regard to the holding of incompatible offices.

It is also well established that where one loses the right to an office by abandonment, or surrender, or resignation, no matter how such abandonment, surrender, or resignation may be manifested and effected, he loses it forever. He cannot become restored to the right to the office by the cessation of the cause which resulted in his losing it. If he has lost it by removal he cannot by returning revest himself with the right to the office. If he has lost it by accepting an office which he cannot hold contemporaneously with it, he cannot by resigning such office revest himself with the rights which he had lost. Kierskey could not by resigning the office of assistant postmaster become revested with the right to the office of city assessor. The case therefore is simply this: Kierskey has put himself in such an attitude that under no circumstances can he become entitled to be put in possession of the office of city assessor. It would, therefore, be not only a waste of time, but an abuse of the authority of the law to permit him to prolong this litigation.

McLaurin, Armstead & Brien, J. D. Thames, Henry & Scudder and Alexander & Alexander, against the motion.

It takes a strong mental effort to conceive that sec. 266 of our constitution can have any application to a case like this. The object of the provision is to...