State ex rel. Koalska v. Swenson

• Decision Date: 01 October 1954
• Docket Number: No. 36455,36455
• Citation: 66 N.W.2d 337,243 Minn. 46
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Robert J. KOALSKA, Relator, v. Edwin T. SWENSON, Warden of Minnesota State Prison, and Jarle Leirfallom, Commissioner of Public Welfare, Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 337

66 N.W.2d 337

243 Minn. 46

STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Robert J. KOALSKA, Relator, v. Edwin T. SWENSON, Warden of Minnesota State Prison, and Jarle Leirfallom, Commissioner of Public Welfare,

Respondents.

No. 36455.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Oct. 1, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court

1. General rules of regulation for inmates of the state prison at Stillwater, promulgated by the commissioner of public welfare pursuant to M.S.A. §§ 245.04, 246.01, and 640.01, which impose new disciplinary measures for violation of prison regulations are not ex post facto acts in violation of Minn.Const. art. 1, § 11, M.S.A., or U.S.Const. art. I, § 10, when applied to an inmate of the state prison who was sentenced by a court of competent jurisdiction, committed pursuant thereto, and imprisoned prior to their promulgation.

2. The revised rules of January 1, 1953, promulgated by the state parole board under the powers conferred by § 637.12 to control paroles and discharges, are not ex post facto laws violative of either the state or the United States constitution when applied to an inmate of the state prison who was sentenced by a court of competent jurisdiction, committed pursuant thereto, and imprisoned prior to their promulgation.

3. Rule V of the revised rules of January 1, 1953, governing parole and discharge of which relator complains, does not affect his minimum sentence. It simply constitutes a limitation on the board's power to continue a case and nothing more, for it has to do with one under sentence, and parole if granted is an act of grace and therefore may be withheld or revoked without depriving a prisoner of any legal rights.

4. The writ of habeas corpus may not be utilized as a remedy to control the exercise of the powers conferred upon the state parole board by § 637.12. The writ was never intended for such purpose as clearly appears from a reading of §§ 637.12 and 589.01.

5. The relator having pleaded guilty to an information charging grand larceny in the second degree and having admitted the truth of two informations charging prior felony convictions, did not receive two alternative judgments and sentences when sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than two and not more than ten years. The judgment and sentence of the court constituted but a single indeterminate sentence and not two sentences under §§ 622.06, 610.17, and 610.28.

6. The writ of habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for a writ of error or appeal or as a cover for a collateral attack upon a judgment of a competent court which had jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject-matter.

Robert J. Koalska, Stillwater, for relator.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., Lowell J. Grady, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

NELSON, Justice.

The relator, Robert J. Koalska, petitioned the district court for Washington county on April 14, 1954, for a writ of habeas corpus. It was denied by order of the court June 2, 1954. The relator then moved for a rehearing of his petition June 10, 1954. The motion for a rehearing was denied June 11, 1954. The relator appeals from the order of the district court of June 2.

The relator was convicted of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree in the Ramsey county district court and duly sentenced on June 4, 1951, to serve a term in the state prison for not less than two years nor more than ten years. The record is clear that he did not begin to serve this sentence until November 14, 1952, for the reason that he was required to serve out another sentence, the obligations of which were not fulfilled until that date.

The relator makes the following contentions: First, that on January 1, 1953, the state board of parole published a set of revised 'Rules Governing Parole and Discharge.' The pertinent sections of these rules are IV and V which read as follows:

'IV. All persons shall have an initial hearing before the Board of Parole during the month on the first day of which they shall have been confined at the institution for a period of five full months. The primary purpose of this hearing is to acquaint the Board with each individual appearing and the time for subsequent hearings shall be determined by the Board.

'V. Where it is believed that an individual may benefit from further training at the institution, the Board shall continue the case for such periods of time as it deems proper and the facts warrant, but in no instance in excess of three years at any one hearing.'

The relator alleges that on October 21, 1953, he received the following notice from the state board of parole: 'After carefully considering your application for release, we have to inform you that the same has been continued 3 years.' The relator argues that the revised rules of January 1, 1953, as applied by the parole board constitute in effect an ex post facto law in relation to the judgment, sentence, and the term of imprisonment imposed upon the relator and violate his constitutional rights.

The relator further argues that the 'General Rules for the Government of Inmates of the Minnesota State Prison * * * as approved by the Department of Public Welfare, May 1, 1953,' constitute in effect an ex post facto law in relation to relator's sentence, judgment, and term of imprisonment imposed upon him and are violative of his constitutional rights. The relator draws the court's attention to those provisions of the governing rules which provide that certain disciplinary measures may be taken, among which is the following statement:

'Confinement in a special segregated section of the institution for such period of time as the Warden or Deputy Warden may determine.'

The relator contends that these rules which provide for segregation are laws which increase the burden of the punishment for a crime which he committed before the rules were approved and are therefore ex post facto laws as applied to him.

He makes the further contention that his minimum sentence of two years, imposed by the Ramsey county district court, has been increased by the state parole board to three years, eleven months, and seven days under the revised rules approved January 1, 1953, governing parole and discharge and the action taken by the state board of parole thereunder October 21, 1953, whereby it continued relator's application for release after due consideration for a period of three years. He claims that he is entitled to a deduction for good time and states that, if this deduction is made from the minimum sentence of two years, his minimum term will have been served as of June 20, 1954. He further contends that the minimum and maximum limits of his sentence are really two separate sentences and two separate punishments for the same offense and, since he has now served the first sentence of two years with time off for good behavior and since the increase of the 'minimum sentence' by the parole board is unconstitutional and in effect an ex post facto law, that the second sentence of ten years is unconstitutional because it inflicts a second punishment for the same offense; that his continued imprisonment is therefore illegal; and that he is by reason thereof entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. All of this he says is violative of his constitutional rights under the provisions of Minn.Const. art. 1, § 11, M.S.A., and U.S.Const. art. I, § 10.

Relator's further contention is to the effect that any and all of these grounds as set forth by him in his petition entitle him to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and his immediate discharge by virtue of such writ.

The relator in this proceeding was heretofore named as relator in State ex rel. Koalska v. Swenson, Minn., 62 N.W.2d 842, wherein this court held that the sentence under which the relator is presently confined in the state prison and which he began to serve November 14, 1952, and not before, is a valid sentence rendered by a competent tribunal having jurisdiction over both the person of the relator and the subject matter of the offense for which the sentence was imposed. In that case it appears that this court based its decision therein in affirming the court below and denying the writ of habeas corpus applied for upon the following statement of facts, namely: That the relator was convicted of grand larceny in the second degree in the district court for Ramsey county and sentenced June 4, 1951, to serve a term of imprisonment in the state prison for not less than two nor more than ten years; that he did not begin to serve this sentence until November 14, 1952; that after pleading guilty to the information charging him with grand larceny in the second...