State ex rel. Koster v. Cain
| Decision Date | 13 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 74734.,WD 74734. |
| Citation | 383 S.W.3d 105 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, ex rel. Chris KOSTER, Missouri Attorney General, Appellant, v. Hortense CAIN, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Laura E. Elsbury, Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.
Peter P. Fiore, Jr., St. Louis, MO, for respondent.
Before Division Three: ALOK AHUJA, Presiding Judge, VICTOR C. HOWARD, Judge and CYNTHIA L. MARTIN, Judge.
The State appeals from a trial court judgment that sustained a motion to quash a garnishment filed by Hortense Cain (“Cain”) and garnishee, Stone, Rich & Fiore (“Law Firm”). The State contends that the trial court erroneously treated the garnishment as an attempt to enforce a contempt judgment against Cain when the garnishment was in fact intended to enforce an underlying consent judgment against Cain. The State also argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that the State's garnishment interrogatories violated the attorney-client privilege. We reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Cain was incarcerated in a state prison under the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections. Cain was injured while participating in a work-release program during her incarceration. Cain sued the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission (“the Commission”).1 The State filed a Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act (“MIRA”) petition against Cain, seeking reimbursement for the costs of her incarceration pursuant to sections 217.825 through 217.841.2
Before Cain's suit against the Commission was resolved, the State and Cain settled the MIRA case. On April 12, 2006, a consent judgment signed by Cain and the State was filed in the trial court (“Consent Judgment”). 3 The Consent Judgment entered judgment “in favor of the State and against Defendant Hortense Cain, in the amount of $168,078.85, as reimbursement for the cost of Defendant Hortense Cain's care and custody while incarcerated in a state correctional facility.” 4 The Consent Judgment imposed a lien in favor of the State against 50 percent of any amount due to Cain from her suit against the Commission (excluding attorney's fees and costs incurred), up to the total amount of the judgment. The Consent Judgment provided that the trial court “shall retain jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with the above provisions until all of the parties' obligations have been completed.”
Cain and the State filed an addendum to the Consent Judgment on April 18, 2006. The addendum reflected the State's additional agreement to file a satisfaction of the Consent Judgment upon its receipt of 50 percent of the amounts due to Cain from the Commission (up to $168,078.85), or should Cain receive no money from her suit against the Commission.5 The addendumto the Consent Judgment effectively limited the source from which the State could collect its $168,078.85 judgment to the net proceeds, if any, from Cain's suit against the Commission.
On March 1, 2010, the State filed a motion for order of contempt and for an ex parte order with the trial court. The State alleged that an arbitration panel heard evidence and awarded Cain a judgment against the Commission in the amount of $235,021,6 and that the Commission issued a check in that amount payable to Cain, her attorneys, and the Missouri Department of Social Services. The State claimed that it had received a settlement statement from Cain's attorney, Peter Fiore (“Fiore”), about the amount due to be paid to Cain, which the State attached to its motion for contempt. The settlement statement indicated that Cain was due the net amount of $84,218.19 following reduction of her settlement by attorney's fees and costs. The State alleged that after receiving the settlement statement, it sent a letter to Fiore demanding payment of $42,109.09 (50 percent of the amount due Cain). The State asserted that Cain “has refused and continues to refuse to pay [the State] in accordance with the Court's judgment,” referring to the Consent Judgment. The State asked the trial court to issue a show cause order to require Cain to appear before it to demonstrate why she should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the terms of the Consent Judgment. The State also requested an ex parte order restraining any person or legal entity in possession of the proceeds from Cain's suit against the Commission from disposing of those proceeds.
The trial court entered an order to show cause and an ex parte order that restrained Cain, Fiore, and Law Firm from disposing of $42,109.09 of the net proceeds from Cain's settlement with the Commission. After Cain did not appear for the show cause hearing, the trial court entered a judgment of contempt (“Contempt Judgment”). The Contempt Judgment found that Cain had refused to comply with the terms of the Consent Judgment and that as a result, Cain was in contempt of the Consent Judgment. The Contempt Judgment ordered Cain “to immediately deliver $42,109.09 to the State of Missouri to avoid punishment by this Court in the form of fines or imprisonment or both.”
Following entry of the Contempt Judgment, Cain filed a special entry of appearance, and a motion to set aside the Contempt Judgment. Cain alleged that the trial court's order to show cause had not been properly served on her and that the Contempt Judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court rejected Cain's motion, reasoning that the Consent Judgment, by which Cain had agreed to be bound, expressly provided that the trial court “shall retain jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with the above provisions until all of the parties' obligations have been completed.” The trial court thus found that it had personal jurisdiction over Cain to enter the Contempt Judgment, notwithstanding the absence of personal service of the order to show cause on Cain.
On February 23, 2011, the State filed a garnishment application. The application identified Law Firm, c/o Fiore as the garnishee, and identified the Consent Judgment as the judgment it was seeking to collect. The application indicated that the “original amount of [the] judgment” the State was seeking to collect was in the amount of $42,109.09. The State's application for garnishment was accompanied by “standard form” interrogatories. 7
Law Firm and Cain filed a motion to quash the garnishment. They claimed the garnishment actually sought to enforce the Contempt Judgment and that the Contempt Judgment was void because the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over Cain. Further, they claimed that the garnishment interrogatories sought attorney-client privileged information.
The trial court 8 entered a judgment and order sustaining the motion to quash the garnishment (“Judgment”). The Judgment concluded that the State's garnishment was “in aid of execution” of the Contempt Judgment, not the Consent Judgment, and that the Contempt Judgment was void as it had been entered without personal jurisdiction over Cain.9 The Judgment further concluded that the garnishment interrogatories “may require [Law Firm] to reveal privileged and confidential matters,” in violation of the attorney-client privilege.
The State appeals.
The trial court's Judgment was entered as a part of a proceeding in aid of enforcement or collection of an underlying judgment. It was thus a special order, defined as “orders in special proceedings attacking or aiding the enforcement of [a] judgment after it has become final in the action in which it was rendered.” GUI, Inc. v. Adams, 978 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Mo.App. W.D.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Special orders after final judgment are appealable pursuant to section 512.020(5).
“Appellate review of a trial court's decision on a motion to quash [a garnishment] requires that the judgment be affirmed unless there is not substantial evidence to support it, the judgment is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” Keipp v. Keipp, 385 S.W.3d 470, 473, 2012 WL 3079060 (Mo.App. W.D.2012). If the motion to quash a garnishment is based on the alleged invalidity of a judgment, we exercise de novo review. State v. Superior Mfg., 373 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Mo.App. W.D.2012).
The State raises three points on appeal. First, the State argues that the trial court erroneously quashed the garnishment based on the conclusion that the garnishment was in aid of execution of the Contempt Judgment, which was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Second, the State argues that the garnishment was instead sought in aid of execution of the Consent Judgment, a valid judgment that was not too indefinite to be enforced. Third, the State argues that the trial court erroneously quashed the garnishment based on the conclusion that the garnishment interrogatories sought attorney-client privileged information.
We combine our analysis of the State's first and second points on appeal as each requires us to determine the judgment the garnishment sought to enforce.
The State's application for garnishment identified the judgment it was seeking to enforce. In the garnishment application, the State specified the “Date Judgment Entered Against Debtor” as April 12, 2006, the date of the Consent Judgment. Cain argued, however, that because the garnishment application indicated the “Amount of [the] Judgment” to be $42,109.09, the specific amount Cain was ordered to pay by the Contempt Judgment, the garnishment was actually sought to enforce the Contempt Judgment. The trial court accepted Cain's argument and quashed the garnishment because it found the Contempt Judgment to be void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court's conclusion was legally erroneous.
“Civil contempt is intended to benefit a party for whom relief has been granted by coercing compliance with the relief...
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