State ex rel Koster v. Green

• Decision Date: 26 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. WD 75820.,WD 75820.
• Parties: STATE of Missouri ex rel Chris KOSTER, Relator, v. The Honorable Daniel GREEN, Circuit Judge of Cole County, and Marilue Hemmel, Circuit Clerk Cole County Circuit Court, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

388 S.W.3d 603

STATE of Missouri ex rel Chris KOSTER, Relator,

v.The Honorable Daniel GREEN, Circuit Judge of Cole County, and Marilue Hemmel, Circuit Clerk Cole County Circuit Court, Respondents.

No. WD 75820.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Western District.

Dec. 26, 2012.

Michael J. Spillane, Jefferson City, MO, for relator.

Ameer Gado and Daniel F. Harvath, St. Louis, MO, for respondents.

Before Writ Division: CYNTHIA L. MARTIN, Presiding Judge, JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge and MARK D. PFEIFFER, Judge.

CYNTHIA L. MARTIN, Judge.

This is an original proceeding in certiorari to review the record in the case of Allen v. Dormire, Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, Cause No. 11AC–CC00634. In that case, the Honorable Daniel Green (“habeas court”) issued a writ of habeas corpus to George Allen Jr. (“Allen”) on November 2, 2012.

Allen was convicted in July 1983, following a second jury trial in the Circuit Court of St. Louis City of capital murder, rape, sodomy, and first degree burglary in connection with the February 4, 1982 murder of Mary Bell in her apartment in St. Louis, Missouri.¹ Allen was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for fifty years and to three consecutive terms of fifteen years' imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections. Allen's conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Allen, 684 S.W.2d 417 (Mo.App. E.D.1984).

The writ of habeas corpus vacated Allen's conviction and commanded that Allen be released from custody should the City of St. Louis Circuit Attorney's Office indicate within ten days its intent not to retry Allen. The Circuit Attorney's Office so indicated and the habeas court issued its order conditionally releasing Allen on his own recognizance on November 14, 2012.²

The Attorney General for the State of Missouri (“Attorney General”) filed a petition for writ of certiorari on November 14, 2012. We granted the writ of certiorari as a matter of right. State ex rel. Nixon v. Kelly, 58 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. banc 2001); State ex rel. Taylor v. Blair, 357 Mo. 586, 210 S.W.2d 1, 3–4 (1948).

We refuse to quash the record of the habeas court.³

Procedural History

Allen filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Cole County Circuit Court ⁴ on September 26, 2011, pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91. A first amended petition was filed on February 17, 2012, and was thereafter supplemented on March 2, 2012, and June 28, 2012 (collectively, hereinafter, “Petition”).

Allen's Petition asserts three claims. First, Allen claims that the State failed to disclose exculpatory, material evidence in violation of his right to due process pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (“Claim No. 1”). Second, Allen claims that the undisclosed evidence, and newly discovered exculpatory evidence, combine to demonstrate that his prosecution resulted in a miscarriage of justice under State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d 210 (Mo. banc 2001) (“Claim No. 2”). Third, Allen claims that he has presented clear and convincing evidence of innocence (“actual innocence”) under State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. banc 2003) (“Claim No. 3”).

On July 16, 2012, cross motions for summary judgment were filed by Allen and the Attorney General. The cross motions were each supported by a joint statement of uncontroverted material facts (“Stipulated Facts”).

After considering the Stipulated Facts, Judge Green issued a writ of habeas corpus on November 2, 2012 (“Judgment”) which included seventy-five pages of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact were cross-referenced to the Stipulated Facts. The Judgment granted Allen habeas relief on Claim No. 1, and purported not to reach or determine Claims No. 2 or No. 3.

We issued our writ of certiorari on November 15, 2012. “A writ of certiorari requires an inferior court to produce a certified record of a particular case for review for irregularities.” State ex rel. Koster v. McElwain, 340 S.W.3d 221, 231 (Mo.App. W.D.2011). We ordered the Circuit Court of Cole County to return the record of the habeas corpus proceedings to this court for review.⁵

Standard of Review

Certiorari is “available to correct judgments that are in excess or an abuse of jurisdiction,⁶ and that are not otherwise reviewable [on] appeal.” State ex rel. Nixon v. Sprick, 59 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Mo. banc 2001). Our review is limited to whether the habeas court exceeded the bounds of its authority to grant habeas relief or abused its discretion in issuing the writ of habeas corpus. State ex rel. Koster v. Jackson, 301 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Mo.App. W.D.2010).

In applying this standard of review, we do not review findings of fact. Sprick, 59 S.W.3d at 518. We limit our review to questions of law presented by the record before the habeas court. Id. The habeas court will have exceeded the bounds of its authority if the evidence as a whole does not support the grant of a writ of habeas corpus in light of the applicable law. Id. “[E]very lawful intendment will be made in favor of the determination and the regularity of the proceedings below.” State ex rel. Shartel v. Skinker, 324 Mo. 955, 25 S.W.2d 472, 478 (1930). The habeas court will have abused its discretion if its “ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstancesthen before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.” State v. Stewart, 313 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Mo. banc 2010).

Upon the completion of our review, our options are to “either quash the writ or [to] uphold the actions of the habeas court,” Jackson, 301 S.W.3d at 589, “in whole or in part.” State ex rel. White v. Swink, 241 Mo.App. 1048, 256 S.W.2d 825, 827 (1953).

Analysis

The habeas court granted Allen habeas relief on the basis of Claim No. 1. The habeas court thus concluded that the State failed to disclose exculpatory, material evidence in violation of Allen's right to Due Process pursuant to Brady and Kyles. The undisclosed evidence on which the habeas court relied to reach this conclusion consisted of serological test results, police documents referencing serological test results, documents concerning fingerprints found at the crime scene, a drawing of the crime scene made by Allen, and the fact that a key prosecution witness had been hypnotized.

The Attorney General's petition for writ of certiorari does not claim that Allen was procedurally barred to assert Claim No. 1 in his habeas petition, and thus does not claim that the habeas court exceeded its authority to entertain Claim No. 1. We dispense, therefore, with discussion of the extent to which a habeas court has the authority to entertain claims raised in a habeas corpus petition that are procedurally barred because they could have been asserted on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding.⁷ We instead accept the habeas court's uncontested conclusion that Allen's Claim No. 1 (his Brady claim), though procedurally barred, was nonetheless reviewable pursuant to the gateway of “cause and prejudice” recognized by the Missouri Supreme Court in Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d at 215.⁸

The Attorney General's petition for writ of certiorari concedes that evidence in the categories described, supra, was not disclosed to Allen. In fact, the Stipulated Facts concede as much, presenting this court with the somewhat unusual scenario wherein the Attorney General's independent investigation of Allen's habeas claims has persuaded the Attorney General to stipulate that Allen was denied access to evidence prior to his trial which should have been made available to him.

The sole issue the Attorney General has asked this court to review is “the legal issue whether the prejudice resulting from the failure to disclose the evidence rises to the level of Due Process Clause violations” under Brady and Kyles. [Suggestions in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 2]. Specifically, the Attorney General asks us to determine whether “it was an abuse of discretion to find prejudice rising to the level of [a] Due Process Clause violation from the failure to disclose evidence in this case.” [Suggestions in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 3]. Given the narrow issue presented in the Attorney General's writ petition, we thus need only determine whether the habeas court's finding that Allen established a Brady violation “is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.” Stewart, 313 S.W.3d at 665.

The Essential Elements of a Brady Claim

To prevail on a Brady claim, a movant “must show each of the following: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) he was prejudiced.” State ex rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Mo. banc 2010).

To determine “whether ... evidence meets the test for Brady prejudice, this Court must assess whether the evidence at issue is material to [Allen's] case.” Id. at 128.

The materiality standard for Brady claims is established when “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 .“The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial ... resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”Id. at 434 .

Id. (emphasis added). If there is a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that the outcome of a criminal proceeding would have been different, then the evidentiary suppression “ ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434...