State ex rel. Lakeman v. Siedlik
| Decision Date | 25 January 1994 |
| Docket Number | Nos. WD,s. WD |
| Citation | 872 S.W.2d 503 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, ex rel. Harold G. LAKEMAN, Relator, v. The Honorable Mark S. SIEDLIK, Respondent. Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys, Amicus Curiae. 47536, WD 47565. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
George G. Allen, Jr., Kansas City, for relator Lakeman.
Terry J. Brady, Mark E. Kelly, Gage & Tucker, Kansas City, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for appellant-respondent Siedlik.
John B. Boyd, Connaughton, Boyd & Kenter, P.C., Kansas City, for amicus curiae.
Before KENNEDY, P.J., and ULRICH and SPINDEN, JJ.
The Honorable Mark S. Siedlik, Administrative Law Judge, Missouri Division of Workers' Compensation, (ALJ Siedlik) appeals the writ of prohibition prohibiting him from requiring Harold G. Lakeman, employee/claimant, to submit to a rehabilitation evaluation by a vocational expert as requested by Allied-Signal, Inc. (employer) and the State Treasurer as custodian for the Second Injury Fund (Fund). The writ of prohibition did not prohibit enforcement of ALJ Siedlik's order directing Mr. Lakeman to submit to physical evaluation by a physician, although the prohibition was sought by Mr. Lakeman. 1
Mr. Lakeman cross appeals from the circuit court's writ of prohibition, contending that ALJ Siedlik exceeded his authority by requiring him to submit to physical evaluation by a medical doctor at the request of the Fund. The issue presented is whether an administrative law judge, Missouri Division of Worker's Compensation (ALJ), can require a claimant to submit to an evaluation by a nonphysician vocational expert at the request of an employer or require a claimant who asserts a claim against the Second Injury Fund to submit to rehabilitation evaluation by a vocational expert or physical examination by a physician.
The portion of the writ of prohibition prohibiting the ALJ from compelling Mr. Lakeman to submit to evaluation by a vocational expert is affirmed. The denial of the application for a writ prohibiting enforcement of the ALJ's order compelling Mr. Lakeman to submit to physical examination at the request of the Fund is reversed. The case is remanded with direction.
Harold G. Lakeman filed a claim for workers' compensation on May 10, 1991. He alleged that on May 24, 1989, while in the scope and course of his employment, he suffered an injury to his right shoulder, neck and back. Mr. Lakeman claimed he was due compensation from the Second Injury Fund for permanent partial disability because of a previous injury to his left foot. This claim was later amended to seek permanent total disability from the Fund because of the injury he incurred on May 24, 1989, combined with several preexisting disabilities, including total loss of hearing in his right ear, loss of hearing in his left ear, and limitations to the use of his left foot, right shoulder, right knee, and upper back.
Counsel for the Fund scheduled Mr. Lakeman for evaluation by two physicians to determine the nature and extent of his disability. Mr. Lakeman was seen by a specialist in the treatment and evaluation of industrial and orthopedic injuries on July 27, 1992. Mr. Lakeman refused to submit to the scheduled examination by a medical specialist in diagnosis and treatment of hearing loss.
The Fund and the employer requested Mr. Lakeman to submit to examination by a vocational expert to determine the extent of his employment capabilities. Mr. Lakeman refused to submit to examination by the vocational expert. Mr. Lakeman was evaluated and obtained a report from a vocational expert of his choice.
Judge Siedlik ordered Mr. Lakeman to submit to a physical examination on behalf of the Fund and to submit to examination by a vocational expert on behalf of the Fund and employer. Mr. Lakeman then sought a writ of prohibition in the circuit court of Jackson County to prevent enforcement of ALJ Siedlik's order. The circuit court issued its writ of prohibition, and this appeal resulted.
As point one on appeal, ALJ Siedlik claims the circuit court erred in prohibiting him from ordering Mr. Lakeman to submit to a vocational evaluation at the request of the Fund. Point two claims that the court erred in prohibiting ALJ Siedlik from ordering Mr. Lakeman to submit to expert vocational evaluation at the request of the employer. The Circuit Court, in its order, ruled that an ALJ does not have authority to order vocational evaluation by anyone who is not a medical doctor.
Workers' compensation is a creation of statute. It did not exist at common law but is considered "substitutional for common law tort remedies whose primary purpose is to mitigate losses sustained from accidental injuries received by working persons in the course of employment." Sheldon v. Board of Trustees, 779 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Mo. banc 1989); Scott v. Edwards Transp. Co., 807 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Mo. banc 1991). The ALJ has only the authority granted by statute. Soars v. Soars-Lovelace, Inc., 346 Mo. 710, 142 S.W.2d 866, 871 (1940). Workers' compensation was enacted to reduce costs and time involved in litigation for accidents occurring in the course and scope of employment. See 99 C.J.S. § 5(a) (). The workers' compensation laws replaced an injured worker's common law right to bring suit when the injury is encompassed by the workers' compensation laws. § 287.120(1), RSMo 1986. The workers' compensation provisions "shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare," § 287.800, "accordingly, we resolve all doubts in favor of the employee." Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis-Cardinal Ritter Inst., 793 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo.App.1990).
The Second Injury Fund is also a creation of statute, 2 and its limits and powers are expressed by statute. ALJ Siedlik cites section 287.220(2)--which empowers the State Treasurer, as custodian of the Fund, to defend the Fund--as the authority for his discovery order compelling Mr. Lakeman to submit to examination by a nonphysician vocational expert for the purpose of aiding the determination of the employee/claimant's employment capabilities.
The scope of discovery available to each party, including the Fund, in a workers' compensation case is set by statute. No additional common law rights to discovery exist in workers' compensation cases beyond those provided for in the workers' compensation statute. Section 287.220(2) does not grant the Fund additional discovery power beyond the scope outlined in chapter 287. ALJ Siedlik confuses defense with discovery. The statutory authority for the State Treasurer to defend the Fund grants neither discovery rights to the State Treasurer nor authority to compel boundless discovery to ALJs.
The proceedings of workers' compensation are to be "simple, informal and summary." § 287.550. If the Fund were allowed to exercise full discovery procedures "in defending," the workers' compensation case would be as complex, costly and time consuming as a litigated personal injury case. The legislature intended that the workers' compensation laws provide: rapid resolution of employee claims of job-related injury to benefit the employee, resolution of doubts to favor the employee, and limited exposure to benefit the employer/insurer. Allowing the ALJs to exercise unrestricted authority to compel discovery would defeat the intent of the legislature by permitting extensive, expensive and potentially protracted discovery in worker compensation Second Injury Fund cases while continuing to limit exposure of the Fund.
The workers'...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Seeley v. Anchor Fence Co.
...from accidental injuries received by working persons in the course of employment" in a timely manner. State ex rel. Lakeman v. Siedlik, 872 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Mo.App. 1994); see also § 287.800, RSMo 2000. Point One is In its second point, Employer contends the Commission erred in finding that......
-
Lutes v. Schaefer
...of statute, ALJs and the Division of Workers' Compensation only have the authority granted by statute. State ex rel. Lakeman v. Siedlik, 872 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Mo.App.W.D.1994); see also Soars v. Soars–Lovelace, Inc., 346 Mo. 710, 142 S.W.2d 866, 871 (1940) (“Like other administrative tribuna......
-
State ex rel. Miss. Lime v. MISSOURI AIR CONSERVATION COMM.
...898 S.W.2d 559 (Mo.App.1994); Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Mo. State Bd. of Health, 896 S.W.2d 640 (Mo.App.1995); State ex rel. Lakeman v. Siedlik, 872 S.W.2d 503 (Mo.App.1994); Scott County Reorganized R-6 Sch. Dist. v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, 872 S.W.2d 892 (Mo.App.1994); Southwestern Bell T......
-
McCormack v. Stewart Enterprises, Inc.
...Worker's Compensation Act was to mitigate losses sustained from accidental injuries received in the workplace. State ex rel. Lakeman v. Siedlik, 872 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Mo.App.1994). The system was enacted to provide quick recovery to those who were injured without their incurring the cost and......