State ex rel. Lambert v. Stephens

• Citation: 200 W.Va. 802,490 S.E.2d 891
• Decision Date: 17 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 23931,23931
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia ex rel. Gordon LAMBERT, President, County Commission of McDowell County, and Donald L. Hicks, Sheriff of McDowell County, Relators, v. Honorable Booker T. STEPHENS, Judge of the Circuit Court of McDowell County, and William Bowman, Administrator, McDowell County Jail, Respondents.

Page 891

490 S.E.2d 891

200 W.Va. 802

STATE of West Virginia ex rel. Gordon LAMBERT, President,

County Commission of McDowell County, and Donald

L. Hicks, Sheriff of McDowell County, Relators, v. Honorable Booker T. STEPHENS, Judge of the Circuit Court of

McDowell County, and William Bowman,

Administrator, McDowell County Jail, Respondents.

No. 23931.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted March 25, 1997.

Decided July 17, 1997.

[200 W.Va. 804] Syllabus by the Court

1. "The system of "checks and balances" provided for in American state and federal constitutions and secured to each branch of government by "Separation of Powers" clauses theoretically and practically compels courts, when called upon, to thwart any unlawful actions of one branch of government which impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a coequal branch. State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 158 W.Va. 390, 402, 214 S.E.2d 467, 477 (1975)." Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Frazier v. Meadows, 193 W.Va. 20, 25, 454 S.E.2d 65, 70 (1994).

2. Not only does our Constitution explicitly vest the judiciary with the control over its own administrative business, but it is a fortiori that the judiciary must have such control in order to maintain its independence.

3. Courts have inherent authority to require necessary resources, such as sufficient funds for operating expenses, work space, parking space, supplies, and other material items. In order for a court to invoke use of its inherent power to require resources, the court must demonstrate that such resources are reasonably necessary for the performance of its responsibilities in the administration of justice. Although courts must be cautious not to reach beyond the power of the judicial branch, it is crucial for the judiciary to be able to invoke such power as is reasonably necessary to maintain itself as an independent and equal branch of our government.

4. It is the constitutional obligation of the judiciary to protect its own proper constitutional authority by upholding the independence of the judiciary.

5. A court may use the legal resources available to it to defend those interests it is constitutionally bound to protect, including, but not limited to, ex parte orders in necessary circumstances in administrative matters within the court's inherent authority.

Sidney H. Bell, Prosecuting Attorney, of McDowell County Welch, for Relators.

John M. Hedges, Byrne & Hedges, Morgantown, for Booker T. Stephens, Judge.

WORKMAN, Chief Justice:

This original habeas corpus proceeding was brought to this Court on January 3, 1997, seeking the immediate custodial release of Gordon Lambert, President of the County Commission of McDowell County, and Donald L. Hicks, Sheriff of McDowell County (hereinafter collectively referred to as Relators). On that same day, this Court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, commanding William Bowman, Administrator of the McDowell County Jail, to release said Relators pending further order of this Court. We also ordered the Honorable Booker T. Stephens, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of McDowell County (hereinafter the Respondent Judge), to file a written response with this Court by January 7, 1997, together with a copy of the order sentencing Relators to thirty days in jail for contempt of court. Thereafter, by order dated January 8, 1997, this Court set a rule to show cause hearing to be held on March 25, 1997. Upon review of the facts of this case, we find it unnecessary to issue a writ of habeas corpus as Relators have purged themselves of any contempt.

I. FACTS

The facts which give rise to this proceeding involve a dispute over a parking area, consisting of eight parking spaces, situated behind the magistrate court building in the City of Welch, McDowell County. ¹ On December 18, 1996, the Respondent Judge issued On January 2, 1997, the Commission met to discuss the magistrate court parking situation and the Respondent Judge's order. According to the Respondent Judge, who attended this meeting, the commissioners voted unanimously to authorize Sidney Bell, Prosecuting Attorney of McDowell County, to file a petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the parking order. The very next day, however, before a petition could be filed, construction began on a ramp to provide the disabled access to the sheriff's office. The sheriff's office was located in a building next to the magistrate court building, and the ramp was being built adjacent to the magistrate court parking area. The Respondent Judge was notified of the construction and went to the construction site.

                [200 W.Va. 805] a "General Order," designating the parking area solely for magistrate court personnel use.  In this order, the Respondent Judge found the parking area was paid for by the McDowell County Commission (hereinafter Commission) out of the magistrate court fund. 2  The Respondent Judge further warned that violators of the order would face contempt proceedings
                

Upon arrival, the Respondent Judge was informed by Sheriff Hicks of his plan to build the ramp. After viewing the proposed design and the location of the ramp, the Respondent Judge apparently concluded that use of one of the parking spaces at issue would render the ramp inaccessible. Consequently, the Respondent Judge told Sheriff Hicks to appear before him at 1:30 p.m. that day. After the Respondent Judge left, Robert Estep, a maintenance worker employed by the Commission, arrived at the site with materials needed to build the ramp. ³ After learning of Mr. Estep's arrival at the site, the Respondent Judge apparently believed that construction of the ramp had not ceased, and, therefore, he expedited a hearing to be held at 11:30 that morning.

Relators, along with Mr. Bell and Mr. Estep, attended the hearing. ⁴ At the beginning of the hearing the Respondent Judge stated he requested Sheriff Hicks and Mr. Estep to appear before the court and "show cause why they should not be held in violation of ... [the December 18, 1996] order." Mr. Estep testified that he was instructed by Sheriff Hicks and "B. G. Smith," who was instructed by President Lambert, to build the ramp up to the edge of the parking lot. Mr. Estep further testified that: (1) the ramp would not be built on the parking lot, but he believed access to the ramp would be blocked if an automobile was parked in the space closest to the ramp; (2) he did not know much about the contents of the circuit court's prior order and merely was doing what he was told to do; and (3) the only construction performed thus far was that he knocked down and dug out a cement curb at the edge of the parking lot and he got some materials to build the ramp.

President Lambert testified at the hearing that he authorized the construction of the ramp, but that he was not at the site when the construction began. During his testimony, he repeatedly stated he did not know the ramp would interfere with the magistrate court parking and was unaware his authorization of the ramp would be viewed as contemptuous of the prior order. Sheriff Hicks testified he believed the ramp would be accessible to a wheelchair even if a vehicle was in the parking space in controversy and he did not believe he was in contempt of the prior order.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Respondent Judge orally pronounced President Lambert and Sheriff Hicks to be in "criminal contempt" and sentenced Relators to thirty days in jail. ⁵ The Respondent Judge added, however, that Relators could purge themselves Relators maintain the area was restored that afternoon, but the Respondent Judge could not be located, necessitating the filing of the habeas corpus petition with this Court. On January 6, 1997, Relators filed a motion with the Respondent Judge asking him to purge them of the contempt. At oral argument before this Court, both parties agreed that the area in controversy was restored and, consequently, the contempt charges against Relators were purged. Consequently, we find the parties' arguments with respect to the alleged procedural deficiencies in the manner in which the Respondent Judge handled the contempt action are moot. ⁶ Nevertheless, there are two significant issues capable of recurrence which merit discussion by this Court. These issues center around (1) the fundamental confusion between the concepts of criminal versus civil contempt and (2) the scope of a court's authority to require reasonable and necessary resources for the performance of its responsibilities.

[200 W.Va. 806] of the contempt by restoring the disturbed area. Mr. Bell's objections and exceptions to the Respondent Judge's decision were noted in the record.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Criminal v. Civil Contempt

Confusion often arises between criminal and civil contempt. ⁷ In the present case, while the circuit court stated it was holding Relators in "criminal contempt" of its order, the circuit court actually imposed a civil contempt sanction. To explain the difference between the two concepts, we briefly reiterate the principles we set forth in State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael, 166 W.Va. 660, 276 S.E.2d 812 (1981), where we succinctly summarized the law of contempt.

In Robinson, we stated that we do not look at the contemptuous conduct to determine whether the contempt should be considered criminal or civil, because either type of contempt may be justified upon the same conduct. Rather, we said the classification of the contempt and the type of sanction imposed depend upon what purpose is being served by the sanction. If the purpose of imposing the sanction is to compel the contemner to comply with a court order to benefit the party bringing the contempt action, it is civil contempt. However, if the purpose of imposing the sanction "is to punish the contemner for an affront to the dignity or authority of the court, or to preserve or restore order in the court or respect for the court, the contempt is criminal." Syl. Pts....