State ex rel. Land v. Trimble

• Decision Date: 04 February 1928
• Docket Number: 28268
• Parties: The State ex rel. Marion O. Land v. Francis H. Trimble et al., Judges of Kansas City Court of Appeals
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

2 S.W.2d 616

318 Mo. 963

The State ex rel. Marion O. Land v. Francis H. Trimble et al., Judges of Kansas City Court of Appeals

No. 28268

Supreme Court of Missouri

February 4, 1928

To Kansas City Court of Appeals.

Record quashed.

W B. Norris for relator.

(1) The question is not one involving the general principles of law of taxation, but the construction of the statutes in reference to the cities of the first class. The provisions of the statute in reference to the cities of the first class are similar to the provisions as found in the Kansas City Charter. Those provisions have been construed by this court in favor of the priority of the lien arising from special tax bills over the lien given to the city for general city taxes. Secs. 7731, 7753, 7795, 7796, 7797, 7722, 7723, 7726, 7733 R. S. 1919; Good v. Johnson, 299 Mo. 186; Commerce Trust Co. v. Syndicate Lock Co., 208 Mo.App. 261. (2) Section 7797 provides that tax bill in this suit shall be a lien upon the property therein described continually for two years and no longer, unless suit is brought within such period to collect the same, in which case the lien shall continue until the determination of the legal proceedings. It is manifestly not the meaning of the law that a sale for city taxes during the life of the lien for a subsequent year shall discharge the lien of the tax bill unless the charter of the city of St. Joseph expressly provides to the contrary. State ex rel. Rosenblatt v Werner, 10 Mo.App. 41; City of Excelsior Springs to use of McCormick v. Henry, 99 Mo.App. 450. (3) There being no distinction between assessments made by the city for general purposes from assessments made for the purpose of special taxation, the defendant Landis bought the property under the general law of taxation subject to all prior liens given by the law for the protection of either liens for general taxes or liens for special taxes. Morey Eng. & Const. Co. v. Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241; Good v. Johnson, 299 Mo. 186.

Landis & Duncan and John C. Landis for respondents.

(1) The opinion of respondents is not subject to review by this court. It construes the statutes governing cities of the first class which have not been previously construed by this court. Therefore, its decision whether right or wrong is final. State ex rel. Tummons v. Cox, 282 S.W. 694; State ex rel. Winters v. Trimble, 290 S.W. 115; State ex rel. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 267 S.W. 379. (a) It is evident that a review of the opinion of the Court of Appeals is sought in order to determine, in addition to the claim of an alleged contravention with a ruling of the Supreme Court, whether statutes have been misinterpreted or errors in the construction of the law other than those of conflict have been committed. This court will not do so. Courts of appeals within the limits of their jurisdiction as defined by the organic law are supreme. State ex rel. Tummons v. Cox, 282 S.W. 694; State ex rel. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 267 S.W. 379. (b) The opinion is not in conflict with the decision of this court in Good v. Johnson, 299 Mo. 186. (2) Even if respondents failed to follow the opinion of Good v. Johnson, the writ should be quashed for respondents have correctly construed the charter governing cities of the first class as it relates to taxation. State ex rel. Thomas v. Daues, 283 S.W. 57. (a) The lien of the general taxes levied by the city of St. Joseph is a perpetual lien against all interest in the real estate. Art. 10, sec. 1, Mo. Constitution; Secs. 7709, 12757, 12964, 12965, R. S. 1919. (b) The charter granted by the legislature to cities of the first class does not grant holders of special tax bills a lien superior to the lien of general taxes. Sec. 7731, R. S. 1919. (c) General taxes unless there is legislative enactment to the contrary are liens superior to all other liens. Finkelstein v. Baxter, 114 Mo. 493; Browne v. Browne, 124 Mo. 791; Allen v. McCabe, 93 Mo. 138; Gitchill v. Kleider, 84 Mo. 472; Merriweather v. Overly, 228 Mo. 218; Rhorer v. Oder, 124 Mo. 24; Keething v. Craig, 73 Mo. 507; Jaicks v. Oppenheimer, 264 Mo. 693.

OPINION

Gantt, J.

Relator seeks to quash the record of the Kansas City Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County in the case of Marion O. Land, doing business as Land Construction Company v. Michael Costello and W. A. Landis. The facts are as follows:

On August 4, 1923, the city of St. Joseph issued two tax-bills to plaintiff against lots 3 and 4 in Block 29, St. Joseph Extension Addition to the city of St. Joseph. The bills were each for $ 215.16, for paving Highland Avenue abutting on said lots. On January 17, 1925, the city of St. Joseph sold the lots to Walter A. Landis for general taxes for the year 1924. It is admitted the paving was in accordance with the contract and specifications; that the bills are for the proper amount, and are in all respects regular and according to law. It is further admitted the general taxes were lawfully levied, were delinquent, the sale was in all respects regular and according to law, that the City Treasurer of St. Joseph on the day of the sale issued to Landis certificates of purchase in due form on payment by him of the amount bid for the lots, and that said certificates have not been redeemed.

Plaintiff sued in two counts to enforce the liens of the special taxbills. Landis answered by general denial, and further answered that he purchased the lots at a sale duly and regularly held by the city of St. Joseph for delinquent general taxes for the year 1924 and prior years, received proper certificates of purchase, and that the title so obtained by him is in no wise affected by the lien of the taxbills set forth in the petition, but is superior thereto.

The question for solution was the priority of the liens. The trial court, without a jury, held that under the charter of the city of St. Joseph, a city of the first-class, the lien of the special tax-bills, which attached August 4, 1924, took precedence over the lien for general taxes for the year 1924. Judgment was rendered for $ 291.17 against each lot. Defendant Landis appealed. The Court of Appeals gave priority to the lien for general taxes and reversed the judgment, citing Jaicks v. Oppenheimer, 264 Mo. 693, 175 S.W. 972; Const. Co. v. Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241, 146 S.W. 1142; Mo. Real Estate & Loan Co. v. Burri, 202 Mo.App. 242, 216 S.W. 570; Commerce Trust Co. v. Syndicate Lock Co., 208 Mo.App. 261, 232 S.W. 1055, 235 S.W. 150.

In the Jaicks case we only determined the question of priority between special tax-bills issued against the same land by authority of the charter of Kansas City. In the Construction Company case we only determined the question of priority between the lien of a special tax-bill and a prior deed of trust. The point here involved was not under consideration in those cases. In the course of the opinions we stated the general rule as follows: "A general tax which has primarily for its object the support of the government is of greater dignity and more important than a tax-bill issued for public improvements, and, therefore, entitled to priority." The Court of Appeals disposed of the instant case by application of the general rule. It was held that charters of cities of the first-class contained no provision modifying or qualifying the general rule. In passing on the question, the court said:

"It is urged by plaintiff that such ruling is not in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court in Good v Johnson, 299 Mo. 186, 252 S.W. 363. In that case the court was discussing and applying the charter of Kansas City, which expressly provided all tax-bills for special improvements shall vest in the purchaser thereof an absolute estate in fee simple in real property as described therein, and adds:

"'And shall convey all the right, title and interest of the former owner or owners . . . free from any and all encumbrances of whatsoever kind or nature subject, however, to all unpaid state, county and city taxes, general and special or assessments which are a lien thereon.'

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