State ex rel. Lennon v. District Court of Douglas County
| Decision Date | 05 October 1917 |
| Docket Number | 20,597 |
| Citation | 164 N.W. 366,138 Minn. 103 |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. GEORGE A. LENNON v. DISTRICT COURT OF DOUGLAS COUNTY AND OTHERS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Upon the relation of George A. Lennon the supreme court granted its writ of certiorari directed to the district court for Douglas county to review the proceedings in that court Roeser, J., brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act by relator, as employee, against Trask H. Fezler, as employer. Affirmed.
Workmen's Compensation Act -- casual employment.
The erection of a temporary sned by defendant, upon a farm owned but not operated by him, cannot be held to be an employment within the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of defendant so as to make him liable under the Workmen's Compensation Act to a person accidentally injured in such erection while casually employed.
Ralph S. Thornton, for relator.
Gunderson & Leach, for respondents.
Certiorari to review a judgment of the district court disallowing a claim made by relator under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The undisputed facts are, in substance, these: The defendant owned a farm near the village of Osakis, Minnesota. When the accident, upon which relator bases the claim, happened, defendant did not operate the farm but had it rented to a tenant who expected to soon take possession. Defendant lived in the village mentioned, "where he was dealing in horses, had a livery and auto livery business on a small scale and also did some auctioneering, and dealing in real estate," presumably as agent. Fire had destroyed the barn on the farm shortly before the accident to relator, and it was necessary to provide some temporary shelter for the tenant's stock. Early on the tenth of October, 1916, defendant called on relator and asked his assistance in constructing a shed for the purpose stated, informing him that he needed another man, in addition to the two carpenters and help he already had, to finish the work that day. Relator went with defendant and four other men to the farm and began to erect a temporary shed, 16 feet by 30 feet, which they would have completed that day but for a delay occasioned by a break down of the wagon on which the needed lumber was being brought to the premises. Relator and the two other carpenters were therefore requested to come back the next day to finish the shed and also to build a small chicken house. The work would not require the entire day. They came as requested, and about noon, when relator was assisting in boarding up the chicken house, he struck a nail in such a manner that it flew up and hit one of his eyes, practically destroying its vision. When relator was requested to come to work nothing was said as to the amount of his compensation. Upon these facts the court found that the employment of relator was casual only and was not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of defendant, hence denied compensation.
The findings as to the casual character of the employment are not challenged, but it is claimed that the work came within the usual course of the business, trade, profession or occupation of defendant and that therefore under the decision of State v. District Court of Rice County, 131 Minn. 352, 155 N.W. 103, the injury is covered by the act notwithstanding the casual character of the employment.
It was part of defendant's business as a landlord, it is argued to erect or repair the necessary structures on the farm, no matter what other trades or businesses he also might be engaged in. In support of this contention relator cites Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 748, 158 P. 1031. However, that case turned upon the question whether a person employed to repair a tractor, used on a ranch, was excluded from the benefits of the act by a clause reading like the one in our statute. A recovery was denied, and, in the opinion, the court suggested arguendo that, had the injury been received in the building of a barn on the ranch which would have become a part thereof and generally useful only for ranch purposes, the result as to compensation might have been different from the one then arrived at, for the court says a tractor is an instrumentality useful for many things not connected with a ranch. Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 450, 452, 97 A. 328, L.R.A. 1916E, 506, is relied on. The principal contentions there were whether the claimant was an employee and whether the employment to clear and develop the defendant's lands was casual. The finding that it was not casual, grounded on evidence that the claimant had entered upon a work requiring weeks to complete, was sustained. The court also found that the development of the land was one of the businesses of the defendant, "not evidently his main business, and yet a very substantial one." The decision is not of much weight here for both the facts and the statutes are dissimilar. There is here no finding to the...
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