State ex rel. Longanacre v. Crabtree

Decision Date20 November 1986
Docket NumberNo. 17265,17265
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE ex rel. Hon. Louis E. LONGANACRE, et al. v. Paul CRABTREE, etc., and Glen B. Gainer, Jr., etc.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "Where a statutory classification based on population bears no rational relationship to the purposes of the statute, such classification is arbitrary, and violates the constitutional guaranty of equal protection." Syllabus Point 3, Donaldson v. Gainer, --- W.Va. ---, 294 S.E.2d 103 (1982).

2. "Where economic rights are concerned, we look to see whether the classification is a rational one based on social, economic, historic or geographic factors, whether it bears a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose, and whether all persons within the class are treated equally. Where such classification is rational and bears the requisite reasonable relationship, the statute does not violate Section 39 of Article VI of the West Virginia Constitution." Syllabus Point 7, Atchinson v. Erwin, --- W.Va. ---, 302 S.E.2d 78 (1983).

3. "A classification which excludes without any reasonable basis certain public officers who would otherwise be subject to a general law on the same matter is arbitrary and violative of the constitutional provisions forbidding special laws where a general law is required or would be proper." Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. County Court v. Battle, 147 W.Va. 841, 131 S.E.2d 730 (1963).

4. W.Va.Code, 50-1-3, to the extent it provides an exception permitting increased salaries for magistrates in Boone, Preston, Jefferson, Mercer, and Fayette counties as against magistrates who are in counties with the same general population per magistrate, violates equal protection concepts.

Michael Edward Nogay, Sellitti & Nogay, Weirton, for appellant.

Lucy Norrow Huey, Charleston, for appellees.

MILLER, Chief Justice:

In this original proceeding in mandamus, magistrates from Greenbrier, Hancock, Marshall, and Mingo counties claim that the statute setting their salaries, W.Va.Code, 50-1-3, violates equal protection principles. 1 Under this statute, magistrate salaries are set based on the population served. The population served figure is determined by dividing the number of magistrates authorized in a county into the total population of that county. 2 However, there are created certain pay exceptions within the statute which give higher pay to magistrates in Boone, Preston, Jefferson, Mercer, and Fayette counties.

The magistrates in these counties serve 10,000 or more in population, but less than 15,000 in population and would ordinarily under the statute be paid an annual salary of $20,625. Under the exception, magistrates in Boone, Preston, Jefferson, Mercer and Fayette counties are paid $25,125 annually. Consequently, the relators contend that as they serve the same population per magistrate and receive an annual salary of $20,625, they are being discriminated against for no valid reason.

We have had similar issues presented with regard to the magistrate system in two earlier cases. In Donaldson v. Gainer, --- W.Va. ---, 294 S.E.2d 103 (1982), a group of magistrates filed an original mandamus to compel these same respondents to pay them additional salary. Their claim was based upon population increases that had occurred in their counties, as reflected by the 1980 decennial census. These population increases had the effect of moving the involved magistrates to a higher pay bracket under W.Va.Code, 50-1-2.

The key issue in Donaldson was when the pay increases were to be effective. We held they became effective "the next ensuing fiscal year after the census figures were tabulated and published." Syllabus Point 1, in part, Donaldson.

We recognized in Donaldson that equal protection principles are applicable to a statutory classification based on population, citing the Annotation in 96 A.L.R.3d 538 (1980), and concluded in Syllabus Point 3:

"Where a statutory classification based on population bears no rational relationship to the purposes of the statute, such classification is arbitrary, and violates the constitutional guaranty of equal protection."

However, we declined to determine whether the magistrate pay statute, W.Va.Code, 50-1-3, violated equal protection principles because there was an insufficient factual basis to make that determination.

This unaddressed issue was the subject of the next magistrate suit, State ex rel. West Virginia Magistrates Ass'n. v. Gainer, --- W.Va. ---, 332 S.E.2d 814 (1985), where the contention was made that the population-based, magistrate-pay statute denied equal protection. We concluded that it did not because there was a rational basis for the classification. This conclusion was based on the fact that the statute provided less pay for magistrates who served fewer people. Statistical data demonstrated that the workload was less on magistrates who served fewer people. Consequently, the lower pay scales for magistrates who served lesser populations were not irrational.

Today's case is more narrowly drawn. It raises the question of whether the legislature may carve out an exception within the same pay classification that enables magistrates in five counties to obtain an additional $4,450 in annual salary. The obvious problem is that all the magistrates involved are serving the same number of people, yet some are paid more than others.

The respondent Paul Crabtree, Administrative Director of this Court, argues that the exception is logical since "factors such as the presence of an interstate, dispersed population, high unemployment, high crime rate, topography, adjoining populous counties" would justify the exception. However, we are not informed as to how these general factors favor the five counties, Boone, Preston, Jefferson, Mercer, and Fayette, as against the other counties, Greenbrier, Hancock, Marshall, and Mingo, whose magistrates are in the same population class. 3 There is no statistical data presented as in Gainer that would show that the higher paid magistrates do in fact have a heavier workload.

We do not believe that the respondents can justify the exceptions by merely reciting generalized factors by which we determine whether classifications involving economic rights violate equal protection. These factors are from Syllabus Point 7 of Atchinson v. Erwin, --- W.Va. ---, 302 S.E.2d 78 (1983):

"Where economic rights are concerned, we look to see whether the classification is a rational one based on social, economic, historic or geographic factors, whether it bears a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose, and whether all persons within the class are treated equally. Where such classification is rational and bears the requisite reasonable relationship, the statute does not violate Section 39 of Article VI of the West Virginia Constitution." 4

See also Hartstock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., --- W.Va. ---, 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984); Shackleford v. Catlett, 161 W.Va. 568, 244 S.E.2d 327 (1978); Cimino v. Board of Education, 158 W.Va. 267, 210 S.E.2d 485 (1974).

In considering our own equal protection principles under Article VI, Section 39 of the West Virginia Constitution, 5 we have obtained guidance from federal cases interpreting the equal protection mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution which is applicable to state actions. 6 Myers v. Barte, --- W.Va. ---, 279 S.E.2d 406 (1981); State ex rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee, 160 W.Va. 329, 233 S.E.2d 419 (1977); Cimino v. Board of Education, supra. It may also be observed that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] state court may, of course, apply a more stringent standard of review as a matter of state law under the State's equivalent to the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 715, 722 n. 6, 66 L.Ed.2d 659, 667 n. 6 (1981). 7

In this case, the relators initially have shown that the statute, W.Va.Code, 50-1-3, contains an apparent irrational classification by awarding additional salary to certain magistrates who are serving the same population classification as the other magistrates. However, the respondents do not show any specific facts that would rationally justify this disparate treatment. In many cases there is a legislative history that would indicate the reasons for the classification. E.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., supra; Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). None of the parties has given us any legislative history here.

In several instances where the statute on its face appears to create an improper classification, in the absence of any legislative history or purpose expressed, we have placed some burden on those supporting the legislation to articulate the reasons that make the statute rational. E.g., West Virginia Magistrates Ass'n v. Gainer, supra; Shackleford v. Catlett, 161 W.Va. 568, 244 S.E.2d 327 (1978); O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 160 W.Va. 694, 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977).

In this case, we are left much in the same posture as New York's highest court in Weissman v. Evans, 56 N.Y.2d 458, 452 N.Y.S.2d 864, 438 N.E.2d 397 (1982). There the legislature had permitted two different salary scales to exist for judges in adjoining counties whose workloads and populations were similar. The court, in finding an equal protection violation, remarked that the state in attempting to justify the disparity "is now reduced to reiteration of its position that the territorial distinction ... [and other general factors] interdicts an equal protection claim." 56 N.Y.2d at 464, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 866, 438 N.E.2d at 399. The lack of any specific rational reason for the pay exception cannot be overcome by recanting the general factors that may be utilized...

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