State ex rel. Lotz v. Hover

• Decision Date: 12 December 1962
• Docket Number: No. 37302,37302
• Parties: , 21 O.O.2d 332 The STATE ex rel. LOTZ, v. HOVER, Pros. Atty.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 68

174 Ohio St. 68

186 N.E.2d 841, 21 O.O.2d 332

The STATE ex rel. LOTZ, v. HOVER, Pros. Atty.

No. 37302.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 12, 1962.

Edwin Lotz, in pro. per.

C. Watson Hover, Prosecuting Atty., and George S. Heitzler, Cincinnati, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

It is relator's contention that he is entitled to have these indictments pending against him dismissed on the ground that he has been denied a speedy trial.

The purpose of the framers of our Constitution, in including therein provisions that an accused is entitled to a speedy trial for a crime with which he is charged, was undoubtedly to obviate the ancient practice of holding individuals in jail for long periods of time without giving them an opportunity to establish their innocence.

The provisions for a speedy trial of persons accused of crimes appear in Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and in the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.

The limitation as to holding a person in jail without trial on a particular pending indictment is set forth in Section 2945.71, Revised Code, which reads as follows:

'No person shall be detained in jail without a trial for a continuous period of more than two terms after his arrest and commitment on an indictment or information, or, if he was in jail at the time the indictment or information was found, more than two terms after the term at which the indictment or information was presented. He shall be discharged unless a continuance is had on his motion or the delay is caused by his act.'

It is, of course, quite clear that as to being held in jail without trial the time served itself has not prejudiced relator.

However, this is not the only matter which must be considered. He does have a right to a speedy trial. It is now well established that, even though one is incarcerated in one of the state's penal institutions, he is still entitled to a speedy trial on any other indictment pending against him. The general rule is stated in 118 A.L.R. 1037, as follows:

'The general rule, followed in the majority of the states and in the federal courts, is that, under a constitutional provision guaranteeing to accused a speedy trial, and under statutes supplementing the constitutional provision and enacted for the purpose of rendering it effective, and prescribing the time within which accused must be brought to trial after indictment, a sovereign may not deny an accused person a speedy trial even though he is incarcerated in one of that sovereign's penal institutions under a prior conviction and senetence in a court of that sovereign.'

The reason for the provisions for speedy trial is not confined solely to a prompt determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The court in State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 257, 98 P. 122, 131, 22 L.R.A.,N.S., 896, very clearly stated the position of a convicted person, in such instances, as follows:

'The right of a speedy trial is granted by the Constitution to every accused. A convict is not excepted. He is not only amenable to the law, but is under its protection as well. No reason is perceived for depriving him of the right granted generally to accused persons, and thus, in effect, inflict upon him an additional punishment for the offense of which he has been convicted. At the time of defendant's trial upon the one information, he was under the protection of the guaranty of a speedy trial as to the other. It cannot be reasonably maintained, we think, that the guaranty became lost to him upon his conviction and sentence or his removal to the penitentiary. Possibly in his case, as well as in the case of other convicts, a trial might be longer delayed, in the absence of a statute controlling the question, than in the case of one held in jail merely to await trial without violating the constitutional right, for an acquitta. would not necessarily terminate imprisonment. However, the purpose of the provision against an unreasonable delay in trial is not solely a release from imprisonment in the event of acquittal, but also a release from the harassment of a criminal prosecution and the anxiety attending the same; and hence an accused admitted to bail is protected as well as one in prison. Moreover, a long delay may result in the loss of witnesses for the accused as well as the state, and the importance of this...