State ex rel. Lull v. Frizzell
| Decision Date | 25 January 1884 |
| Citation | 18 N.W. 316,31 Minn. 460 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota ex rel. Legrand W. Lull v. Gilbert A. Frizzell |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Proceeding under Gen. St. 1878, c. 79, to determine the right of the defendant to continue to hold and exercise the duties of the office of county treasurer of Olmsted county.
On November 8, 1881, at the general fall election, defendant was duly elected such county treasurer for the term of two years from and after March 1, 1882, and duly qualified and entered upon the performance of his duties as such officer, and was so continuing to act as such officer, when this proceeding was instituted in this court. By Sp. Laws 1879, c. 305, the salary of the county treasurer of Olmsted county was fixed at $ 1,500 per annum and the fees of the office.
The relator having been duly elected to the office of such county treasurer, on November 6, 1883, at the general fall election on January 7, 1884, duly complied with all the requirements of statute, and qualified as such officer, and demanded of the defendant possession of said office, which demand was refused. Thereupon the Attorney General instituted this proceeding. On the argument, the above facts were conceded and defendant claimed to be lawfully in possession of the office, on the ground that his term of office did not expire till March 1, 1884.
W. J Hahn, Attorney General, and Frank B. Kellogg, for the State.
Jones & Gove, for defendant.
By chapters 1, 2, and 3, Laws 1883, the legislature submitted to the people for their approval or rejection, at the last general election, the following amendments to the constitution, and a majority of the electors present, and voting for or against them, having voted in favor of each of the proposed amendments, the governor made proclamation thereof on the fourth day of January, 1884, and the same thereupon took effect and were in force as a part of the constitution of this state:
First. An amendment to section 5 of article 5, fixing the official term of the state auditor at four instead of three years; the official term of all other state officers of the executive department remaining or being fixed anew at two years, as before.
Second. An amendment to article 7, by adding thereto an additional section, to read as follows:
Third. Amendments to sections 2, 3, and 4, of article 6, fixing the official terms of judges of the supreme and district courts at six instead of seven years, and that of clerk of the supreme court at four instead of three years, as theretofore.
These several amendments are in a sense in pari materia, all having a common object, and must therefore be considered together, and so construed, if possible, as to give force and effect to all their provisions. The common object was to provide for biennial elections. The means employed to accomplish this were -- First, to fix all constitutional terms of office at an even number of years. Some were lengthened, others shortened. By the amendment to article 5, the official term of state auditor was increased from three years to four; and, by the amendment to article 6, the official term of judges of the supreme and district courts was shortened from seven years to six, and that of clerk of the supreme court increased from three years to four. The next means adopted to bring about the desired change was the amendment to article 7, by which the official year is made to commence on the first Monday in January, at which date all terms of office are made to terminate. This amendment further fixed the time at which the first general election, under the biennial system, should be held. This was fixed in 1884. This time was doubtless adopted for two reasons: First, because it would work less disturbance in the existing order of things than to defer it until 1885; and, secondly and chiefly, because presidential elections always occur in even-numbered years.
In order to bridge over from the old to the new system, another thing remained to be provided for. As fixed by the constitution or existing statutes, the terms of many state and county officers, elected in 1883 or prior years, would expire in January, 1886. But, as there would be no election in 1885, their successors could not be elected until November, 1886. Hence, the last clause of this amendment provided that "all state, county, or other officers, elected at any general election, whose terms of office would otherwise (i. e. but for this clause) expire on the first Monday in January, 1886, shall hold and continue in such offices respectively until the first Monday in January, 1887."
These amendments became the supreme law of the state on the fourth day of January, 1884, and entirely superseded all inconsistent provisions of law on the same subjects. They apply equally to present incumbents and to those who may hereafter be elected. Their provisions are general and without exceptions. If they do not apply to the official terms of present incumbents, there is now no provision of law governing such cases. Had the legislature intended to exempt present incumbents, or those elected in November, 1883, from any of the provisions of these amendments, it is fair to presume that they would have so said in express terms. To do so would partially defeat the very object which all of these amendments were intended to accomplish. The clause of the amendment to article 7, fixing the time of holding the first general election under the biennial system in 1884, we construe, not as requiring an election at that time of all state and county officers, but only of such as may, under existing laws, be required to be elected at that time. This will necessarily include a large number of county officers where the terms of present incumbents will expire in January, 1885. It may also include state or county officers where vacancies occur by reason of death, resignation, or other such causes. That this clause does not mean that there shall be an election for all state and county officers next November, we conclude for the following, among other, reasons: First, it is not dealing with terms of office, -- that matter has been elsewhere disposed of; second, to so construe it would virtually render it inconsistent with other amendments, which expressly fix the official terms of the various officers; third, such a construction would render the next and following clause of no effect and without meaning, for if there is to be an election for all state and county officers in 1884, there will be none whose terms of office expire in January, 1886. It is not without significance that this amendment was mainly copied from one submitted to the people of Wisconsin, (Laws Wis. 1882, c. 290,) which contains the word "all," which our legislature has ex industria omitted.
The only serious difficulty we have met in construing this clause is what force or effect to give the expression "except judicial officers." This exception is found in the Wisconsin amendment already referred to, of which this section is almost a literal transcript. The meaning as well as propriety of this exception in that state is apparent from the fact that she elects judicial officers at a special election held on the first Tuesday of April, and not at the general election in November. It might be suggested that our legislature retained this exception through inadvertence, not observing its inapplicability to our system. But we have no right to assume this. Neither would this remove the difficulty. We must...
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