State ex rel. MacNish v. Landwehr

• Decision Date: 19 April 1933
• Docket Number: 32291
• Parties: State ex rel. James M. MacNish, Relator, v. Frank Landwehr, Judge of the Juvenile Court of the City of St. Louis
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

60 S.W.2d 4

332 Mo. 622

State ex rel. James M. MacNish, Relator, v. Frank Landwehr, Judge of the Juvenile Court of the City of St. Louis

No. 32291

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 19, 1933

Provisional rule discharged.

Julius T. Muench, Oliver Senti and Archa W. Weiss for relator.

(1) The information filed in the Juvenile Court in this case was brought under Section 14159, Revised Statutes 1929, which provides that any minor of the age of seventeen years or over, who shall commit any acts constituting a delinquent child, as defined in the statutes of this State applicable to children under seventeen years of age, may be caused to be brought by his or her parents or lawful guardian, or by the probation officer before a court of record having jurisdiction over misdemeanors, and tried in the same manner as a person charged with the commission of a misdemeanor. This section of the statute fixes the jurisdiction of the court as "a court of record, having jurisdiction over misdemeanors." (2) The Juvenile Court does not have jurisdiction over misdemeanors. (a) The Juvenile Court is a court of general jurisdiction, exercising special powers, and the authority for its jurisdiction in a particular case must be found in the statutes creating it. State ex rel. Dew v. Trimble, 269 S.W. 622, 306 Mo. 657; 15 C. J. 726 par. 14. (b) A proceeding based upon an act of "delinquency," even when the act itself constitutes a crime, is an action of an equitable and civil nature, and not criminal. State ex rel. Matacia v. Buckner, 254 S.W. 179, 300 Mo. 359; Ex parte Naccarat, 41 S.W.2d 176. (c) The Juvenile Court does not have jurisdiction over criminal cases. State ex rel. Wells v. Walker, 34 S.W.2d 124; Ex parte Bass, 40 S.W.2d 457.

Gilbert Weiss for respondent.

All the averments necessary to confer jurisdiction appear upon the face of the petition. Secs. 14159, 14136, R. S. 1929; State v. Robertson, 13 S.W.2d 566. The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis possesses jurisdiction over misdemeanors whose punishment is not by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, or both, or by forfeiture, provided that the imprisonment is for a period longer than six months. Art VI, Sec. 22, Constitution; Secs. 1938, 14631, 14646, 14666 R. S. 1929; Art. II, Sec. 30, Constitution; Ex parte Jilz, 64 Mo. 205; State v. Buchardt, 144 Mo. 83; State v. Gregori, 318 Mo. 998; Sec. 3886, R. S. 1929; State ex rel. v. Foster, 187 Mo. 590; State ex rel. Stinger v. Kreuger, 280 Mo. 293; State ex rel. Kaiser v. Miller, 316 Mo. 372. The circuit court also possesses concurrent jurisdiction over misdemeanors when so conferred by statute. Sec. 9440, R. S. 1929. The cause is one that properly falls within the assignment as declared by the rules of the circuit court, coming under the Children's Code of this State. Secs. 2116, 2117, 2131, R. S. 1929.

Luke E. Hart, amicus curiae.

Frank, J. All concur, except Leedy, J., not sitting.

OPINION

FRANK

Original proceeding in prohibition by which relator seeks to prohibit Honorable Frank Landwehr, one of the judges of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis from proceeding further with a contempt proceeding pending in said court.

On March 23, 1932, a prohibition officer filed in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, an information, verified by his oath, charging that one Opal Brown, a minor over the age of seventeen years, had committed certain acts which constituted her a delinquent child as defined in the statutes of this State, applicable to children under the age of seventeen years. Such information was filed pursuant to the provisions of Section 14159, Revised Statutes 1919. The cause so instituted was thereafter duly assigned to Division No. 15 of said circuit court, which for convenience is designated and called Division No. 1 of the Court of Domestic Relations. A warrant was issued directing the sheriff to apprehend the said Opal Brown and bring her before said court. Upon being taken into custody it was discovered that she was suffering from certain venereal diseases in the communicable stage. It was thereupon ordered by said court that she be transferred to the City Hospital, and there confined in a certain ward, known and designated by the hospital as the Detention Ward for female prisoners. While being so confined she made her escape, and at the time application was made for the writ herein, had not been apprehended.

At the time of said Opal Brown's commitment to and escape from the City Hospital, relator, James MacNish, was attached to the hospital staff in the capacity of resident physician, and as such it was incumbent upon him to observe and enforce the rules and regulations prescribed by order of the circuit court relating to the incarceration of female prisoners committed to the hospital for treatment.

Following Opal Brown's escape from custody, the court issued a citation to relator, requiring him to appear on a day named and show cause why he should not be punished as for a contempt in that he had permitted such escape. The citation, after setting forth the filing of the information against Opal Brown, her apprehension and commitment to the hospital for treatment, relator's knowledge that she was being held under a warrant of the court, her escape from the hospital and her failure to appear in court when the cause against her came on for hearing, charged that the prisoner's escape was effected through relator's connivance and failure to observe the regulations prescribed by court order. The citation for contempt has occasioned the challenge of the court's jurisdiction.

Section 14159 upon which the charge against Opal Brown was based is as follows:

"Whenever in the state of Missouri any minor of the age of seventeen years or over shall commit any of the acts constituting a delinquent child as defined in the statutes of this state, applicable to children under seventeen years, such minor may be caused to be brought by his or her parents or lawful guardian or by the probation officer or by any person interested in said minor, before a court of record having jurisdiction over misdemeanors, and tried in the same manner as a person charged with the commission of a misdemeanor. Upon the finding of delinquency, the court may proceed to make such order in the case as may seem to be for the best interests of said minor, either by commitment to any public institution, or to any private institution willing to receive such minor, or to the care and custody of any individual willing to care for said minor or said minor may be left in the care of his or her parents or guardian, subject to the supervision of the court under suspended sentence; or the court may proceed to make any other lawful disposition of the case." (Italics ours.)

By express mandate of Section 14159 complaints against minors over seventeen years of age, based upon said section, must be brought before a court of record having jurisdiction over misdemeanors. It is relator's contention that the complaint against Opal Brown was filed in the Juvenile Court and as the Juvenile Court has no jurisdiction over misdemeanors it is without jurisdiction to entertain, hear or determine the cause, and being without jurisdiction of that cause, necessarily it is without jurisdiction of the contempt proceeding which is purely ancillary thereto.

Relator is wrong in his contention that the complaint against Opal Brown was filed in the Juvenile Court because there is no such court. The statute does not create a Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Law, so called, vests original jurisdiction of all cases arising under that law in the circuit court. The Juvenile Law applicable to the city of St. Louis is contained in Article 8 of Chapter 125, Revised Statutes 1929. Section 14137 of that article makes the following provision:

"The circuit courts exercising jurisdiction in counties now or hereafter having a population of fifty thousand (50,000) inhabitants or more shall have original jurisdiction of all cases coming within the terms of this article. . . . For the purpose of this article the city of St. Louis shall be considered a county within the meaning of this article. . . . And the court may for convenience be called the juvenile court."

Section 14162 of Article 9 of Chapter 125, Revised Statutes 1929, applies to all counties in the State containing less than fifty thousand inhabitants, and vests jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Juvenile Law in the circuit courts of such counties, and provides that the court shall be known as the circuit court, but may for convenience be called the juvenile court.

It is clear from these statutory provisions that circuit courts are given original jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Juvenile Law. The information against Opal Brown was filed in the circuit court. As the statute upon which this information was based, requires that such an information must be filed in a court of record having jurisdiction over misdemeanors, the question presented is whether or not the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis has jurisdiction over misdemeanors.

Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution of Missouri gives circuit courts jurisdiction over all criminal cases unless otherwise provided for by law. Sections 14646 and 14666, Revised Statutes 1929, gives the St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction exclusive jurisdiction over all misdemeanors under the laws of this State committed in St. Louis City, the punishment whereof is by fine, or by imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, or by forfeiture, but we take judicial notice that there are other misdemeanors under the laws of this State, the exclusive jurisdiction of which is not by statute vested in the St. Louis Court of Criminal...