State ex rel. Maney v. Hsu
| Decision Date | 27 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | A166163 |
| Citation | 482 P.3d 136,308 Or.App. 822 |
| Parties | STATE EX REL Paul Julian MANEY, Relator-Appellant, v. Michael HSU, Chairperson, Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Jason E. Thompson, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the opening brief was Ferder Casebeer French Thompson & Stern, LLP. Also on the reply brief was Thompson Law, LLC.
Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and Landau, Senior Judge.*
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an alternative writ of mandamus. The issue is whether the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision must set a release date for relator, who has served the mandatory minimum sentence for aggravated murder under ORS 163.105 (1977).1 The board concluded that it is without authority to set a release date until relator meets his statutory burden of establishing that he is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable time. The trial court concurred, based on Larsen v. Board of Parole , 191 Or. App. 526, 84 P.3d 176, rev. den. , 337 Or. 248, 95 P.3d 729 (2004). On appeal, relator argues that Larsen was wrongly decided and that the law compels the board to set a release date for him without proof that he is likely to be rehabilitated. We conclude that Larsen remains controlling and therefore affirm the judgment dismissing the writ.
The facts are procedural and undisputed. Relator was convicted of aggravated murder in 1981. At the time of the offense, ORS 163.105(2) (1977) provided, in part, that when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, "the court shall order that the defendant shall be confined for a minimum of 20 years without possibility of parole." Accordingly, relator was sentenced to life in prison with a minimum of 20 years without the possibility of parole.
At the time of the offense, ORS 163.105 (1977) also provided a process for modifying the sentence when a defendant has been convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 20-year minimum:
The statute thus permits the board to override the 20-year minimum if a prisoner has served at least 15 years and establishes that he or she is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time.
In Larsen , the issue was what happens if the prisoner has already served the minimum—does the prisoner still have the burden of proving likelihood of rehabilitation before the board can authorize release? Id. at 528, 84 P.3d 176. The prisoner in that case argued that the statute imposes that burden only in cases brought any time after 15 years from sentencing but before the statutory minimum has been served . Id. This court rejected that argument, noting that the prisoner's reading of the statute was contrary to its plain meaning, specifically, the statute's declaration that "at any time after 15 years from the date of imposition" of the sentence a prisoner may seek a release date, not "any time after 15 years but before serving 20 years." Id . at 533, 84 P.3d 176 (emphasis in original). The court further noted that other provisions of the statute permit multiple successive petitions for relief "at intervals of not less than two years," which also appears to contemplate an open-ended time span that commenced after the service of 15 years. Id .2
In this case, relator—like the prisoner in Larsen —had already served the 20-year minimum when, in 2016, he requested that the board establish a parole release date. Relator—also like the prisoner in Larsen —failed to establish that he is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable time. Not surprisingly, the board denied relator's request.
Relator then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the board to establish a parole release date. ORS 34.130. The trial court initially granted an alternative writ. The board then moved to dismiss, based on Larsen . The trial court granted the board's motion and entered judgment dismissing the alternative writ.
On appeal, relator does not contest that his case is squarely controlled by Larsen . His sole contention is that Larsen was wrongly decided and must be overruled. Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Gaines , 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009), relator contends that "the Larsen court did not follow Gaines and apply the appropriate statutory interpretation framework to ORS 163.105 (1977)." In particular, relator argues, the court gave inadequate attention to the relevant context of the statute, which he contends includes two later Oregon Supreme Court decisions— Janowski/Fleming v. Board of Parole , 349 Or. 432, 245 P.3d 1270 (2010), and State ex rel Engweiler v. Felton , 350 Or. 592, 260 P.3d 448 (2011). Relator argues that, in those two cases, the Supreme Court made statements about the effect of ORS 163.105 (1977) that render Larsen no longer tenable.
The board responds that neither Janowski/Fleming nor Engweiler addressed the issue decided in Larsen , and nothing in either of them can fairly be read to undercut the holding in Larsen .
Thus framed, the issue for us is whether Larsen and its interpretation of ORS 163.105 (1977) should be overruled. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law. State v. Guynn , 302 Or. App. 78, 79, 459 P.3d 900 (2020). But regarding the meaning of a statute that has already been interpreted by this court, a party arguing that the court was wrong in doing so bears a heavy burden. As recently explained in State v. Merrill , 303 Or. App. 107, 120, 463 P.3d 540 (2020), we will overrule a prior statutory construction decision "only in extraordinary circumstances—when such prior interpretation was plainly erroneous."
At the outset, it must be said that relator's contention that Larsen was erroneously decided because it failed to follow Gaines is an odd one on at least a couple of levels. First, Gaines was not decided until more than five years after Larsen . Second, aside from that, Gaines did not introduce any new principles of interpretation apart from permitting the examination of legislative history in the absence of a demonstrated ambiguity in the statutory text—a principle that relator does not invoke in this case. 346 Or. at 171-72, 206 P.3d 1042. Instead, relator invokes the principle that courts must construe a statute consistently with its context—a principle that long predated Gaines . See, e.g ., Lane County v. LCDC , 325 Or. 569, 578, 942 P.2d 278 (1997) (). Finally, the context that relator emphasizes consists of Supreme Court decisions that, again, were not published until years after Larsen was decided.
Gaines , then, provides a shaky basis for arguing that Larsen must be reevaluated.
It may nonetheless be the case that subsequent Supreme Court decisions undercut the validity of prior Court of Appeals decisions. As we have noted, though, that must plainly be the case before this court will overrule its precedents. See, e.g ., State v. McKnight , 293 Or. App. 274, 278, 426 P.3d 669, rev. den. , 363 Or. 817, 432 P.3d 1093 (2018) (). Here, relator has not met his burden.
In Janowski/Fleming , both prisoners had been convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to the mandatory minimum term of incarceration. 349 Or. at 436-37, 245 P.3d 1270. Before having served that minimum, both sought a hearing under ORS 163.105(3) (1985).3 Id. at 437, 245 P.3d 1270. Both established that they were likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable time. Id. at 437-38, 245 P.3d 1270. The issue was what law governed the board's determination of a release date. Id. at 446, 245 P.3d 1270. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the release dates were to be determined by the matrix ranges in effect on the dates the prisoners had committed their crimes. Id . at 453, 245 P.3d 1270.
In the course of its opinion, the Supreme Court described the effect of ORS 163.105(3) (1985) as giving the board "authority to override the * * * mandatory minimum sentence for aggravated murder." Janowski/Fleming , 349 Or. at 446, 245...
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State v. Woods
...decisions undercut the validity of prior Court of Appeals decisions before we will overrule our precedents. State ex rel Maney v. Hsu , 308 Or. App. 822, 827, 482 P.3d 136, rev. den. , 368 Or. 273, 488 P.3d 771 (2021). In deciding whether one of our cases remains good law in light of a subs......
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