State ex rel. Manson v. Morris, No. 92-2179

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM; MOYER; PFEIFER
• Citation: 613 N.E.2d 232,66 Ohio St.3d 440
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. MANSON v. MORRIS, Warden, et al.
• Docket Number: No. 92-2179
• Decision Date: 16 June 1993

Page 440

66 Ohio St.3d 440 613 N.E.2d 232 The STATE ex rel. MANSON
v.
MORRIS, Warden, et al. No. 92-2179. Supreme Court of Ohio. Submitted Feb. 9, 1993.
Decided June 16, 1993.

David A. Manson, pro se.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Joseph Mancini, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

For the following reasons we grant respondents' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, Manson's request for a writ of mandamus is denied.

Manson argues that CCI's visiting office and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction denied him Addy's visitation because she was a former employee of the department and that the denial was unconstitutional.

Three requirements must be met to establish a right to a writ of mandamus: that relator have a clear legal right to the [613 N.E.2d 234] relief prayed for, that respondent have a clear legal duty to perform the acts, and that relator have no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 28, 29, 6 OBR 50, 51, 451 N.E.2d 225, 226.

Manson does not meet the first requirement because he does not have a constitutional right to receive certain visitors. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: "Prison inmates have no absolute constitutional right to visitation." Bellamy v. Bradley (C.A.6, 1984), 729 F.2d 416, 420, certiorari denied (1984), 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 156, 83 L.Ed.2d 93.

Page 442

In Kentucky Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson (1989), 490 U.S. 454, 460-461, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908-1909, 104 L.Ed.2d 506, 515, the United States Supreme Court stated:

"Respondents do not argue--nor can it seriously be contended, in light of our prior cases--that an inmate's interest in unfettered visitation is guaranteed directly by the Due Process Clause. * * * The denial of prison access to a particular visitor 'is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence,' Hewitt v. Helms [1983], 459 U.S. at 468, [103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675, 686] and therefore is not independently protected by the Due Process Clause."

In addition, Manson, as an Ohio inmate, does not have a state-protected liberty interest in receiving certain visitors. The Thompson court found that in order for prison regulations to create for an inmate a protected liberty interest in receiving certain visitors, the relevant regulations must contain " 'explicitly mandatory language,' i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if...