State ex rel. Martin v. Preston

• Citation: 385 S.E.2d 473,325 N.C. 438
• Decision Date: 09 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 58PA89,58PA89
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina, ex rel., James G. MARTIN, as Governor of the State of North Carolina and James G. Martin, in his capacity as a citizen and Governor of the State of North Carolina, Plaintiffs, v. Edwin S. PRESTON, Jr., Henry V. Barnette, Jr., Franklin R. Brown, Robert E. Gaines, and Donald Stephens, in their capacities as regular Superior Court Judges and on behalf of all other similarly situated Superior Court Judges, and the North Carolina State Board of Elections, Original Defendants, and The North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, Intervening Defendants.

Page 473

385 S.E.2d 473

325 N.C. 438

STATE of North Carolina, ex rel., James G. MARTIN, as

Governor of the State of North Carolina and James

G. Martin, in his capacity as a citizen

and Governor of the State of

North Carolina, Plaintiffs, v. Edwin S. PRESTON, Jr., Henry V. Barnette, Jr., Franklin R.

Brown, Robert E. Gaines, and Donald Stephens, in their

capacities as regular Superior Court Judges and on behalf of

all other similarly situated Superior Court Judges, and the

North Carolina State Board of Elections, Original Defendants,

and

The North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, Intervening

Defendants.

No. 58PA89.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Nov. 9, 1989.

On discretionary review prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure and N.C.G.S. § 7A-31(a), of judgment entered by McKinnon, J., in Superior Court, Wake County, on 17 November 1988. Heard in the Supreme Court on 11 October 1989.

Maupin, Taylor, Ellis & Adams, P.A. by W.W. Taylor, Jr., Charles B. Neely, Jr., Thomas A. Farr and John T. Matteson, Raleigh, for plaintiffs.

Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Charles M. Hensey, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen. and James Wallace, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for original defendants.

Ferguson, Stein, Watt, Wallas, Adkins & Gresham, P.A. by James E. Ferguson, II, and Leslie J. Winner, for intervening defendants.

MITCHELL, Justice.

His Excellency The Governor of North Carolina, the Honorable James G. Martin, initiated this declaratory judgment action by the filing of a complaint on 23 December 1987 in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina and in his individual capacity as a citizen of the State. By his complaint, the plaintiff sought a construction of Chapter 509 of the 1987 North Carolina Session Laws (hereafter "Chapter 509"). ¹ The plaintiff also sought a declaration that certain provisions of Chapter 509 violate the Constitution of North Carolina and sought an injunction prohibiting the holding of primary or general elections for certain superior court judgeships pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 509.

The original defendants, the North Carolina State Board of Elections and certain regular superior court judges, filed an answer on 22 January 1988. On the same day, the trial court entered an order granting the motion of the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers to intervene as a defendant.

On 17 November 1988, the trial court entered judgment granting in part and denying in part the plaintiff's and defendants' motions for summary judgment and granting in part injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff. Both the plaintiff and the defendants entered timely notices of appeal. The petition by all parties for discretionary review of the judgment of the trial court, prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals, was allowed by this Court on 6 March 1989.

This action was heard by the trial court upon stipulated facts. Therefore, the facts material to the issues presented before this Court are undisputed.

The State of North Carolina has had several Constitutions. The current judicial article, article IV, was entirely rewritten and ratified by the voters in 1962 and was not substantively changed when the Constitution of 1971 was ratified. See J. Sanders, A Brief History of the Constitutions of North Carolina, in Constitution of North Carolina: Its History and Content (1987). The following provisions of article IV are relevant to the issues raised in this litigation:

Sec. 9. Superior Courts.

(1) Superior Court Districts. The General Assembly shall, from time to time, divide the State into a convenient number of Superior Court judicial districts and shall provide for the election of one or more Superior Court Judges for each district. Each regular Superior Court Judge shall reside in the district for which he is elected....

....

Sec. 16. Terms of office and election of ... Judges of the Superior Court.

... [R]egular Judges of the Superior Court shall be elected by the qualified voters and shall hold office for terms of eight years and until their successors are elected and qualified.... Regular Judges of the Superior Court may be elected by the qualified voters of the State or by the voters of their respective districts, as the General Assembly may prescribe.

....

Sec. 19. Vacancies.

Unless otherwise provided in this Article, all vacancies occurring in the offices provided for by this Article shall be filled by appointment of the Governor, and the appointees shall hold their places until the next election for members of the General Assembly that is held more than 60 days after the vacancy occurs, when elections shall be held to fill the offices.

N.C. Const. art. IV.

Chapter 509 was ratified by the General Assembly of North Carolina on 29 June 1987 and became effective upon its ratification. It increased the number of superior court judicial districts in North Carolina from thirty-four to sixty. Eighteen of the former judicial districts were retained under Chapter 509. Twenty-four new judicial districts were created by dividing former districts--ignoring county boundaries and dividing counties--into separate judicial districts as follows:

1. Former District 7, comprised of Nash, Edgecombe, and Wilson Counties, was divided into District 7A, comprised of Nash County; District 7B, comprised of part of Edgecombe County and part of Wilson County; and District 7C, comprised of part of Edgecombe County and part of Wilson County;

2. Former District 10, comprised of Wake County, was divided into Districts 10A, 10B, 10C, and 10D, each of which is comprised of a part of Wake County;

3. Former District 12, comprised of Cumberland County and Hoke County, was divided into Districts 12A, 12B, and 12C, all comprised of parts of Cumberland County, with Hoke County being placed with Scotland County in District 16A;

4. Former District 14, comprised of Durham County, was divided into Districts 14A and 14B, each of which is comprised of a part of Durham County;

5. Former District 18, comprised of Guilford County, was divided into Districts 18A, 18B, 18C, 18D, and 18E, each of which is comprised of a part of Guilford County;

6. Former District 21, comprised of Forsyth County, was divided into Districts 21A, 21B, 21C, and 21D, each of which is comprised of a part of Forsyth County; and

7. Former District 26, comprised of Mecklenburg County, was divided into Districts 26A, 26B, and 26C, each of which is comprised of a part of Mecklenburg County. 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 509, title I, § 1(a), (b), and (c) (codified as N.C.G.S. § 7A-41(a), (b), and (c)).

Chapter 509 also created eighteen new judicial districts comprised of one or more entire counties:

1. Former District 3, comprised of Pitt, Craven, Pamlico, and Carteret Counties, was divided into District 3A (Pitt) and District 3B (Craven, Pamlico, and Carteret);

2. Former District 4, comprised of Sampson, Duplin, Jones, and Onslow Counties, was divided into District 4A (Sampson, Duplin, and Jones) and District 4B (Onslow) 3. Former District 6, comprised of Halifax, Northampton, Hertford, and Bertie Counties, was divided into District 6A (Halifax) and District 6B (Northampton, Hertford, and Bertie);

4. Former District 8, comprised of Greene, Lenoir, and Wayne Counties, was divided into District 8A (Greene and Lenoir) and District 8B (Wayne);

5. Former District 16, comprised of Scotland and Robeson Counties, was divided into District 16A (Hoke County, taken from former District 12, and Scotland County) and District 16B (Robeson);

6. Former District 19A, comprised of Cabarrus and Rowan Counties, was divided into District 19A (Cabarrus) and District 19C (Rowan);

7. Former District 20, comprised of Anson, Richmond, Moore, Union, and Stanly Counties, was divided into District 20A (Anson, Richmond, and Moore) and District 20B (Union and Stanly);

8. Former District 25, comprised of Caldwell, Burke, and Catawba Counties, was divided into District 25A (Caldwell and Burke) and District 25B (Catawba); and

9. Former District 30, comprised of Cherokee, Graham, Clay, Swain, Macon, Haywood, and Jackson Counties, was divided into District 30A (Cherokee, Graham, Clay, Macon, and Swain) and District 30B (Haywood and Jackson). Id.

Under Chapter 509 a total of forty incumbent regular superior court judges were assigned to thirty-four of the new judicial districts. 1987 N.C.Sess.Laws ch. 509, title I, § 1(d) (codified as N.C.G.S. § 7A-41(d)). Chapter 509 changed the election dates for, inter alia, eight superior court judgeships by two years and for a ninth judgeship by four years, thereby eliminating the system of staggered terms of office for regular superior court judgeships which had previously existed in some multi-seat districts. Id., § 1(d)(7), (17), (22), (25), (26), (47), (52), (54), and (55) (codified as N.C.G.S. § 7A-41(d)(7), (17), (22), (25), (26), (47), (52), (54), and (55)). Chapter 509 also provided that no person may file as a candidate for a superior court judgeship or be nominated for the office of superior court judge under N.C.G.S. § 163-114 "unless that person is a resident of the judicial district as it will exist at the time the person would take office if elected." Id., title IV, § 13 (codified as N.C.G.S. § 163-106(i)).

Following the State's submission of Chapter 509 to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, the Attorney General advised the State by letter of 25 September 1987 that he chose to interpose no objection under 42 U.S.C. 1973c to the submitted legislation.

The trial court conducted a hearing upon cross-motions by the plaintiff and the defendants for summary judgment as to the constitutionality of various provisions of Chapter 509. All pertinent facts having been stipulated by the parties, the trial court concluded that: ...