State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin
| Citation | 104 Ohio St.3d 279,819 NE 2d 644 |
| Decision Date | 01 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004-1477.,2004-1477. |
| Parties | THE STATE EX REL. MASON, PROS. ATTY., v. GRIFFIN, JUDGE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
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William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lisa Reitz Williamson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for relator.
Rebecca M. Horst, for respondent.
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, urging denial of writ for amicus curiae, Terrance Moore.
{¶ 1} Terrance Moore was indicted in two separate criminal cases in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. After Moore waived his right to a jury trial on the charges, respondent, Judge Burt W. Griffin, conducted a bench trial of the criminal cases. The trial concluded on June 17, 2004.
{¶ 2} On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a Washington trial court's sentencing of a criminal defendant to more than three years above the statutory maximum of the standard range for second-degree kidnapping involving the use of a firearm, which was based on the sentencing judge's finding under Washington law that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Blakely v. Washington (2004), ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403.
{¶ 3} On July 7, 2004, Judge Griffin convicted Moore of multiple counts of trafficking in drugs, some of which had accompanying major-drug-offender specifications, and possession of drugs. Judge Griffin also found Moore guilty of having weapons while under disability and possessing criminal tools.
{¶ 4} At a July 26, 2004 presentencing hearing, Judge Griffin advised Moore that the court believed that he had a right to a jury trial for sentencing if the state sought a prison term longer than the initial statutory maximum for the major-drug-offender specifications or requested consecutive sentences. Judge Griffin cited Blakely in support of the jury-trial option. On July 27, 2004, the state, represented by the office of relator, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney William D. Mason, announced its intention to seek more than the initial statutory maximum for the convictions. Moore then elected a jury sentencing hearing pursuant to Blakely. By entries dated July 29, 2004, Judge Griffin scheduled the jury sentencing hearing for October 6.
{¶ 5} In August 2004, Mason, on behalf of the state, filed a written objection to the jury sentencing hearing.
{¶ 6} On September 3, 2004, Mason filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Griffin "from creating and presiding over a non-statutory sentencing procedure by which a jury will make findings necessary to support certain sentences" in Moore's criminal cases. On September 22, 2004, Judge Griffin moved to dismiss the prohibition action. On that same date, Judge Griffin held another presentencing conference at which he concluded that a hearing should be held before he determined whether a Blakely jury sentencing hearing would be required. By entries dated September 28 and October 5, 2004, Judge Griffin set the hearing for October 6 "to determine any Blakely issues." Judge Griffin did not, however, cancel the previously scheduled jury sentencing hearing.
{¶ 7} On October 1, 2004, we denied Judge Griffin's motion to dismiss, granted an alternative writ of prohibition, and ordered the submission of evidence and briefing. State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin, 103 Ohio St.3d 1469, 2004-Ohio-5294, 815 N.E.2d 1122. For his evidence, Judge Griffin submitted an affidavit in which he stated, "I am unable to determine if a jury sentencing hearing is appropriate until I am satisfied, based both on proposed evidence and an examination of the law, that the State is able to justify the imposition of an enhanced sentence because of the major drug offender specifications of which defendant was convicted or other specifications for which Blakely would require a jury sentencing hearing." Judge Griffin specified that he set the hearing on October 6 "to provide the parties with the opportunity to show what evidence they intended to present which would warrant a Blakely hearing."
{¶ 8} Mason provided evidence that established that Judge Griffin never expressly cancelled the jury sentencing hearing and that he understood that "Judge Griffin intends to create and preside over a jury sentencing trial in violation of Ohio sentencing statutes, if the State seeks consecutive sentences, a sentence on the major-drug-offender specifications or maximum sentences in Moore's criminal cases." On November 16, Judge Griffin filed his brief. On November 17, Moore moved to intervene in this proceeding.
{¶ 9} This cause is now before the court for a consideration of Moore's motion to intervene and for a decision on the merits.
{¶ 10} Moore moves to intervene as a respondent in this case. We deny the motion for the following reasons. Even though Moore either knew or should have known of this case shortly after it was filed in September, he waited until after we granted an alternative writ and the parties filed their evidence and initial briefs before attempting to intervene on November 17. Under these circumstances, Moore's motion was not timely. See, generally, State ex rel. First New Shiloh Baptist Church v. Meagher (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 501, 503, 696 N.E.2d 1058. In addition, Moore did not file the required pleading with his motion. See Civ.R. 24(C); State ex rel. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Milligan, 100 Ohio St.3d 366, 2003-Ohio-6608, 800 N.E.2d 361, ¶ 13; see, also, State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506, 789 N.E.2d 203, fn. 1, and cases cited therein.
{¶ 11} Nevertheless, because Moore was entitled to file an amicus curiae brief without leave of court as long as he filed it by the date that Judge Griffin's brief was due, we treat his brief as an amicus curiae brief and consider it in resolving this case. See S.Ct.Prac.R. X(8) and VI(6).
{¶ 12} Mason seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Griffin from holding a jury sentencing hearing in the underlying criminal cases. In order to be entitled to the writ, Mason must establish that (1) Judge Griffin is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is not authorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ will cause injury for which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists. Campaign to Elect Larry Carver Sheriff v. Campaign to Elect Anthony Stankiewicz Sheriff, 101 Ohio St.3d 256, 2004-Ohio-812, 804 N.E.2d 419, ¶ 9.
{¶ 13} Mason asserts that Judge Griffin patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to hold the jury sentencing hearing in the criminal cases. "`If a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition * * * will issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.'" State ex rel. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Henson, 102 Ohio St.3d 349, 2004-Ohio-3208, 810 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12. "In cases of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, the requirement of a lack of an adequate remedy at law need not be proven because the availability of alternate remedies like appeal would be immaterial." State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 99 Ohio St.3d 97, 2003-Ohio-2476, 789 N.E.2d 195, ¶ 18.
{¶ 14} For the following reasons, Judge Griffin patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to hold a jury sentencing hearing, and Mason is entitled to a writ of prohibition.
{¶ 15} Neither the Ohio Constitution nor any statute authorizes Judge Griffin to conduct a jury sentencing hearing. The Ohio Constitution does not confer jurisdiction on courts of common pleas; the Constitution instead provides that jurisdiction must be conferred on these courts by the General Assembly. Section 4(B), Article IV, Ohio Constitution (); In re Seltzer (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 220, 222, 616 N.E.2d 1108; Nielsen v. Ford Motor Co. (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 495, 499, 681 N.E.2d 470. (Emphasis added.) No statute authorizes Judge Griffin to convene a jury to make findings concerning sentencing in the underlying criminal cases.
{¶ 16} In fact, the sentencing statutes pertinent to Moore's criminal cases vest the exclusive responsibility to make these determinations in the court and not in a jury. See, e.g., R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) (); 2929.14(D)(3)(b) (); 2929.14(C) (...
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