State ex rel. Mathews v. Houndersheldt, 22660.

• Citation: 186 N.W. 234,151 Minn. 167
• Decision Date: 13 January 1922
• Docket Number: No. 22660.,22660.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
• Parties: STATE ex rel. MATHEWS v. HOUNDERSHELDT, County Auditor.

151 Minn. 167

186 N.W. 234

STATE ex rel. MATHEWS

v.HOUNDERSHELDT, County Auditor.

No. 22660.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 13, 1922.

Original proceeding in mandamus by the State, on relation of J. V. Mathews, against R. R. Houndersheldt, as Auditor of Lyon County, Minnesota. Writ discharged.

Dibell, J., and Brown, C. J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

A constitution, like a statute, should be given a prospective operation only, unless on its face the contrary intention is clearly manifested, or such a construction is absolutely necessary to give meaning to the language used.

If the language is unambiguous, there is no room for construction of a constitutional amendment, but if it requires construction, the Constitution will be read as a whole so as to harmonize its various parts, and the intent of the people, as expressed in the language of the amendment, will be given effect.

Construing the amendment to section 7, art. 6, of the state Constitution extending the term of office of probate judges, it is held that the amendment enlarged the term of judges chosen at the general election in 1920, and that they took office in January, 1921, for a term of four years. C. L. Hilton, Atty. Gen., and Egbert S. Oakley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for relator.

Butler, Mitchell & Doherty, of St. Paul, for respondent.

LEES, C.

At the general election in November, 1920, an amendment to section 7, art. 6, of the state Constitution, proposed by the Legislature at the 1919 session (chapter 531, Laws 1919) was duly approved.

In the title of chapter 531, the amendment is referred to as one changing the length of the term of the judges of the probate court. The act provided that the ballots used at the election should have printed thereon:

‘Amendment to section seven (7), article six (6), of the Constitution of the state of Minnesota, providing for extension of the term of office of the probate judge to four (4) years.’

On December 1, 1920, the Governor issued his proclamation declaring that the amendment had been approved by the electors.

At the same election the relator was duly elected to the office of judge of the probate court of Lyon county for the term commencing on the first Monday in January, 1921. He qualified and has since been the acting judge of said court. On July 19, 1921, he duly tendered to the respondent, as county auditor of Lyon county, the filing fee and affidavit required by law in order to have his name placed on the primary election ballot as a candidate for the same office at the primary election to be held in 1922. The auditor refused to receive them for the sole reason that he was of the opinion that the amendment operated to make the relator's term of office four years from the first Monday in January, 1921, and hence there would be no vacancy in the office to be filled at the election held in 1922. These facts were set forth in relator's petition to this court, upon which he obtained an alternative writ of mandamus directed to the county auditor, requiring him to receive the filing fee and affidavit or show cause why he had not done so. The respondent answered, admitting the allegations of the petition, and asked that the writ be quashed. The question to be decided, as concisely stated in relator's brief, is this: Does relator's term of office as judge of probate expire in January, 1923, or in January, 1925?

Section 7, before it was amended, read:

‘There shall be established in each organized county in the state a probate court, which shall be a court of record, and be held at such times and places as may be prescribed by law. It shall be held by one judge, who shall be elected by the voters of the county for the term of two years.’

The only change was to substitute ‘four’ for ‘two’ before the word ‘years.’ The answer to the question depends on the effect of the amendment. Relator contends that its operation must be postponed until 1923, and that probate judges elected in November, 1922, will be the first to hold office for four years. Respondent contends that probate judges elected in November, 1920, hold office for four years from the first Monday in January, 1921. In support of his contention counsel for the relator argues that when the electors cast their ballots at the November election in 1920 the term of office of probate judges was two years, and continued to be two years until December 1st, when the Governor's proclamation was issued. City of Duluth v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 60 Minn. 178, 62 N. W. 267;State v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 128 Minn. 314, 150 N. W. 917. With this as a point of departure, the argument proceeds thus: If it be held that the amendment extended the term of office of probate judges elected before it took effect, it will operate retrospectively, contrary to the well-settled rule that a constitution, like a statute, should be construed to operate prospectively only, unless on its face the contrary intention is clearly manifested, or such construction is absolutely necessary to give meaning to the language used. Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U. S. 36, 9 Sup. Ct. 210, 32 L. Ed. 589;Brown v. Hughes, 89 Minn. 150, 94 N. W. 438;State v. Probate Court, 142 Minn. 283, 171 N. W. 928. The application of this principle to cases involving the term of office of public officials is illustrated by citation of a number of cases, those chiefly relied on being State v. Dirckx, 211 Mo. 568, 111 S. W. 1,People v. Foley, 148 N. Y. 677, 43 N. E. 171, and People v. Palmer, 21 App. Div. 101,47 N. Y. Supp. 403. The value of these cases as authority for relator is impaired by reason of the fact that in the first case the amendment contained an express provision, indicating that it was not to become operative before a date in the future, and in each of the other two cases it appeared that a statute would be unconstitutional if construed to enlarge the term of persons already elected to fill the office. The other decisions cited merely exemplify the rule that in election cases, as in others, a retrospective operation will not ordinarily be given to a statute.

Counsel for respondent insist that the real question is: What did the Legislature intend by the proposed amendment and what did the electors understand it to mean when they voted on it? Usually when a court sets out to ascertain how a constitutional amendment was understood by the electorate, it has no reliable guide. Probably the question now raised occurred to few. The ordinary voter casts his ballot for the man he wishes to have elected, uninfluenced by any consideration of the length of his term of office. In the present instance, if he thought about it at all, he might properly conclude that, if the amendment was adopted, the candidate elected would take office for a term of four years. There was nothing in the language to suggest that the operation of the amendment was to be postponed for two years. After December 1, 1920, the original provision of the Constitution was no longer in effect. It is difficult to presume that it was the intention that the duration of a term of office which began after December 1st should be fixed by a provision which had been superseded by the amendment. The object of the amendment was to make the term of office of probate judges conform to that of other county officers as fixed by chapter 168, Laws of 1915 (Gen. St. Supp. 1917, §§ 810-1 to 810-3). Such officers will be elected in 1922 and probate judges in 1924, if respondent's construction is adopted, but we do not regard that circumstance of much importance since there must be general elections every two years anyway.

There are certain familiar rules for the construction of constitutional provisions which are more or less pertinent here. They are substantially the same as the rules applicable to the construction of statutes. State v. Twin City Tel Co., 104 Minn. 270, 116 N. W. 835. Chief among them is the one which requires a construction which will give effect to the intent of the people as expressed in the language of the amendment they adopt. Davis v. Hugo, 81 Minn. 220, 83 N. W. 984. If the language is unambiguous, it must be taken as it reads-there is no room for construction. State v. Sutton, 63 Minn. 147, 65 N. W. 262,30 L. R. A. 630, 56 Am. St. Rep. 459. The constitution must be read as a whole so as to harmonize its various parts. State v. Stearns, 72 Minn. 200, 75 N. W. 210, and the maxim, noscitur a sociis, is applicable. Dike v. State, 38 Minn. 366, 38 N. W. 95. The evils the amendment was designed to remedy and its legislative history may be considered. State v. O'Connor, 81 Minn. 79, 83 N. W. 498;State v. Brown, 97 Minn. 402, 106 N. W. 477,5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327.

[3] Article 6 should be read as a whole to get at the meaning of any one of its sections. Sections 3, 4, and 8 relate respectively to judges of the Supreme Court, district judges, and justices of the peace. After defining the body of electors by whom these judicial officers are chosen, the term of office is fixed at six years in the first two instances, and two years in the last. Section 7, relating to probate courts, directs that the judges ‘shall be elected by the voters of the county for the term of two years,’ instead of declaring that their term of office shall be two years. If an amendment to section 4, extending the term of office of district judges to eight years, had been submitted and approved and a judge elected at the same general election, a question would arise similar to that presented here....