State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma

Decision Date02 July 1985
Docket NumberNos. 60074,SENECA-CAYUGA,60075,s. 60074
Citation1985 OK 54,711 P.2d 77
PartiesSTATE of Oklahoma, ex rel. Thomas H. MAY, District Attorney of Ottawa County, Oklahoma, Appellant, v.TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA, James Allen, Chief and Business Manager, Appellees. STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel. Thomas H. MAY, District Attorney of Ottawa County, Oklahoma, Appellant, v. QUAPAW TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA, Walter King, Business Manager, and Sonny Glass, Operations Manager, Appellees.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Thomas H. May, Dist. Atty., Miami, for appellant.

Ben Loring, Hall, Loring & Smith, Miami, for appellee--Seneca-Cayuga Tribe.

John H. Charloe, Ethel C. Krepps, Tulsa, Nancy M. Tuthill, Albuquerque, for appellee--Quapaw Tribe.

J. Lawrence Blankenship, Duane N. Rasmussen, Oklahoma Tax Com'n., Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae.

OPALA, Justice.

Four issues are presented on appeal: (1) Are the lands on which the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe and the Quapaw Tribe conduct bingo games "Indian Country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151? (2)1 If so, is the State's suit barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity? (3) If not barred by tribal immunity, will the provisions of PL 83-280 2 prevent an exercise of state jurisdiction because its assumption would constitute per se an infringement upon tribal self-government? and, if not, (4) How far may the State extend its regulation of bingo games conducted in "Indian Country"?

We hold that: (a) the lands in question are "Indian Country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c); (b) the State's injunction suit is not barred by tribal sovereign immunity since that doctrine has largely been displaced by the principles of federal preemption and infringement on tribal self-government; (c) PL 83-280 is not an absolute bar to state jurisdiction; and (d) whether the State may regulate the playing of bingo in Indian Country presents a mixed issue of law and fact which must be resolved after an evidentiary hearing in the trial court.

In separate actions the State of Oklahoma [State] sought to enjoin the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe and the Quapaw Tribe [hereinafter Quapaw, Seneca-Cayuga or Tribes] from conducting unlicensed bingo playing on certain lands held in trust by the United States government for the Tribes. 3 The The State brought separate appeals that were consolidated for disposition by a single opinion.

                State alleged that (a) the Tribes did not meet the requirements of a non-profit organization, 4 (b) were operating without a license, 5 (c) were operating on Sundays 6 and (d) offered prizes in excess of the limit authorized by state law. 7  Restraining orders were issued against both Tribes.  The Seneca-Cayuga Tribe demurred to the State's petition and the Quapaw Tribe moved to dismiss the suit, both claiming tribal sovereign immunity and exclusive jurisdiction in the United States government.  The Seneca-Cayuga also requested from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma a temporary restraining order against the sheriff and district attorney.  The State's injunction suits initially culminated in the trial court's dissolution of the restraining orders against both Tribes.  At the conclusion of the second hearing the trial court resolved the controversy in favor of the Tribes.  The same ruling was made in both causes:  (1) the tracts of land were owned by the United States of America in trust for the Tribes;  (2) the Tribes were recognized as such by the United States government;  (3) the lands involved were "Indian Country" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151;  (4) the State had not taken proper steps to acquire civil or criminal jurisdiction over "Indian Country";  and (5) the trial court had no jurisdiction over the lands involved
                
I

"INDIAN COUNTRY"

Both the Quapaw and Seneca-Cayuga claim federal recognition of their tribal status 8 and assert that the lands on which bingo is conducted are tribal trust allotments qualifying as "Indian Country". 9 The Tribes also claim that these lands were formerly accorded reservation status by the United States of America under supervision

of the Quapaw Indian Agency, 10 and that such status was never abolished or diminished by Congress or by judicial interpretation. 11

A. Federal Recognition of Tribal Status

We hold that both the Quapaw and Seneca-Cayuga are federally recognized tribes. Congressional authority to regulate commerce with Indian tribes has its origin in the United States Constitution. 12 The Quapaw and Seneca-Cayuga Tribes are acknowledged by federal statutes 13 and are listed in the Federal Register. 14 Federal recognition may also be inferred by the Department of Interior's approval of tribal enactments or deference to Indian consent. 15

Both the Seneca-Cayuga and Quapaw distinguish their history from that of the Five Civilized Tribes, claiming that the termination of their tribal status was not scheduled to occur with the disestablishment

                and assimilation of the Five Civilized Tribes. 16  We recognize that the history of the Quapaw and the Seneca-Cayuga diverges from that of the Five Civilized Tribes, with federally-acknowledged status of the Quapaw and Seneca-Cayuga continuing in force.  To the extent that extant Oklahoma case law may be construed to reach a contrary conclusion, it is hereby disapproved and withdrawn. 17
                
B. Trust Allotments as "Indian Country"

Underlying the trial court's refusal to assume state jurisdiction is the premise that the lands in question are "Indian Country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151. The definition of "Indian Country" is relevant to questions of both criminal and civil jurisdiction. 18 Although the trial court did not explain the basis for its ruling that the tracts in question are "Indian Country", the Tribes argue that the trial court's ruling should be upheld on the basis that the land qualifies either as an allotment or as a reservation, or both. We are persuaded that the land claimed by both Tribes is "Indian Country" within the meaning of an Indian Allotment under section (c) of the statute.

Indian allotments were originally lands owned by individual Indians held in trust by the United States or subject to statutory restrictions on alienation. 19 The test for "Indian Country" is whether the land was "validly set apart for the use of the Indians, as such, under the superintendence of the government", or whether the land was "excepted from the portion reserved to the public domain" at the time of allotment. 20 A trust allotment is "Indian Country" 21 and remains so irrespective of reservation boundaries. 22 An allotment restricted against alienation is "Indian Country". 23 So is a portion of an original Indian allotment now held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of a tribe. 24

Although there has been some confusion regarding the allotment status of certain tribes in Indian Territory, including the Seneca and Quapaw, we entertain no doubt that the General Allotment Act applied to both tribes. 25 As tribal allotments, the lands in question--belonging to the Quapaw and Seneca-Cayuga--are "Indian Country" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c).

Hence we do not reach the issue whether the Quapaw and the Seneca-Cayuga lands are a "reservation" within the meaning of the statute. 26

II TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Although the Tribes urged as a defense the tribal sovereignty doctrine as a bar to the State's suit, the trial court did not address this question. Because an understanding of the concept of tribal immunity is essential to solving the present jurisdictional puzzle, we now turn to a brief analysis of the subject in light of its historical antecedents and modern-day usage.

A. Development of Immunity Doctrine

The doctrine of tribal immunity 27 had its beginnings with Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, who, in 1823, originated a theory similar to a landlord-tenant relationship for the interaction of the federal government with the Indian Tribes. 28 This analysis, expressed in terms of a wardship or dependent status, 29 prevented state encroachment on tribal activities within territorial confines, because Indian territory was considered a separate entity from the surrounding state. 30 Although Indian reservations did not technically acquire sovereign status equal to that of foreign powers, the government did come to view the tribes as sovereign nations. 31

B. Infringement upon Self-Government and Federal Preemption

Through time and with the checkerboard development of Indian with non-Indian fee ownership, this strict territorial approach later proved awkward to apply. 32 Although some adherence to the immunity doctrine continues, 33 the strict territorial approach applied earlier has largely given way to two other tests developed by the United States Supreme Court since 1959 for assessment of Indian Country's amenability to state law: 34 infringement upon tribal self-government and preemption by federal action.

The infringement test allows state jurisdiction in cases not involving tribal self-government. 35 Preemption analysis recognizes inherent Indian sovereignty as "a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read", 36 but focuses on whether the state has been granted jurisdiction by the federal government. 37 Because of the many interests at stake, and because the traditional concept of tribal sovereignty could invalidate legitimate state authority, state regulatory interests must also be considered. 38

III

AUTHORITY OF STATES IN INDIAN COUNTRY:

PUBLIC LAW 83-280

A. Public Law 83-280

Generally speaking, states have authority over non-Indians in Indian Country unless there is a conflict with federal law. 39 States may also exercise authority over Indians and their activities outside Indian Country, but within Indian Country, state jurisdiction is limited under the two tests. 40 In some instances, Congress has specifically allowed the application of state...

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